Nebraska § 60-1429 Franchise; termination; noncontinuation; change community; additional dealership; acts
not constituting good cause

Nebraska Statutes

§ 60-1429 — Franchise; termination; noncontinuation; change community; additional dealership; acts not constituting good cause

Nebraska § 60-1429

Ch. 60Motor Vehicles

This text of Nebraska § 60-1429 (Franchise; termination; noncontinuation; change community; additional dealership; acts not constituting good cause) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-1429 (2026).

Text

Notwithstanding the terms, provisions, or conditions of any agreement or franchise, the following shall not constitute good cause, as used in sections 60-1420 and 60-1422 , for the termination or noncontinuation of a franchise, for changing the franchisee's community, or for entering into a franchise for the establishment of an additional dealership in a community for the same line-make:

(1)The sole fact that the franchisor desires further penetration of the market;

(2)The change of ownership of the franchisee's dealership or the change of executive management of the franchisee's dealership unless the franchisor, having the burden of proof, proves that such change of ownership or executive management will be substantially detrimental to the distribution of the franchisor's motor vehic

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Notwithstanding the
terms, provisions, or conditions of any agreement or franchise, the following
shall not constitute good cause, as used in sections 60-1420 and 60-1422 ,
for the termination or noncontinuation of a franchise, for changing the franchisee's community, or
for entering into a franchise for the establishment of an additional dealership
in a community for the same line-make:
(1) The sole fact that the franchisor desires further penetration
of the market;
(2) The change of ownership of the franchisee's dealership
or the change of executive management of the franchisee's dealership unless
the franchisor, having the burden of proof, proves that such change of ownership
or executive management will be substantially detrimental to the distribution
of the franchisor's motor vehicles, combination motor vehicles and trailers,
motorcycles, or trailer products or to competition in the community. Substantially
detrimental may include, but is not limited to, the failure of any proposed
transferee or individual to meet the current criteria generally applied by
the franchisor in qualifying new motor vehicle dealers; or
(3) The fact that the franchisee refused to purchase or accept
delivery of any motor vehicle, combination motor vehicle and trailer, motorcycle,
trailer, vehicle parts or accessories, or other commodity or service not ordered
by the franchisee.

Legislative History

Source: Laws 1971, LB 768, § 29; Laws 1984, LB 825, § 32; Laws 1989, LB 280, § 6; Laws 2011, LB477, § 6. Annotations: Change of ownership of a franchisee's dealership is not good cause for termination of the franchise unless the franchisor proves that the change of ownership will be substantially detrimental to the distribution of franchisor's motor vehicles in the community. S & T Motors v. General Motors Corp., 203 Neb. 188, 277 N.W.2d 701 (1979). The term "motor vehicle" as used in this section refers to the motor vehicle covered by the franchise and does not refer to all of the motor vehicles which a franchisor may distribute through various divisions and separate franchises. S & T Motors v. General Motors Corp., 203 Neb. 188, 277 N.W.2d 701 (1979). When the franchisee transfers its ownership, the franchisor need not recognize the transfer until after the board has had a chance to act on the issue of whether the transfer is detrimental to the distribution of franchisor's vehicles in the community. Kizzier Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 705 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1983).