Zulema Rosa, Individually and as Next Friend of Miguel Rosa, a Minor v. Richard D. Caldwell, M.D., Childress Regional Medical Center, D. Barfield, R.N. and Perry Foster, R.N./F.N.P.

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided June 30, 2004·No. 07-02-00346-CV·Published

Opinion

NO. 07-02-0346-CV


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS


FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


AT AMARILLO


PANEL A


JUNE 30, 2004



______________________________


ZULEMA ROSA, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NEXT FRIEND
OF MIGUEL ROSA, A MINOR, APPELLANT


V.


RICHARD D. CALDWELL, M.D., CHILDRESS REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, D. BARFIELD, R.N.
AND PERRY FOSTER, R.N./F.N.P., APPELLEES


_________________________________


FROM THE 100TH DISTRICT COURT OF CHILDRESS COUNTY;


NO. 8709; HONORABLE DAVID MCCOY, JUDGE


_______________________________


Before JOHNSON, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

OPINION

Appellant Zulema Rosa, individually and as next friend of Miguel Rosa, sued Dr. Richard Caldwell, the Childress Regional Medical Center and two nurses, D. Barfield and Perry Foster (collectively, "the health care providers"), alleging that Miguel suffered injuries as a result of their professional negligence. The trial court granted the health care providers' motions to dismiss for Rosa's failure to file an adequate expert report. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

According to Rosa's petition, Miguel was treated at the Childress Regional Medical Center by Caldwell, Barfield, and Foster. Rosa alleged that the treatment was negligent and proximately caused injuries to Miguel.

On January 4, 2001, Rosa filed suit against the health care providers. On March 30, 2001, she filed an expert report. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4590i, § 13.01 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act, occasionally referred to as "the Act"). (1) The expert report was prepared by Herman E. Schaffer, M.D. However, Schaffer's curriculum vitae ("c.v.") was not attached to the report, as required by section 13.01(d)(1), nor did the report address Schaffer's qualifications to render the opinions in the report.

In February 2002, the health care providers filed motions to dismiss alleging that Rosa's expert report was inadequate because, among other reasons, the report did not include the required c.v. of Schaffer. See section 13.01(d)(1) and (r)(6).

On March 12, 2002, Rosa filed a motion entitled "Motion for Extension of Time Pursuant to Texas Revised Civil Statute Ann., Art. 4590i, Section 13.01(f)." The body of the motion requested a 30-day extension of time to submit her expert's c.v. or to amend the expert report, specified that an extension was permitted under section 13.01(f), and stated that she had good cause for requesting the extension. Under the section entitled Basis for Motion, Rosa stated that article 4590i "contains provisions that permit the Court to grant an extension of 30 days to satisfy requirements" of the statute, then again referenced section 13.01(f) and quoted the language of that section. Finally, the motion claimed that it would not be within the ultimate purposes of the Act to dismiss her claims because the c.v. was honestly and mistakenly omitted from the expert report. On March 21, 2002, without holding a hearing, the trial court signed an order granting Rosa's motion.

Also on March 21st, Rosa filed responses to the motions to dismiss. The responses urged, in part, that omission of the c.v. was an honest mistake, referenced and quoted section 13.01(f), attached a copy of the motion for extension of time which she had previously filed, and requested that she be allowed to furnish a copy of the c.v. "within a thirty day extension as permitted by §13.01(f)." In the Conclusion sections of the responses, she mentioned that the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act contained two provisions which authorized extensions in cases where "honest mistakes" have been made: section 13.01(f) and (g).

On March 28th, Rosa filed an amended motion for extension of time. The amended motion did not seek an extension of time to amend the expert report, but sought only an extension to submit Schaffer's c.v. Otherwise, the amended motion was the same as the original motion.

The trial court held a hearing on the health care providers' motions to dismiss and Rosa's motion to extend time. The court vacated its March 21st order authorizing the 30-day extension to file the expert's c.v. on the basis that the motion was untimely filed and because no hearing was held prior to entry of the order. The court also found that Rosa had not timely filed a section 13.01(g) motion to extend time and dismissed her claims with prejudice.

On appeal, Rosa contends that: (1) the motion for extension of time filed on March 21st encompassed a request for relief pursuant to section 13.01(g) and comprised a timely filed section 13.01(g) motion; (2) the trial court erred in vacating its March 21st order and dismissing her claims after having granted the extension of time; (3) the dismissal of her claims was barred by the doctrine of laches; and (4) dismissal was contrary to the Legislature's intent in passing the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act.ISSUES ONE AND TWO: THE

MOTION TO EXTEND TIME



Rosa presents and argues issues one and two together. She maintains that her motion to extend was both a section 13.01(f) and a section 13.01(g) motion, was filed on March 21st before commencement of the hearing of March 28th, and that the trial court erred in ruling that she did not timely file a section 13.01(g) motion.

The granting or denial of a section 13.01(g) grace period is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard because denial of a grace period will result in dismissal of the case as a sanction pursuant to section 13.01(e). See Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex. 2003). The abuse of discretion standard applies when a trial court has discretion either to grant or deny relief based on its factual determinations. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex. 1998). The standard is especially appropriate when the trial court must weigh competing policy considerations and balance interests in determining whether to grant relief. See General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 526 (Tex. 1998). Thus, the abuse of discretion standard is typically applied to procedural or other trial management determinations. See In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000).

The test for abuse of discretion is whether the court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Zulema Rosa, Individually and as Next Friend of Miguel Rosa, a Minor v. Richard D. Caldwell, M.D., Childress Regional Medical Center, D. Barfield, R.N. and Perry Foster, R.N./F.N.P., (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).

Zulema Rosa, Individually and as Next Friend of Miguel Rosa, a Minor v. Richard D. Caldwell, M.D., Childress Regional Medical Center, D. Barfield, R.N. and Perry Foster, R.N./F.N.P. (Zulema Rosa, Individually and as Next Friend of Miguel Rosa, a Minor v. Richard D. Caldwell, M.D., Childress Regional Medical Center, D. Barfield, R.N. and Perry Foster, R.N./F.N.P.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Chisholm v. Maron
63 S.W.3d 903 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
General Tire, Inc. v. Kepple
970 S.W.2d 520 (Texas Supreme Court, 1998)
American Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palacios
46 S.W.3d 873 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Fredonia State Bank v. General American Life Insurance Co.
881 S.W.2d 279 (Texas Supreme Court, 1994)
In Re Canales
52 S.W.3d 698 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
In Re Doe
19 S.W.3d 249 (Texas Supreme Court, 2000)
Walker v. Gutierrez
111 S.W.3d 56 (Texas Supreme Court, 2003)
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.
39 S.W.3d 191 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
General Services Commission v. Little-Tex Insulation Co.
39 S.W.3d 591 (Texas Supreme Court, 2001)
Knie v. Piskun
23 S.W.3d 455 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Upjohn Co. v. Rylander
38 S.W.3d 600 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Joe Guerra Exxon Station v. Michelin Tyre Public Ltd.
32 S.W.3d 383 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2000)
Gonzalez v. El Paso Hospital District
68 S.W.3d 712 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 2001)
Broom v. MacMaster
992 S.W.2d 659 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1999)
Transport Insurance Co. v. Faircloth
898 S.W.2d 269 (Texas Supreme Court, 1995)
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc.
701 S.W.2d 238 (Texas Supreme Court, 1985)
Bocquet v. Herring
972 S.W.2d 19 (Texas Supreme Court, 1998)