UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MOHAMED MEDHI ZORGANI, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. 17-cv-2360-EGS-MAU
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs Mohamed Medhi Zorgani and his ex-wife Soukaina Laasiri sued the District of
Columbia for negligence, violation of D.C. municipal regulations, violation of Zorgani’s civil
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and loss of consortium. ECF No. 18. 1 The District Court dismissed
all of Plaintiffs’ claims except for Zorgani’s negligence claim against the District, Zorgani’s § 1983
policy-or-custom claim against the District, and Laasiri’s loss of consortium claim. See ECF Nos.
34, 35. The District Court referred this case to this Court for full case management and for a report
and recommendation on dispositive motions. See Min. Order (Nov. 21, 2023). Before the Court
are Plaintiffs’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on Zorgani’s negligence (Count I) and
§ 1983 (Count III) claim (ECF Nos. 72, 74-1) and for Class Certification (ECF No. 71), and the
District’s Motions for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims (ECF No. 76), as
well as its Motion to Stay briefing on Plaintiffs’ class certification motion (ECF No. 73).
For the following reasons, the Court recommends GRANTING the District’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and DENYING Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court
1 Citations are to the page number in the ECF header. 1 further recommends DENYING as MOOT the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and the
District’s Motion to Stay.
BACKGROUND
The facts material to the resolution of these motions are not genuinely disputed. On May
24, 2014, Zorgani received a traffic ticket, or “Notice of Infraction,” for failing to yield the right
of way. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶ 1; 81-1 at 1. The Notice of Infraction stated, “If your answer to a
moving violation is not received within 60 calendar days, your license may be suspended.” ECF
Nos. 72-4 at 59; 77-1 at 155. The Notice of Infraction also notified Zorgani that he had “60
calendar days from the ticket issue date to request a hearing” and that, by paying the fine, Zorgani
would be “admit[ting] to the infraction and waiv[ing] [his] right to a hearing.” ECF Nos. 72-4 at
59; 77-1 at 155. On June 30, 2014, the DMV mailed a “Notice of Suspension” to Zorgani’s home
address. ECF Nos. 81-1 at ¶ 11; 77-1 at 55. The notice stated that Zorgani’s “driver license or
privilege to drive in the District of Columbia will be suspended if [he] fail[s] to answer the notice
of infraction listed below within 60 calendar days of the date it was issued,” and that he would “be
subject to summary arrest if [he] operate[s] a motor vehicle in the District of Columbia with a
suspended driver license.” ECF No. 77-1 at 55 (emphasis added).
A month later, on July 30, 2014, Zorgani paid his ticket and associated late fee through the
DMV’s “eTIMS” system. ECF Nos. 72-4 at 14; 79-1 at ¶ 4; 81-1 at ¶¶ 18, 20. This was 67 days
after the infraction. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶ 6; 81-1 at ¶ 19. At the time, the DMV provided a ten-day
grace period before suspending a license for late payment, but because neither one of the notices
informed Zorgani of this, he would not have known about this grace period when he paid his ticket
beyond the 60-day period. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶ 3; 81-1 at ¶¶ 8, 10, 16. On August 21, 2014, the
DMV suspended Zorgani’s license for non-payment. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶ 10; 81-1 at ¶¶ 21, 50.
2 Because Zorgani’s payment fell within the grace period after he received the initial notice of
infraction, there is no dispute that the suspension was in error. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶ 35; 81-1 at
¶¶ 22–23. Both Parties agree that a communication error between eTIMS and the DMV’s other
computer system caused the erroneous suspension. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶ 7; 81-1 at ¶¶ 22–23.
In November 2014, a Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”) officer pulled Zorgani
over for making an illegal left turn. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶ 12; 81-1 at ¶ 48. After checking Zorgani’s
license, the officer arrested Zorgani for driving with a suspended license. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶¶ 13–
14, 16; 81-1 at ¶¶ 49–51. MPD detained Zorgani overnight and released him the next morning.
ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶¶ 17–18; 81-1 at ¶ 52. After he was released, Zorgani went to the DMV to
determine the status of his license. ECF Nos. 79-1 at ¶ 19; 81-1 at ¶ 53. A DMV official told
Zorgani his license suspension was an error. ECF Nos. 72-4 at 47; 79-1 at ¶ 20. The DMV Service
Center Manager provided Zorgani an Official Notice of Correction. ECF Nos. 72-4 at 47; 79-1 at
¶ 21; 81-1 at ¶ 54. That letter stated: “Your driving privilege is NOT disqualified, suspended, or
revoked. We apologize for the inconvenience resulting from this error.” ECF No. 72-4 at 47.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court must grant summary judgment when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact is one capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the
litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine”
if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-movant. See Scott
v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). The movant bears the initial burden of identifying the portions
of the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The mere existence of some factual dispute,
3 however, is insufficient on its own to bar summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247–48. The
dispute must also pertain to a “material” fact. Id. Accordingly, “[o]nly disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Id. at 248.
In reviewing the record, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. See, e.g., Stoe v.
Barr, 960 F.3d 627, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The non-movant, however, must point to specific facts
in the record that reflect a genuine issue warranting trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-movant “need
not present evidence in a form that is currently admissible,” but “must produce evidence capable
of being converted into admissible evidence.” Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 6 F.4th 1301, 1315
(D.C. Cir. 2021). Conclusory assertions offered without any evidentiary support do not establish
a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
ANALYSIS
I. Count I: Zorgani’s Negligence Claim
Both Parties move for summary judgment on Zorgani’s negligence claim. See ECF Nos.
74-1 at 15–22; 76 at 23–31. Plaintiffs argue that the District was negligent because it failed to
provide notice to Zorgani that his license was going to be suspended and failed to update the
automated license suspension systems to comply with alleged industry standards. ECF No. 74-1
at 15. The District principally argues that the public duty doctrine bars Zorgani’s negligence claim
because Zorgani has no special relationship with the District. See ECF No. 76 at 29–31.
To prove negligence, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) duty; (2) breach of that
duty; and (3) an injury proximately caused by that breach. Hoodbhoy v. District of Columbia, 282
4 A.3d 1092, 1096 (D.C. 2022). The Court first addresses whether there is a triable issue on the first
essential element of Count I: whether the District owed a duty to Zorgani sufficient to maintain a
claim for negligence.
A. The District Owed No Duty to Zorgani.
1. Zorgani has Failed to Overcome the Public Duty Doctrine on his Theory that the District Failed to Provide Sufficient Notice.
Zorgani first argues that the District negligently failed to provide him notice that his license
was going to be suspended. ECF No. 74-1 at 15. Because the District does not owe a general duty
to the public as a matter of law, a plaintiff seeking to hold the District liable for negligence must
plead and prove that “the District owed a special duty to the injured party, greater than or different
from any duty which it owed to the general public.” 2 Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d
1123, 1129 (D.C. 1992) (quoting Khlar v. District of Columbia, 576 A.2d 718, 719 (D.C. 1990)).
As such, the doctrine operates to shield the District from liability associated with providing public
services. Powell, 602 A.2d at 1125. The D.C. Court of Appeals construes this doctrine broadly to
limit the District’s liability. Id. at 1128.
A plaintiff can show a special relationship arises in at least two ways. See Woods v. District
of Columbia, 63 A.3d 551, 553–54 (D.C. 2013) (discussing the “somewhat varying formulations
to describe the circumstances in which such a special relationship will arise”). First, a plaintiff
may show direct or continuing contact with the government that leads to the plaintiff’s justifiable
reliance, which is often called the “Platt test.” See Powell, 602 A.2d at 1130 (citing Platt v. District
of Columbia, 467 A.2d 149, 151 (D.C. 1983)). Second, a plaintiff may point to a statute or
2 Courts use special relationship and special duty somewhat interchangeably. See Snowder v. District of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590, 603 (D.C. 2008) (“This ‘special duty’ is also referred to as a ‘special relationship.’”) (citation omitted). 5 regulation that prescribes “mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons
rather than the public as a whole.” See id. at 1129 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Courts construe this exception narrowly. See Woods, 63 A.3d at 554.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the District’s act arose from a public service, but fail to address
the public duty doctrine with any analytical rigor. See ECF No. 79 at 8–11. Construing Plaintiffs’
arguments generously, Plaintiffs raise two separate theories of how a special relationship formed
between Zorgani and the District: (1) through Zorgani’s contact with the DMV; and (2) by
regulation.
a. Plaintiffs Did Not Have Direct Contact with the DMV to Create a Special Relationship.
Plaintiffs argue that Zorgani had direct contact with the DMV sufficient to create a special
relationship as a matter of law. See ECF No. 79 at 8–11 (arguing “contact with the DMV was
direct, transactional, and consequential”; “Plaintiff had individualized contact with the DMV”;
“Mr. Zorgani interacted directly with the DMV”). They also argue Zorgani reasonably relied to
his detriment on “the District’s affirmative actions.” Id. at 12. The District contends that there is
no genuine dispute to suggest that Zorgani had a special relationship because he paid his fine late
and failed to take the affirmative action necessary to prevent suspension. ECF No. 82 at 20–21.
As stated above, a plaintiff may meet the “Platt test” to establish a special relationship by
showing direct or continuing contact with the government and justifiable reliance on the part of
the victim. See Platt, 467 A.2d at 151. This test covers cases where contact caused the victim to
rely on the District to fulfill a special duty to it. See generally Powell, 602 A.2d at 1130–31
(discussing how the Platt test shows when the District assumed a greater duty to the victim than
the duty it owed to the public at large). Direct or continuing contact “sets the victim apart from
the general public.” Id. at 1130 (citation modified). The contact must be a “direct transaction” or
6 an “arms-length relationship” in which the city’s agent is dealing directly with the plaintiff. See
id. Justifiable reliance means the plaintiff had “particular or special reliance.” Snowder v. District
of Columbia, 949 A.2d 590, 604 (D.C. 2008) (citation modified). Reliance exists only when the
District undertakes an affirmative act. See id.; Powell, 602 A.2d at 1131–32. Thus, the District
will not be liable for an official’s inaction or futile action. See Snowder, 949 A.2d at 604.
Zorgani fails to raise a genuine dispute that he had direct or continuing contact because his
only contact was the late payment of his ticket online. Although a fee payment may be evidence
of direct contact in certain cases, payment alone is insufficient to create a special relationship. See
Nealon v. District of Columbia, 669 A.2d 685, 692 (D.C. 1995) (holding that appellants’ payment
of water rates did not create a special relationship to render the District liable for negligence in
maintaining fire hydrants). Zorgani does not show that paying his ticket was a different form of
contact than the District has with the general public because everyone must pay their traffic tickets.
See Auto World, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 627 A.2d 11, 13–14 (D.C. 1993) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that the public duty doctrine is inapplicable merely because the District is
“function[ing] in a commercial capacity” and “charging a non-waivable fee”).
Zorgani also fails to establish a genuine dispute as to justifiable reliance. Plaintiffs argue
that Zorgani relied on the District’s “affirmative actions of releasing him from any further sanctions
after accepting his fine fee.” ECF No. 79 at 11. Failure to provide notice, however, is not an
affirmative action. See Snowder, 949 A.2d at 604. Nothing in the record suggests that the District
took any action after Zorgani paid his ticket. At most, the eTIMS system automatically accepted
Zorgani’s payment. ECF Nos. 72-4 at 14; 72-4 at 54 ¶¶ 154:17–155:2 (“If you paid online or
something you get confirmation if you’re payment was successful, that’s it. . . . [eTIMS] doesn’t
generate anything, thank you for your payment, here’s your receipt. It doesn’t do that.”).
7 Plaintiffs further rely on Powell to show justifiable reliance, but that case is distinguishable. See
ECF No. 79 at 10–11. In Powell, the public duty doctrine did not bar the District’s liability for
negligently issuing the wrong automobile license tags and registration numbers. See 602 A.2d at
1124–25. There, the plaintiff engaged in a direct transaction with the Bureau of Motor Vehicle
Services through her application and payment for registration. See id. at 1131. That transaction
“was an undertaking by the District to her individually that the number on her license tags and
registration belonged only to the car she owned.” Id. (citing D.C. Code § 40-102(c) (1990 Repl.)).
Here, although paying for registration and paying a ticket appear similar, the Powell court
was clear that payment alone does not give rise to a special relationship. Id. Second, the Powell
plaintiff relied on the District’s specific representation that her car would be correctly registered
and her registration number would be correctly entered into the system. Id. at 1132. Here, there
was no affirmative undertaking or constructive representation. Lastly, Powell involved a statute
governing car registration, which has a statutory element not present here. See id. at 1130 (“A
statute which affords an individual the opportunity to seek its protection by taking certain actions
may give rise to a special duty to that individual.”). Specifically, the District’s duty to issue a
correct license plate and registration arose from a direct transaction with the plaintiff. Id. at 1132
(“The statutory scheme for lawful operation of a motor vehicle placed certain responsibilities on
appellant which, upon their fulfillment, in return placed responsibilities on the District to her as
the owner of the registered vehicle.”). Here, Plaintiffs identify no similar obligation on the District
or statute that operates in combination with Zorgani’s payment to give rise to a special duty. At
most, D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(e) merely prescribes consequences for licensees. It does not,
however, impose reciprocal affirmative requirements on the District analogous to certifying that a
driver’s tag number belongs to one particular car.
8 b. Plaintiffs Fail to Cite Any Statute or Regulation Creating a Special Relationship.
Plaintiffs also attempt to show a special relationship by arguing that the District breached
§ 307.3 of the D.C. Municipal Regulations, which in Plaintiffs’ view provides a duty for the
District to provide notice and a hearing. ECF No. 79 at 8. Section 307.3 of the DCMR states:
Whenever the Director, acting under this chapter, proposes to revoke or suspend the license of any person for any reason which does not require a revocation, a notice of proposed suspension or revocation shall be prepared setting forth the proposed action and the grounds for the proposed action in sufficient detail to permit that person to understand fully the nature of the proposed action and the reasons for the proposed action.
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 307.3.
To establish a special relationship through a statute or regulation, the regulation must
provide “mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the
general public as a whole.” Nealon, 669 A.2d at 692 (citation modified). A special class does not
exist, however, when any person could be in that class at any time. See Hines v. District of
Columbia, 580 A.2d 133, 138 (D.C. 1990). For example, regulations governing ambulances do
not create a special class because virtually every citizen may need emergency services. Id. (finding
no class of “people who are seriously ill or injured and who receive emergency medical care and
transportation by the Emergency Ambulance Division”).
Plaintiffs’ reliance on municipal regulation § 307.3 is misplaced. Under that regulation,
“[w]henever the Director . . . proposes to revoke or suspend the license of any person for any
reason which does not require a revocation, a notice of proposed suspension or revocation shall be
prepared . . . .” See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 307.3 (2014) (emphasis added). Nothing in the
regulation’s language suggests that the regulation is protecting a particular class. Moreover, the
regulation applies to situations where the Director of the DMV is acting within her discretion to
9 suspend or revoke a license. See Osborne v. District of Columbia, 169 A.3d 876, 883 (D.C. 2017)
(discussing how § 307.3 relates to revocation under the DMV’s discretionary authority). Here,
Zorgani’s suspension was mandatory. See D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(e) (2014) (amended 2021).
2. Zorgani has Failed to Overcome the Public Duty Doctrine on his Theory that the District Negligently Failed to Update its License Suspension System.
Zorgani’s other theory of negligence is that the District failed to update the automated
license suspension systems to comply with alleged industry standards. ECF No. 74-1 at 15.
Zorgani fails to make any meaningful argument other than a cursory argument that the public duty
doctrine is inapplicable to this particular theory. ECF No. 79 at 8, 11 (“This claim is not a duty
owed to the public at large. Instead, this claim pertains to the District’s internal failure to adhere
to professional standards of care in designing a system it uses to take legal action against
individuals.”). Plaintiffs have failed to articulate how the DMV’s operation of its computer
systems is not a public service. Nor could they. The revocation and suspension of licenses is
plainly part of the service that the DMV undertakes for the public at large. See Hines, 580 A.2d at
136 (“Appellant would distinguish ambulance service from police and fire protection on the basis
that emergency medical attention is summoned for and focuses on a particular individual, whereas
the duty to prevent crime and protect against fires is owed to the public at large. We disagree.”).
For these reasons, Zorgani has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the essential
element that the District owed him an actionable duty. The failure on this essential element of
negligence is, on its own, sufficient to warrant summary judgment in the District’s favor.
B. There is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact that the District Breached Its Duty.
Even if the public duty doctrine did not shield the District, the District is still entitled to
summary judgment on Zorgani’s negligence claim because he fails to raise a genuine issue of
10 material fact that the District breached any duty to Plaintiffs. To prove breach, Plaintiffs must
establish the applicable standard of care and show that the District’s conduct deviated from that
standard. See Thurman v. District of Columbia, 282 A.3d 564, 572 (D.C. 2022). Plaintiffs may
establish the standard of care by looking at the practices that other governmental facilities generally
follow or some nationally-recognized standard. Id. at 573 (citation modified). Plaintiffs first argue
that the District was negligent per se because the DMV’s policy of not providing notice violates
§ 302 of the D.C. Municipal Regulations. ECF No. 74-1 at 16–17. The District argues that that
regulation does not create a legal duty. ECF No. 77 at 25. The District also maintains that § 307.3
is inapplicable. ECF Nos. 76 at 23; 77 at 26.
To prevail on a negligence per se theory, a plaintiff may “rely on a statute or regulation as
proof of the applicable standard of care.” McNeil Pharma. v. Hawkins, 686 A.2d 567, 578 (D.C.
1996). If a plaintiff proves the defendant violated that statute, the defendant may be negligent as
a matter of law. Id. But the statute or regulation must be meant to promote public safety and must
create specific guidelines to govern behavior. Night & Day Mgmt. v. Butler, 101 A.3d 1033, 1039–
40 (D.C. 2014). Moreover, the statute must protect a class that includes the plaintiff, and the
defendant must be the person on whom the statute imposes specific duties. Id.
Title 18, Chapter 3 of the D.C. Code of Municipal Regulations governs the cancellation,
suspension, or revocation of licenses. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, §§ 300–312 (2014) (amended
2022). The regulations require the Director of the DMV to send a notice to a motorist when the
Director intends to suspend or revoke the motorist’s license for any discretionary reason. See D.C.
Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 307.3 (2014); see also Osborne, 169 A.3d at 884 (interpreting regulations to
require notice). As discussed above, the regulations do not protect a specific class of individuals.
Nor do they impose any duties on the District. See Night & Day Mgmt., 101 A.3d at 1039–40.
11 Moreover, the notice regulation that Plaintiffs identify is inapplicable because the plain language
provides that when the Director of the DMV “proposes to revoke or suspend the license of any
person for any reason which does not require a revocation, a notice of proposed suspension or
revocation shall be prepared . . . .” D.C. Mun. Reg. tit. 18, § 307.3 (2014) (emphasis added). This
regulation does not apply to Zorgani because, again, D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(e) governs
suspension of licenses. Pls.’ SOF ¶ 4. The District complied with this provision when it included
a notice on the back of Zorgani’s ticket. See ECF No. 72-4 at 3, 59.
Plaintiffs also argue that the DMV breached a standard of care by failing to update its
automated computer system. ECF No. 74-1 at 18–22. Plaintiffs argue their expert testimony
establishes a national standard of care. Id. at 18–19. Further, in Plaintiffs’ view, the DMV breached
this standard by failing to properly update its automated systems. Id. at 20–21. The District argues
that Plaintiffs’ experts have failed to articulate any national standard of care. ECF No. 76 at 24.
In the alternative, the District maintains that there is no evidence that the DMV violated its standard
because of a one-time glitch. See id. at 26–27.
In cases where the issue relates to science beyond the ken of the average layperson, a
plaintiff must provide expert testimony. Thurman, 282 A.3d at 573. The expert must clearly
articulate and reference a standard of care. See Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 269
(D.C. 2006) (citation modified). The expert should identify a standard in “practices in fact
generally followed by other comparable governmental facilities or some nationally-recognized
standard.” Thurman, 282 A.3d at 573 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The expert
“must link his testimony to [a] certification process, current literature, conference or discussion
with other knowledgeable professionals, at a national level.” Cardenas v. Muangman, 998 A.2d
303, 308 (D.C. 2010) (citation modified). To establish that a standard sets a national norm, an
12 expert must show the norm has been accepted as controlling in similar facilities. See Briggs v.
WMATA, 481 F.3d 839, 847 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Plaintiffs rely on the report of two experts: Mitch Martin and Dmitri Adler. See ECF No.
76-1 at 118–22. The experts opine that the District failed to adhere to appropriate standards that
would have prevented the glitch. Id. The experts cite three organizations that set forth the
standards: (1) the International Organization for Standardization; (2) the International
Electrotechnical Commission; and (3) the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Id. at
119. The report is insufficient to establish a standard of care. The experts fail to clarify whether
the standard is applicable to other comparable governmental facilities or whether it is some
nationally-recognized standard. Specifically, Martin attributes the purported standard of care to
computer software systems worldwide, as opposed to systems associated with municipal or
government services. ECF No. 76-1 at 142. Further, Adler similarly states that these certain
standards provide “a common framework for a standard of care.” Id. at 130. A “common
framework” or a “blueprint,” he acknowledges, does not show acceptance of a norm in similar
facilities. Id. at 130–31. Plaintiffs’ failure to establish a standard of care is fatal to their negligence
claim. Briggs, 481 F.3d at 848 (holding that plaintiff’s failure to establish a standard of care
entitled defendants to summary judgment).
Most importantly, even assuming Plaintiffs establish a national standard of care, they fail
to satisfy the essential element that the District departed from or breached that standard of care.
As Martin himself acknowledged, “there’s no such thing as a glitch-free system.” ECF No. 76-1
at 143. Because there is no dispute that what happened here was a one-time glitch in the District’s
system, this does not suffice even under Martin’s view to raise a genuine issue that a breach
occurred. Nor does Zorgani present any other meaningful, direct evidence to raise a genuine issue
13 of a breach on the District’s part. ECF No. 76-1 at 143; see Varner, 891 A.2d at 269; Thurman,
282 A.3d at 573. For the additional, independent reason that Plaintiffs have failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact on the element of breach, the Court recommends granting the
District’s Motion and denying Plaintiffs’ Motion as to Count I.
II. Count II: Zorgani’s Violation of Statutes Claim
In Count II, Zorgani asserts a claim for violation of four provisions of Title 18 of the D.C.
Municipal Regulations, Vehicles, and Traffic. ECF No. 18 ¶¶ 42–46 (citing D.C. Mun. Regs. tit.
18, §§ 305, 307.3–307.4, 308.1 (2014) (amended 2016)). Based on Zorgani’s inconsistent
statements about this claim, there is confusion regarding whether it is a distinct claim for
negligence per se or merely a different theory of his negligence claim. Id. at 32.
Assuming the claim is still live, the District moves for summary judgment on Count II
under two alternative theories. First, the District contends that this claim did not survive the motion
to dismiss. ECF No. 76 at 32. In the alternative, the District argues that the claim fails as a matter
of law because the regulations do not support a negligence per se theory. Id. at 32–33.
Other than arguing that 18 DCMR § 307.3 creates a mandatory duty which the District
breached, Zorgani fails to squarely respond to the District’s arguments or establish a genuine issue
of material fact on a negligence per se theory (as discussed in further detail above). ECF No. 81
at 14. Specifically, Plaintiffs fail to explain under what theory they may bring a cause of action
for violation of these regulations. Nor has the Court located any authority that interprets the D.C.
Municipal Regulations to create an independent cause of action. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ references to
the regulations appear to support their negligence claim under Count I. ECF Nos. 74-1 at 15–17;
81 at 14. Because Plaintiffs fail to articulate a cause of action entitling them to a trial or judgment
as a matter of law, the Court recommends granting the District’s Motion as to Count II.
14 III. Count III: Zorgani’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim
A. Parties’ Arguments
Both Parties move for summary judgment on Zorgani’s § 1983 claim. See ECF Nos. 74-1
at 9–15; 76 at 15–23. Zorgani argues that the District violated his Fifth Amendment due process
rights because the District suspended his license without notice, which deprived him of his
property interest in his license. 3 ECF No. 74-1 at 11. Zorgani argues that the District should have
sent him notice after he paid his fine but before his license was suspended, as well as after his
license was suspended. ECF Nos. 74-1 at 10; 81 at 9 (arguing that “[o]nce . . . the District
processed his timely payment without warning of impending suspension, the subsequent
deprivation of his license without new notice violated due process.”); 18 at ¶¶ 49–50. He further
argues that the District’s due process violation derived from a government policy. Id. at 14.
The District argues that Zorgani’s due process claim fails because there is no genuine issue
of material fact that the DMV suspended Zorgani’s license knowingly. ECF No. 76 at 15. With
respect to the notice issue, the District argues that it provided Zorgani with adequate notice because
there is no dispute that, after 30 days passed without Zorgani having paid his ticket, the DMV sent
another written notice, this time warning Zorgani that his license “will be suspended if you fail to
answer the notice of infraction . . . within 60 calendar days of the date it was issued.” Id. at 16–17
(emphasis added). The District maintains that the two notices it sent to Zorgani were sufficient to
satisfy due process. ECF Nos. 76 at 16–17; 77 at 18 (“Twice warned that his license would be
3 Plaintiffs also argue that the District violated Zorgani’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Fourteenth Amendment, however, “applies only to the states” and does not apply to the actions of the District or those of its officials. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1953). Because the requirements of the Fifth Amendment are the same as those of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court will analyze Zorgani’s arguments under the Fifth Amendment. See Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 15 suspended if he failed to pay, Zorgani cannot complain that he lacked notice.”). Finally, the
District contends that it did not have a widespread practice or custom that caused any potential
violation, but rather that it was a one-time computer error which caused the license suspension.
Id. at 20–21.
B. There is No Genuine Issue of Material Fact that Zorgani Failed to Receive Notice Under the Fifth Amendment.
Section 1983 creates a civil action against a person who, acting under color of state law,
deprives an individual of “any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District may be liable under § 1983 only if a municipal policy or
custom caused the injury. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Sec. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In
evaluating municipal liability, courts conduct a two-part inquiry: (1) whether a constitutional
violation caused the plaintiff’s harm; and (2) if so, whether the District is liable for that violation.
Doe v. District of Columbia, 206 F. Supp. 3d 583, 603 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992)).
Regarding the first inquiry, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend.
V. To prove a due process violation, a plaintiff must establish two elements. See Propert v.
District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1991). First, a plaintiff must identify a
property interest that is protected by the Constitution. Id. Second, a plaintiff must establish that
the government failed to provide sufficient process. Id. Process includes both notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Id. Both Parties agree that Zorgani had a protected property interest in
his driver’s license. See ECF Nos. 74-1 at 9–10; 76 at 18; see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535,
539 (1971) (“Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important
16 interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that
procedural due process . . . .”).
One of the core issues of Count III is whether the two notices that Zorgani received before
his license was suspended were constitutionally sufficient. Courts use two separate frameworks
to answer this question. First, under Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Company, courts
evaluate whether notice is “reasonably calculated . . . to apprise interested parties of the pendency
of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
Second, under Mathews v. Eldridge, courts use a balancing test to determine the “precise form of
notice and the precise kind of hearing required.” Propert, 948 F.2d at 1332 (citing Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976)). Under the Mathews framework, courts balance three factors:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation through the current procedures and the value of additional safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest, including the fiscal and financial burdens that additional or other procedural
requirements would create. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
The Parties invoke both frameworks throughout their briefing. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 74-1 at
11–14; 76 at 18–19. Given that both frameworks evaluate notice, there is some overlap between
them. See Propert, 948 F.2d at 1334 (noting that “the constitutional requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard are interrelated, and that the form and timing of the hearing required may
vary depending upon the adequacy of the initial notice provided.”). Mathews tests more generally
“what process is due to protect against an erroneous deprivation.” Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S.
1, 10 (1979). Mullane, by contrast, focuses only on the method of notice. See Dusenberry v.
United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (clarifying that Mullane, not Mathews, applies to
“questions regarding the adequacy of the method used to give notice”); see also Nozzi v. Hous.
17 Auth. of City of Los Angeles, 806 F.3d 1178, 1193 n.17 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court
applies a streamlined test when the only question to be decided is whether the government has
provided sufficient notice and there is no request for further procedural safeguards.”). The Court
first addresses the Parties’ arguments under Mullane and then turns to Mathews.
1. There is no triable issue on the method of notice to Zorgani under Mullane.
To satisfy Mullane, the District must have sent Zorgani notice that was reasonably
calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the action and afforded him the opportunity to present
his objections. 339 U.S. at 314. The content of the notice must have “provided an accurate picture
of what was at stake and adequately explained how [Zorgani] should respond.” Barkley v. U.S.
Marshals Serv. ex rel. Hylton, 766 F.3d 25, 31 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation modified). There is no
dispute that the District provided Zorgani with two separate warnings before it suspended his
license. First, Zorgani’s Notice of Infraction included a warning that “If your answer to a moving
violation is not received within 60 calendar days, your license or your privilege to drive in the
District of Columbia may be suspended.” ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 6 (citing ECF No. 72-4 at 59). This
language was consistent with D.C. law in 2014, which required a Notice of Infraction to advise
that “failure to answer . . . within 60 calendar days from the date of issuance or greater period
established by the Director by regulation shall by operation of law result in a suspension of his
District operator’s permit.” D.C. Code § 50-2302.04(c) (2014) (amended 2021). Second, the
DMV sent Zorgani a “Notice of Suspension” document on June 30, 2014. ECF No. 81-1 at ¶¶ 11–
17; see ECF No. 76-1 at 55. 4 In that document, the DMV again informed Zorgani of the
4 Although Zorgani denies that there is evidence that the DMV actually mailed Zorgani that document, ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 11, he does not meaningfully dispute through competent, admissible evidence that he received correspondence titled “Notice of Suspension.” ECF No. 81 at 7 (arguing why the Notice of Suspension was inadequate, not that he never received it). 18 consequences of failing to answer his ticket within sixty days: “Your driver license . . . will be
suspended if you fail to answer the notice of infraction within 60 calendar days of the date it was
issued.” ECF No. 76-1 at 55 (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs contend that these notices did not provide Zorgani with “definitive,
individualized notice that a suspension was imminent.” ECF No. 81 at 7. But the Notice of
Suspension plainly stated that Zorgani’s license “will be suspended.” ECF No. 76-1 at 55
(emphasis added). The District informed Zorgani that failure to pay within 60 days would result
in suspension. D.C. Code § 50-2302.05(e) (providing that failure to answer a ticket “within 60
calendar days after the date the notice was issued, or within a greater period of time as prescribed
by the Director by regulation” will result in suspension of the license “until payment of the
penalties, fines, and a reinstatement fee”). Although Plaintiffs insist that the District was required
to send Zorgani a post-suspension notice, the pre-deprivation notices in this case satisfied
constitutional due process under the law of this Circuit.
For example, in English v. District of Columbia, the D.C. Circuit held that the District,
through St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, provided adequate notice it would seize money from a patient’s
account. 717 F.3d 968, 973 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The patient signed a form acknowledging that he
was responsible for any charges not covered by insurance. Id. at 972. The patient received a bill
that stated that the hospital reserved the right to transfer the patient’s funds after seven days of
non-payment. Id. The hospital did not send the patient an additional notice again after that seven-
day period. Id. at 970. Acknowledging that “beyond the basic requirements of notice and an
opportunity to be heard, the precise requirements of procedural due process are flexible,” the
Circuit held that the notice plaintiff received “easily” satisfied the Mullane standard. Id. at 972–
73; see also Barkley, 766 F.3d at 31–32 (holding that government met Mullane standard and
19 provided constitutionally-sufficient notice by providing notice to court security officers prior to
their termination that failure to meet certain standards or provide additional medical information
might result in removal from service).
Accordingly, the District’s notices clearly satisfied due process under the law of this
Circuit. See also Evans v. City of New York, 308 F. Supp. 2d 316, 325–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding
notice was sufficient when DMV computer autogenerated and mailed a notice to plaintiff that his
license would be suspended if he failed to pay a fine by a certain deadline); Crum v. Vincent, 493
F.3d 988, 993 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding notice was sufficient when government mailed doctor notice
that his medical license would be revoked if he failed to respond within ninety days); 1417 Belmont
Cmty. Dev., LLC v. District of Columbia, 302 A.3d 512, 519–21 (D.C. 2023) (holding notice was
sufficient when government stated failure to correct building violations within fifteen days would
result in razing of building).
Plaintiffs also argue that the District complied with the law because Zorgani’s ticket did
not identify the ten-day grace period. ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 7. According to Plaintiffs, that grace
period fit the statute’s requirement of “60 calendar days . . . or a greater period of time.” D.C.
Code § 50-2302.04(c); see ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 7. Plaintiffs’ argument is unavailing for two reasons.
First, the grace period is not part of the statute. The statute states “60 calendar days . . . or a greater
period established by the Director by regulation . . . .” D.C. Code § 50-2302.04(c). Plaintiffs have
not presented any evidence that the Director of the DMV incorporated the grace period by
regulation. Instead, testimony shows the grace period was merely an internal policy. ECF No. 76-
1 at 29–30. Second, even if the District had violated the statute, “the fact of a state law violation
does not resolve whether a plaintiff has been deprived of due process.” Tate v. District of
20 Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 908 (D.C. 2010) (citation modified). The question is whether Zorgani
had notice and opportunity to be heard, which he did. Id.
2. There is no triable issue on the adequacy of notice to Zorgani under Mathews.
Next, under the Mathews test, Plaintiffs identify three points in time that the District should
have provided notice: (1) pre-suspension; (2) after Zorgani paid his ticket; and (3) at the time of
suspension. See ECF Nos. 74-1 at 13–14; 81 at 10. Plaintiffs appear to argue that some additional
notice (the extent of which is unclear) would have served as an appropriate procedural safeguard.
The District argues that notice was sufficient and that despite Zorgani’s suspension, the “District’s
procedures adequately guarded against licensees being unaware when their driver’s license may
be suspended.” ECF No. 77 at 21. Because the District provided Zorgani with adequate pre-
deprivation notice (as discussed above), the Court will weigh the Mathews factors as to Plaintiffs’
argument regarding post-deprivation notice.
Private Interest. For the first factor, the private interest, it is well-settled that a driver’s
interest in his license is substantial because he cannot be made whole if his suspension is later
vacated. See Dixon v Love, 431 U.S. 105, 113 (1977). That said, the nature of the interest requires
only “something less than an evidentiary hearing . . . prior to adverse administrative action.”
Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 343).
The risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards. As for the second
factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of additional safeguards, in 2014, D.C. law
required a ticket to include notice of the 60-day warning. See D.C. Code § 50-2302.04(c). As an
initial matter, a pre-deprivation hearing was not required because due process is satisfied when a
driver can dispute the underlying offense resulting in suspension. See Dixon, 431 U.S. at 110,
113–14 (automatic suspension for three convictions within a 12-month period); Mackey, 443 U.S.
21 at 14 (automatic suspension for refusing to take breathalyzer test). Plaintiffs do not dispute
Zorgani’s original moving violation. ECF No. 79-1 at ¶ 1. Indeed, Zorgani eventually admitted
to that violation when he paid his ticket, and the ticket warned that by paying the fine, he would
be “admit[ting] to the infraction and waiv[ing] [his] right to a hearing.” ECF Nos. 72-4 at 59; 77-
1 at 155. Because Plaintiffs cannot rely on lack of a pre-deprivation hearing, their argument rests
on two issues: lack of post-suspension notice and lack of post-deprivation review.
First, Plaintiffs maintain that notice and review would have provided Zorgani the
opportunity to discover the error in the processing of his payment and challenge his suspension,
which would have prevented his ultimate arrest. ECF No. 74-1 at 14. The District argues that this
was a one-time computer error, and there is no evidence of a similar suspension having occurred.
ECF No. 77 at 21. Accordingly, the risk of an erroneous deprivation from the procedures is near
zero. Id. There is no dispute that an error did occur. Plaintiffs are likely correct that if Zorgani
had notice, he would not have driven on a suspended license. Plaintiffs fall short, however, because
the case law (as discussed above) holds that pre-deprivation notice is all that is required. See
Cokinos v. District of Columbia, 728 F.2d 502, 503 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting assertion that
plaintiff could not challenge his car towing when back of parking ticket advised of hearing).
Additionally, courts evaluate risk as applied to the “generality of cases, rather than the rare
exceptions.” See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 14. Procedures need not be so comprehensive as to preclude
any possibility of errors. Id. at 13; see Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113 (acknowledging possibility of
clerical error). On this record, Zorgani’s case was the rare exception. 5 What Zorgani actually
5 The Parties dispute whether there were any other similar erroneous suspensions. ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 41. Plaintiffs, however, have failed to offer sufficient evidence of similar erroneous suspensions. Rather, Plaintiffs simply “object to the use of any portions of a report from the District’s late-named expert.” ECF No. 81-1 at ¶ 41. 22 seeks is notice and an opportunity to be heard before a one-time computer system error occurred,
which is not possible in light of the fact that it is just that—an unanticipated error. It is difficult to
see how any post-deprivation review would have prevented the unfortunate series of events that
occurred in this case. Moreover, the risk of error here is so miniscule in light of the one-time
computer glitch, that additional, post-deprivation notices were not required as a matter of law. See
Mackey, 443 U.S. at 13; see Dixon, 431 U.S. at 113.
The Government Interest. Finally, with respect to the government interest, the Supreme
Court has recognized the “substantial public interest in administrative efficiency” and “the
important public interest in safety on the roads and highways, and in the prompt removal of a
safety hazard.” Dixon, 431 U.S. at 114. Summary, automatic license suspensions serve the
government’s interest in public safety. See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 18. In weighing the three Mathews
factors as a whole, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the process provided
to Zorgani fell short of the constitutional standard. Accordingly, the Court recommends granting
the District’s Motion on Zorgani’s § 1983 claim and denying Plaintiffs’ Motion. Because Plaintiffs
fail to establish a predicate constitutional violation, the Court need not address whether a policy
or custom caused the constitutional violation.
IV. Count IV: Loss of Consortium Claim
The District moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claim, arguing
that a loss of consortium claim cannot stand alone. ECF No. 76 at 34. A loss of consortium claim
is viable only if a plaintiff has prevailed on an underlying negligence claim. Hill v. Medlantic
Health Care Grp., 933 A.2d 314, 331 (D.C. 2007). Because the Court recommends granting the
District’s Motion on Zorgani’s negligence claim, Plaintiffs’ loss of consortium claim fails as a
23 matter of law. The Court, thus, recommends granting the District’s Motion on Count IV of
Plaintiffs’ Complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends GRANTING the District’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 76) and DENYING Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 72). Because the District is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of
Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court further recommends DENYING Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification (ECF No. 71) and the District’s Motion to Stay (ECF No. 73) as MOOT.
SO ORDERED.
Date: August 7, 2026 ____________________________________ MOXILA A. UPADHYAYA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
24 Local Civil Rule 72.3(b) Notice
The Parties are advised that under the provisions of Local Rule 72.3(b), any Party who objects to
a Report and Recommendation must file a written objection with the Clerk of Court within fourteen
days of the party’s receipt of the Report and Recommendation. The written objections must
specifically identify the portion of the report or recommendation to which objection is made and
the basis for such objections. Failure to file timely objections to the findings and recommendations
set forth in this Report may waive that party’s right of appeal from an order of the District Court
that adopts such findings and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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