Zyla v . SSA 08-CV-086-SM 04/06/09 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Nicholas R. Zyla, Claimant
v. Civil N o . 08-cv-86-SM Opinion N o . 2009 DNH 052 Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Respondent
O R D E R
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), claimant, Nicholas R. Zyla,
moves to reverse the Commissioner’s decision denying his
application for Social Security disability insurance benefits
under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423, and
asks the court to remand the case. The Commissioner, in turn,
moves for an order affirming his decision. For the reasons given
below, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
Standard of Review
The applicable standard of review in this case provides, in
pertinent part:
The [district] court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, the court “must uphold a denial of
social security disability benefits unless ‘the [Commissioner]
has committed a legal or factual error in evaluating a particular
claim.’” Manso-Pizarro v . Sec’y of HHS, 76 F.3d 1 5 , 16 (1st Cir.
1996) (quoting Sullivan v . Hudson, 490 U.S. 8 7 7 , 885 (1989)).
As for the statutory requirement that the Commissioner’s
findings of fact be supported by substantial evidence, “[t]he
substantial evidence test applies not only to findings of basic
evidentiary facts, but also to inferences and conclusions drawn
from such facts.” Alexandrou v . Sullivan, 764 F. Supp. 916, 917-
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Levine v . Gardner, 360 F.2d 7 2 7 , 730
(2d Cir. 1966)). In turn, “[s]ubstantial evidence is ‘more than
[a] mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Currier v . Sec’y of HEW, 612 F.2d 5 9 4 , 597 (1st
Cir. 1980) (quoting Richardson v . Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971)). Finally, when determining whether a decision of the
Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence, the court must
“review[] the evidence in the record as a whole.” Irlanda Ortiz
2 v . Sec’y of HHS, 955 F.2d 765, 769 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting
Rodriguez v . Sec’y of HHS, 647 F.2d 2 1 8 , 222 (1st Cir. 1981)). 1
Background
The parties have submitted a Joint Statement of Material
Facts (document n o . 1 7 ) . That statement is part of the court’s
record, and will be summarized, rather than repeated in full.
Based on an application filed on April 1 8 , 2003, which is
not at issue, Zyla was awarded disability insurance benefits for
a closed period of disability beginning on August 2 , 2002, and
ending on October 3 1 , 2003, when he returned to work. Claimant
worked until at least April 1 , 2004 (Administrative Transcript
(“Tr.”) at 8 7 ) , but the parties agree that he had ceased engaging
in substantial gainful activity by January 1 of that year, the
claimed onset date for the alleged disability in this case (Jt.
Statement of Material Facts (“Jt. Statement”) at 2 ) . 2 From
1 “It is the responsibility of the [Commissioner] to determine issues of credibility and to draw inferences from the record evidence. Indeed, the resolution of conflicts in the evidence is for the [Commissioner], not the courts.” Irlanda Ortiz, 955 F.2d at 769 (citations omitted). Moreover, the court “must uphold the [Commissioner’s] conclusion, even if the record arguably could justify a different conclusion, so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Tsarelka v . Sec’y of HHS, 842 F.2d 529, 535 (1st Cir. 1988). 2 Zyla worked as a subcontractor/taxicab driver from January through March, 2004, but the Administrative Law Judge who ruled on Zyla’s 2003 application found that work not to qualify as
3 August, 2006, through November 2 9 , 2006, the date of his hearing
before the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Zyla worked as a
project manager for an HVAC company. (Tr. at 232.) The record
is unclear as to whether Zyla engaged in substantial gainful
activity between the end date of his claimed period of disability
(April 1 3 , 2006) and August, 2006, when he began his HVAC work.
On January 1 7 , 2005, more than twelve months after Zyla’s
claimed onset date, he saw D r . Michael Cooney of the Palm Beach
Orthopaedic Institute, complaining of right shoulder pain, right
knee pain, neck pain, and left arm weakness. Based upon a
physical examination and x-rays of Zyla’s shoulder, neck, and
knees, D r . Cooney assessed Zyla as having a right rotator-cuff
tear; bilateral knee osteoarthritis, status-post anterior
cruciate ligament reconstruction; and a significant post-surgical
radicular problem from a laminectomy at C5-6 and C6-7.
Subsequent MRIs disclosed multilevel degenerative changes to the
cervical spine, posterior disc bulges at several levels, a right-
of-midline disc herniation at the C4-5 level, marked thinning of
the rotator cuff with a full-thickness tear and degenerative
changes in the acromioclavicular joint without clear impingement
on the subjacent rotator cuff. After a second examination,
substantial gainful activity. (See T r . at 22.) There is also some suggestion that “in April 2004, the claimant became an independent contractor after leasing a car.” (Tr. at 21.)
4 conducted ten days after the first one, D r . Cooney opined that
Zyla had a complex myriad of orthopaedic problems causing a
significant amount of chronic pain. More specifically, he
diagnosed Zyla as having a right rotator-cuff tear with
retraction, right C5 cervical radiculopathy secondary to a
herniated nucleus pulposus at C4-5, a fairly complete left C7
nerve injury status-post surgical decompression and cervical
laminectomy, and right knee osteoarthritis status-post anterior
cruciate ligament reconstruction with residual laxity.
Based upon his examinations, D r . Cooney wrote that Zyla was
not healthy enough to undertake any kind of employment, as he
was, in Cooney’s view, completely disabled. D r . Cooney
prescribed Percocet and also recommended that Zyla: (1) pursue a
disability claim with the federal government; (2) make
arrangements to be evaluated for chronic pain management; and (3)
return for a follow-up appointment. There is no evidence in the
record that Zyla arranged for a pain-management evaluation or
returned for a follow-up appointment with D r . Cooney.
On April 2 5 , 2005, Zyla filed the application for benefits
that gives rise to this case. On June 2 9 , Zyla was given an
independent medical evaluation by D r . Alvin Barber, a
consultative physician. In addition, Physical Functional
5 Capacity Assessments, based solely on the records, were completed
on July 6 and December 1 2 .
Dr. Barber’s impression of Zyla was that he suffered from
chronic pain in both knees, chronic pain in the right rotator
cuff, and chronic pain with radiculopathy in the cervical spine.
He further reported that Zyla could be limited in walking and
standing for long periods of time due to decreased range of
motion in the upper extremities, lower extremities, and back
caused by pain and tight muscles; that he could be limited in
lifting and carrying heavy objects, crawling, squatting, and
kneeling; and that his symptoms could limit him in activities
that require the use of upper-body movements and coordinated
activities with hands.
According to the first non-examining state-agency physician,
Zyla could: lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten
pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for about six hours in an
eight-hour workday, and sit for about six hours in an eight-hour
workday. That physician also opined that claimant had occasional
postural limitations, but no other limitations.
According to the second non-examining state-agency
physician, Zyla could: lift and/or carry twenty pounds
6 occasionally and ten pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for
about six hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit for about six
hours in an eight-hour workday. That physician also opined that
claimant had limitations in his ability to push and/or pull with
his upper and lower extremities and had occasional postural
limitations, but no other limitations.
After conducting a hearing at which claimant was
represented, albeit by a non-attorney, the ALJ issued a decision
which included the following findings:
3 . The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative joint disease of the knees, status-post surgeries; right rotator cuff injury, status-post surgery; cervical spondylosis, status-post surgery; multi-level degenerative disc disease of the lower back; and chronic pain syndrome (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).
4 . The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).
5 . After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that from his alleged onset date of January 2004 the claimant has had the residual functional capacity to perform at least a full range of light work. Light work is defined as work which involves lifting up to 20 pounds at a time, frequently lifting or carrying of object[s] weighing up to 10 pounds, walking or standing of up to six hours in an eight-hour workday, or some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls (20 CFR 404.1567).
7 The claimant has the ability to lift and/or carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally and sit, stand and/or walk for approximately six hours in an eight-hour workday with normal breaks. The claimant has also had the ability to perform functions that involve limited pushing and/or pulling with upper and lower extremities and occasional reaching, climbing, balancing, and stooping. The claimant would need to avoid any activities that involve repetitive overhead reaching, particularly on the right, and/or any functions that involve crawling, squatting, and/or kneeling.
6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as limousine/taxicab driver. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).
7 . The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from January 1 , 2004, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).
(Tr. 22-27).
Discussion
Claimant argues that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed,
and the case remanded, because the ALJ: (1) adjudicated a period
of disability beyond the period he claimed at the hearing; (2)
failed to give adequate weight to his treating physician’s
opinion and failed to explain why he rejected i t ; (3) found that
he had a capacity for light work; (4) determined that his
capacity for light work qualified him to perform his past
relevant work as a limousine/taxi driver; and (5) failed to
8 consider his psychiatric impairments and their likely impact on
his ability to engage in any substantial gainful activity.
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a person
must: (1) be insured for such benefits; (2) not have reached
retirement age; (3) have filed an application; and (4) be under a
disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(A)-(D). The only question in
this case is whether claimant was under a disability during the
period for which he seeks benefits.
For the purpose of determining eligibility for disability
insurance benefits,
[t]he term “disability” means . . . inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
In order to determine whether a claimant is disabled for the
purpose of determining eligibility for disability insurance
benefits, an ALJ is required to employ a five-step process. See
20 U.S.C. §§ 404.1520.
The steps are: 1 ) if the [claimant] is engaged in substantial gainful work activity, the application is
9 denied; 2 ) if the [claimant] does not have, or has not had within the relevant time period, a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the application is denied; 3 ) if the impairment meets the conditions for one of the “listed” impairments in the Social Security regulations, then the application is granted; 4 ) if the [claimant’s] “residual functional capacity” is such that he or she can still perform past relevant work, then the application is denied; 5 ) if the [claimant], given his or her residual functional capacity, education, work experience, and age, is unable to do any other work, the application is granted.
Seavey v . Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1 , 5 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.920, which outlines the same five-step process as
the one prescribed in 20 C.F.R. § 1520).
The claimant bears the burden of proving that he is
disabled. See Bowen v . Yuckert, 482 U.S. 1 3 7 , 146 (1987). He
must do so by a preponderance of the evidence. See Mandziej v .
Chater, 944 F. Supp. 1 2 1 , 129 (D.N.H. 1996) (citing Paone v .
Schweiker, 530 F. Supp. 8 0 8 , 810-11) (D. Mass. 1982)). Finally,
In assessing a disability claim, the [Commissioner] considers objective and subjective factors, including: (1) objective medical facts; (2) plaintiff’s subjective claims of pain and disability as supported by the testimony of the plaintiff or other witness; and (3) the plaintiff’s educational background, age, and work experience.
Mandziej, 944 F. Supp. at 129 (citing Avery v . Sec’y of HHS, 797
F.2d 1 9 , 23 (1st Cir. 1986); Goodermote v . Sec’y of HHS, 690 F.2d
5 , 6 (1st Cir. 1982)).
10 A. The Period of Disability
Claimant objects, in part, to the ALJ’s determination that
he was not under a disability from January 1 , 2004, through April
1 1 , 2007. According to claimant, he sought benefits for a closed
period of disability ending on March 1 3 , 2006, and thus, never
litigated the question of his disability at any time after that
date. In claimant’s view, the ALJ’s decision should be vacated
to the extent it includes findings pertaining to the period from
March 1 4 , 2006, through April 1 1 , 2007. The Commissioner
counters that there is no need to vacate the ALJ’s finding that
claimant was not disabled during that period because he returned
to full-time work on March 1 4 , 2006.
This issue is somewhat puzzling. Presumably, claimant seeks
to avoid some future application of res judicata. On the other
hand, if he did, indeed, work full time from March 1 4 , 2006,
through April 1 1 , 2007, it is difficult to see how he could get
past step one of the five-step process. See Seavey, 276 F.3d at
5 (“if the [claimant] is engaged in substantial gainful work
activity, the application is denied”). But, then again, it is
difficult to see why the Commissioner is opposed to vacating that
portion of the ALJ’s finding pertaining to the disputed period.
And, the issue is further complicated by ambiguity in the record
concerning claimant’s activity during that period. While the
11 Commissioner asserts that claimant “was working full-time after
March 1 3 , 2006” (Comm’r’s Mem. of Law, at 4 ) , and the ALJ
referred to a “return to work activity beginning March 1 4 , 2006”
(Tr. at 2 2 ) , the hearing transcript indicates that claimant began
his job as an HVAC project manager in August, 2006, and that he
was doing something else up through July, 2006. What, exactly,
he was doing, is unclear, and given the history, in this case, of
“work activity [that] did not constitute substantial gainful
activity” (Tr. at 2 2 ) , there is no basis for concluding that
claimant’s work activity between March 14 and the end of July,
2006, would necessarily preclude a determination that he was
disabled during that period. All things considered, the best
course is to vacate the ALJ’s decision in part, limiting his
factual finding concerning claimant’s disability to the closed
period of disability that was actually claimed and litigated.
B. Consideration of the Treating Physician’s Opinion
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred by failing to give
adequate weight to his treating physician’s medical opinion, by
failing to explain his rejection of that opinion, and by citing
the lack of medical treatment as the reason for his reliance upon
the reports of a state-agency medical consultant.3 The
3 Claimant mischaracterizes the ALJ’s decision. The ALJ did not “cite[ ] the lack of medical treatment as the catalyst for . . . relying heavily on the State agency medical consultant.”
12 Commissioner counters that: (1) D r . Cooney does not qualify as a
treating physician; (2) the ALJ did consider D r . Cooney’s medical
opinions; (3) D r . Cooney’s opinion that claimant was unable to
work is not a medical opinion but, rather, an opinion on an issue
reserved to the Commissioner; and (4) the ALJ was entitled to
consider claimant’s lack of treatment as evidence that his
symptoms were not as severe as he alleged.
Claimant’s principal argument is that the ALJ failed to
properly consider the following statement by D r . Cooney: “I
don’t think [claimant] is confident enough or healthy enough to
undergo any type of employment at this point.” (Tr. at 164.)
Dr. Cooney also stated: “I believe him to be 100% disabled.”
(Id.)
(Cl.’s Mem. of Law, at 4.) Rather, the ALJ identified “the absence of regular treating physician records or reports” (Tr. at 2 6 ) , as the reason for having claimant evaluated by a consultative examiner. Regarding claimant’s lack of treatment, the ALJ considered that as a factor bearing on the credibility of claimant’s allegations of disabling pain. (Id.) Claimant further argues that the ALJ erred by failing to inquire into the reasons for his lack of medical treatment, averring that had the ALJ done s o , “he would have found that [claimant’s] lack of treatment was justifiable and would not have used the lack of treatment against him.” (Id.) Even now, however, claimant does not indicate what justification he would have given the ALJ, and does not indicate why his representative at the hearing was unable to inquire into that matter.
13 As a general rule, when considering medical opinions, an ALJ
should
give more weight to opinions from . . . treating sources, since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Medical opinions from treating
sources may even be given controlling weight. See id. Moreover,
an ALJ is obligated “always [to] give good reasons in [his] . . .
decision for the weight [he] gives [a claimant’s] treating
source’s opinion.” Id.
The term “medical opinions” refers to “statements from
physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources
that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [a
claimant’s] impairment(s), including [the claimant’s] symptoms,
diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite
impairment(s), and [the claimant’s] physical or mental
restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). But, the category of
“medical opinions” does not include a medical source’s statement
that a claimant is “disabled” or “unable to work.” See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(e)(1). Rather, such a statement addresses an issue
14 reserved to the Commissioner, and the ALJ need “not give any
special significance” to i t . See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(3).
Here, the statement by D r . Cooney on which claimant relies
is not a medical opinion; it is a statement about an issue
reserved to the Commissioner. Thus, the ALJ was not obligated to
give it any weight, or explain the reasons for giving it the
weight he did. See Arroyo v . Sec’y of HHS, 932 F.2d 8 2 , 89 (1st
Cir. 1991) (“The ALJ was not required to accept the conclusions
of claimant’s treating physicians on the ultimate issue of
disability.”) And, as the Commissioner correctly observes, the
ALJ did consider the medical opinions offered by D r . Cooney. Dr.
Cooney’s assessment of claimant’s physical condition is fully and
accurately described in the ALJ’s decision (see T r . at 2 3 ) , and
the ALJ’s findings concerning claimant’s impairments appear to be
consistent with D r . Cooney’s medical assessment (see id. at 22-
23).
In sum, the ALJ committed no error in his consideration of
Dr. Cooney’s medical opinions and other statements.
C. Capacity for Light Work
Claimant argues that the ALJ erroneously found that he had a
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work
15 because the ALJ: (1) disregarded D r . Cooney’s opinion that he was
totally disabled; (2) relied on D r . Barber’s report, which did
not give him a work capacity of any type; (3) relied on opinions
of non-examining physicians that are not supported by his
treatment records; and (4) failed to adequately develop the
record on the issue of his credibility. The Commissioner
counters that his RFC determination was supported by substantial
evidence, and that he properly considered claimant’s credibility.
As explained above, the ALJ committed no error in his
consideration of D r . Cooney’s statement that claimant was totally
disabled. Moreover, given the ALJ’s obligation to consider all
the evidence in the record when determining claimant’s RFC, see
20 C.F.R. 404.1545(a)(1), ( 3 ) , it is difficult to see how he
could be faulted for considering D r . Barber’s report in reaching
his conclusion on claimant’s RFC.4 Regarding the ALJ’s reliance
on the opinions of the non-examining physicians, claimant is
factually incorrect when he asserts that those physicians ignored
Dr. Cooney’s opinion; the July 6, 2005, RFC assessment expressly
mentioned claimant’s office visit with D r . Cooney. (See T r . at
183.)
4 Claimant offers no legal support for his argument that “[a]ny reliance on D r . Barber’s report for the proposition that Mr. Zyla had a light work capacity is erroneous and unfounded.” (Cl.’s Mem. of Law, at 5.)
16 Further, while claimant argues that the opinions presented
in the RFC assessments are not supported by his treatment
records, it is not at all clear that D r . Cooney’s notes qualify
as “treatment records,” given that D r . Cooney’s “treatment”
consisted of two physical examinations, performed ten days apart,
a set of x-rays, a set of MRIs, and a set of recommendations with
no documented follow-up. That i s , D r . Cooney’s “treatment
relationship” with claimant is more like an individual
examination than a relationship that could “provide a detailed,
longitudinal picture of [claimant’s] medical impairments” and
“bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot
be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from
reports of individual examinations . . .” 20 C.F.R. §1526(d)(2).
Moreover, claimant does not identify any aspect of D r . Cooney’s
“treatment records” that does not support the RFC determination
other than his statement about total disability. But, again,
that statement is entitled to no weight.
Claimant’s argument concerning the ALJ’s credibility
determination is also unavailing. According to claimant, the ALJ
failed to properly develop the record on his credibility.
Claimant is mistaken.
17 According to Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186 (S.S.A.), “an individual’s statement(s) about his or her
symptoms5 is not in itself enough to establish the existence of a
physical or mental impairment or that the individual is
disabled.” Id. at * 2 . When “symptoms, such as pain, fatigue,
shortness of breath, weakness, or nervousness,” id., are alleged,
SSR 96-7p prescribes a two-step evaluation process:
* First, the adjudicator must consider whether there is an underlying medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) – i.e., an impairment(s) that can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques – that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s pain or other symptoms. . . . If there is no medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s), or if there is a medically determinable physical or mental impairment(s) but the impairment(s) could not reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s pain or other symptoms, the symptoms cannot be found to affect the individual’s ability to do basic work activities. * Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment(s) that could reasonably be expected to produce the individual’s pain or other symptoms has been shown, the adjudicator must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit the individual’s ability to do basic work activities. For this purpose, whenever the individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical evidence, the adjudicator must make a finding on the credibility of the individual’s statements based on a consideration of the entire case record.
5 “A symptom is an individual’s own description of his or her physical or mental impairment(s).” SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at * 2 .
18 Id. In addition:
When additional information is needed to assess the credibility of the individual’s statements about symptoms and their effects, the adjudicator must make every reasonable effort to obtain available information that could shed light on the credibility of the individual’s statements. In recognition of the fact that an individual’s symptoms can sometimes suggest a greater level of severity of impairment than can be shown by the objective medical evidence alone, 20 CFR 404.1529(c) and 416.929(c) describe the kinds of evidence, including the factors below, that the adjudicator must consider in addition to the objective medical evidence when assessing the credibility of an individual’s statements:
1 . The individual’s daily activities;
2 . The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the individual’s pain or other symptoms;
3 . Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
4 . The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;
5 . Treatment, other than medication, the individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other symptoms;
6. Any measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to relieve pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and
7 . Any other factors concerning the individual’s functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
Id. at * 3 .
19 Here, it is evident from the ALJ’s decision that he followed
the two-step process set out in SSR 96-7p, and considered the
seven factors described therein. Claimant – who was represented
at the hearing – criticizes the ALJ for failing to pose questions
concerning the SSR 96-7p factors during the hearing. But the
decision demonstrates that the ALJ used claimant’s written
statements to make findings on many of those factors. Moreover,
claimant does not say what testimony he would have offered if the
ALJ had questioned him on the SSR 96-7p factors. See Born v .
Sec’y of HHS, 923 F.2d 1168, 1172 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting, in
decision affirming determination of non-disability over argument
that ALJ failed to properly develop the record, that “claimant .
. . failed to suggest what other information could have been
brought forth by further questioning of him which would have
enhanced a determination of disability”). Finally, while
claimant criticizes the ALJ for conducting a hearing that lasted
only eleven minutes, the ALJ concluded the hearing by asking
claimant whether he had anything else to add to the record, and
his representative responded: “Nothing else, Your Honor.” In
other words, claimant himself, through his representative, had
the opportunity to provide the ALJ with the (unidentified)
information he claims the ALJ failed to elicit, but he did not do
so. Accordingly, claimant’s argument that the ALJ failed to
properly develop the record is not persuasive.
20 Because the ALJ’s finding that claimant had the residual
functional capacity to perform light work is supported by
substantial evidence, in the form of the two RFC assessments, it
must stand as conclusive. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
D. Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work
Claimant argues that once the ALJ found him capable of
performing light work, the ALJ erred by finding that he had the
residual functional capacity to perform his past relevant work as
a limousine driver because that job is classified as medium
exertional job in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. He also
contends that the ALJ failed to follow the mandate of SSR 82-62
and fully develop the record concerning the physical and mental
demands of his past work as a limousine driver. According to
claimant: “If the ALJ had addressed these issues he would have
noted that the past relevant work requires medium exertion as
stated in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Had the ALJ
noted that M r . Zyla’s past relevant work is classified as medium
exertion the ALJ would have found M r . Zyla disabled.”6 (Cl.’s
Mem. of Law, at 8.) The Commissioner counters that claimant
failed to carry his burden of showing how his functional
6 If the ALJ had found claimant unable to perform his past relevant work, he would not have found claimant disabled; he would have gone on to determine whether claimant was able to do any other work. See Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5 .
21 limitations rendered him incapable of performing his past
relevant work, because his own description of limousine driving,
as he performed i t , demonstrates his ability to perform that job.
At step four of the five-step process, claimant had the
burden of showing that he was unable to do his past relevant
work. See Seavey, 276 F.3d at 5 . Moreover, “[t]he claimant is
the primary source for vocational documentation, and statements
by the claimant regarding past work are generally sufficient for
determining the skill level, exertional demands, and non-
exertional demands of such work.” Santiago v . Sec’y of HHS, 944
F.2d 1 , 5 (1st Cir. 1991). Here, the record before the ALJ
included information from claimant himself indicating that when
he worked as a limousine driver, the heaviest weight he lifted
was less than ten pounds, and the amount he frequently lifted was
less than ten pounds. (Tr. at 88.) He also indicated that he
did no walking, standing, climbing, stooping, kneeling,
crouching, crawling, handling of big objects, reaching or
writing. (Id.) While the DOT classifies limousine driving as
medium work, the ALJ had better evidence before him, see
Santiago, 944 F.2d at 5 , claimant’s own characterization of
limousine driving, as he performed that job. Given the ALJ’s
properly supported finding that claimant was capable of light
work, and claimant’s own characterization of limousine driving as
22 light work, there was substantial evidence before the ALJ that
claimant was capable of performing his former job as he actually
performed i t , and thus, was not disabled. See Santiago, 944 F.2d
at 5 . Because the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial
evidence, it must stand as conclusive. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
E. Consideration of Claimant’s Psychiatric Conditions
Finally, claimant argues that the ALJ ignored his long
history of treatment for depression, and failed to properly
evaluate the limitations imposed on his ability to work by his
psychiatric condition. The Commissioner counters that the ALJ
properly considered claimant’s mental impairment and found it not
to be severe.
Zyla received mental-health treatment from the Mental Health
Center of Greater Manchester from April 1 , 2003, through January
2 , 2004, the day after the onset date of the period of disability
he now claims. He was treated for major depressive disorder,
single episode, moderate; opioid abuse; and alcohol dependence in
sustained partial remission. On January 2 , Zyla’s mental-health-
care provider noted: “Nick states he is doing fairly well –
feels that stopping all psychotropics has been [positive] – feels
more energy, return of sex drive. He is working many hours/week
for Limo Co – airport service.” (Tr. at 100.) The provider
23 further noted: “He desires to resume counseling, about monthly,
he states. Does not wish to resume medications.”7 (Id.) The
record includes no evidence of any mental-health treatment after
January 2 , 2004.
On July 1 , 2005, Zyla received a “general clinical
evaluation with mental status” from D r . Malcolm J. Graham, I I I , a
clinical psychologist. Regarding Zyla’s functional ability, D r .
Graham reported: “During his evaluation, there were no problems
noted in his attention or concentration or in his recent or
remote memory. There are no behavior[al] indications of anxiety,
depression or thought disorder.” (Tr. at 180.) The record also
includes psychiatric review technique forms completed by non-
examining psychologists on July 1 9 , and November 9, 2005. With
regard to Zyla’s functional limitations, both psychologists
reported mild restrictions of activities of daily living, mild
difficulties in maintaining social functioning, mild difficulties
in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and no
episodes of decompensation of extended duration. (Tr. at 1 6 0 ,
200.)
7 Claimant also reported that “he [was] not taking any pain meds, either.” (Tr. at 100.)
24 Based upon the reports of D r . Graham and the two non-
examining psychologists, the ALJ found that “[t]he claimant’s
psychiatric impairment . . . does not significantly limit the
claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities and,
therefore, is considered not ‘severe.’” (Tr. at 24.) The ALJ’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence, and are based
upon a correct application of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1). While
the record contains considerable documentation of claimant’s
mental-health treatment in 2003, that information was not
relevant to the question before the ALJ, which was claimant’s
functional capacity during his claimed period of disability,
which began one day after claimant’s last documented contact with
a mental-health-care provider. Accordingly, claimant’s
observation that the ALJ failed to consider any records of his
pre-onset mental-health treatment is not significant. The ALJ
did acknowledge claimant’s 2003 diagnosis and treatment in his
decision. (See T r . at 10.) To restate, the ALJ’s finding that
claimant’s psychiatric impairment did not significantly limit his
ability to perform basic work activities is supported by
substantial evidence, and must, therefore, stand as conclusive.
See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
25 Conclusion
For the reasons given, claimant’s motion to reverse and
remand (document no. 15) is denied, and the Commissioner’s motion
for an order affirming the ALJ’s decision (document no. 16) is
granted. The clerk of the court shall enter judgment in
accordance with this order and close the case.
SO ORDERED.
Steven J./McAuliffe Chief Judge
April 6, 2009
cc: Maureen R. Manning, Esq. Gretchen L. Witt, Esq.