Zolfaghari v. Wall&Associates, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: February 13, 2020
• Docket: 5:19-cv-08101
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 JAVAD ZOLFAGHARI, Case No. 19-cv-08101-SVK

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 9 v. REMAND

10 WALL&ASSOCIATES, INC., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 10 11 Defendants.

12 Before the Court are Plaintiff Javad Zolfaghari’s motion to remand (Dkt. 10) and 13 Defendants Greg Thorson, P. Mark Yates, Wall & Associates, Inc., and Jennifer L. Cable’s 14 (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss (Dkt. 8). All parties have consented to the 15 jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge. See Dkts. 7, 13. The Court finds this matter 16 suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). 17 The initial and fundamental issue in this case is whether the jurisdiction of this Court 18 attached to Plaintiff’s state court complaint as drafted. This Court concludes that it did not. 19 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to remand and DENIES AS MOOT 20 Defendants’ motion to dismiss for the reasons discussed below. 21 I. BACKGROUND 22 A. The Complaint 23 On November 13, 2019, Plaintiff filed his complaint, utilizing standard Judicial Council 24 forms, alleging state-law claims of fraud and intentional tort against Defendants in the Superior 25 Court of California for the County of Santa Clara. Dkt. 1-1 at 2. Plaintiff’s allegations arise out 26 of alleged representations by Defendants that, in return for payment, they would represent Plaintiff 27 before the California Employment Development Bureau (“EDD”) regarding a tax lien. See 1 More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he paid Defendants $63,500.00 for their services in 2 helping Plaintiff remedy a $21,000,000.00 tax lien that was placed on his corporation. Dkt. 1-1 at 3 6. Plaintiff further alleges that despite his payments, Defendants did not take any action to remedy 4 the tax lien. Id. Plaintiff mentions the $63,500.00 payment and the $21,000,000.00 tax lien in 5 various places of the complaint. See id. at 6-8. Plaintiff further alleges: “Defendant would 6 arrange for a hearing before the California Employment Development (EDD) bureau at which 7 Plaintiff would have an opportunity to explain and set aside the tax liabilities which were 8 improperly charged to Plaintiff by way of a tax lien placed on corporation in which he is an officer 9 and shareholder.” Id. at 6. Plaintiff also alleges “Defendant failed to take effective action to 10 resolve the tax obligations disclosed to them” and “Defendant did not arrange for a hearing before 11 EDD and made no effort to set aside tax lien.” Id. In the complaint and under the pre-printed text 12 “[b]ecause of plaintiff’s reliance upon defendant’s conduct, plaintiff has been damaged,” Plaintiff 13 states: 14 Plaintiff expended $60000 plus $3500 to obtain competent, effective and timely representation. Plaintiff did not retain competent representation to proceed against 15 the EDD lien of approximately $21,000,000. Plaintiff’s business interests in Zolman Construction and Development, Inc. was severely jeopardized as a result of 16 Defendant's lack of representation and incorrect tax advice. 17 Id. at 7. Plaintiff indicated that he intended to seek compensatory damages and punitive damages 18 but did not specify an amount. Id. at 5. The civil case cover sheet filed along with Plaintiff’s 19 complaint indicated that Plaintiff sought monetary, nonmonetary (declaratory or injunctive relief), 20 and punitive remedies. Id. at 11. 21 B. Notice of Removal 22 Defendants removed Plaintiff’s action to this Court on December 11, 2019 (Dkt. 1) and 23 filed their motion to dismiss on December 18, 2019 (Dkt. 8). In their notice of removal, 24 Defendants contend that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over the instant action because (1) the 25 amount in controversy exceeds $21,000,000.00; and (2) Plaintiff is a citizen of California and no 26 Defendants are citizens of California. Dkt. 1 at 4-6. 27 //// 1 C. Motion to Remand 2 Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand on December 20, 2019, arguing that in the 3 complaint he claims only $63,500.00 in damages. Dkt. 10; Dkt. 11 at 8. Plaintiff also avers by 4 counsel that “he is willing to stipulate that he will not claim any more than $10,000 in punitive 5 damages, and shall not exceed $74,900.00.” Dkt. 10-1 ¶ 6. 6 In opposition, Defendants clarify that Plaintiff seeks: (1) $60,000.00 for an initial payment; 7 (2) $3,500.00 for a subsequent payment; and (3) $21,000,000.00 for the tax lien Defendants were 8 hired to challenge. Dkt. 15 at 6. Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s argument that his complaint 9 does not seek compensatory damages of over $21,000,000.00 is “absurd” and that “‘it is facially 10 apparent from the allegations in the complaint that plaintiff’s claims’ include a claim for 11 $21,000,000.” Id. at 8. 12 In addition, Defendants argue that they were “eligible to assert the amount in controversy 13 under 28 U.S.C § 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii) because California law ‘does not permit demand for a specific 14 sum’ of exemplary damages and thus ‘does not permit’ Plaintiff to state the total ‘specific sum’ of 15 damages that he is seeking” and “Defendants exercised this right by stating, in their Notice of 16 Removal, that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Dkt. 15 at 10. Defendants also argue 17 that “Plaintiff’s civil cover sheet, which is part of his Complaint, seeks ‘nonmonetary; declaratory 18 or injunctive relief’” and “Defendants were thus eligible to assert the amount in controversy under 19 28 U.S.C § 1446(c)(2)(A)(i)” and subsequently exercised that right. Id. 20 Finally, Defendants take issue with Plaintiff’s post-removal statement that he will not seek 21 more than $74,900.00 in damages. Dkt. 15 at 10-13. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s statement 22 that he “shall not exceed $74,900” is “unclear” and “problematic.” Id. at 11. Defendants also 23 contend that the Supreme Court barred post-removal stipulations in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity 24 Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938). Id. In particular, Defendants argue that “the initial 25 complaint determines original jurisdiction and hence the propriety of remand, and nothing that the 26 plaintiff says after filing the complaint can divest a court of jurisdiction that was conferred by the 27 complaint.” Id. Defendants also argue that this Court has “applied this rule to block plaintiffs 1 (citing Bay Area Surgical Mgmt., LLC v. Principal Life Ins. Co., No. 12-cv-1140 EJD, 2012 WL 2 3656451, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012)). 3 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 4 A. Removal 5 The federal removal statute permits the removal of an action which could have been 6 brought originally in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Removal jurisdiction is determined 7 from the four corners of the complaint as it existed at the time of removal. Franchise Tax Bd. of 8 the State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983). Removal 9 statutes are strictly construed against removal and place the burden on the party seeking removal 10 to show removal is proper. Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 11 2009) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). A case must be remanded to 12 state court “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject 13 matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 14 B. Diversity Jurisdiction - Amount in Controversy 15 Federal courts have original jurisdiction on the basis of diversity where the opposing 16 parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. 17 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 18 2003). Consistent with this framework, “[t]he party seeking to invoke the district court’s diversity 19 jurisdiction always bears the burden of both pleading and proving diversity jurisdiction.” 20 NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2016). 21 “[W]hen a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the defendant’s amount-in- 22 controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff or questioned by the 23 court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014) (citations 24 omitted). Thus, “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that the 25 amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Id. at 89. But, “[i]f the plaintiff 26 contests the defendant's allegation, § 1446(c)(2)(B) instructs [that] [r]emoval . . . is proper on the 27 basis of an amount in controversy asserted by the defendant if the district court finds, by the 1 threshold.” Id. at 88 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In such a case, both sides submit proof 2 and the court decides, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether the amount-in-controversy 3 requirement has been satisfied.” Id. at 88. 4 The Ninth Circuit has also stated that “where . . . it is unclear from the face of the 5 complaint whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, the removing defendant bears the 6 burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy 7 exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th 8 Cir. 2018) (quoting Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of Cal., Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013)) 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[B]oth parties may submit proof of the amount in 10 controversy through summary-judgment-type evidence including affidavits and declarations, and 11 the defendant seeking removal bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence 12 that the amount-in-controversy requirement has been satisfied.” Arakji v. Microchip Tech., Inc., 13 2019 WL 5386239, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2019) (citing Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc, 775 F.3d 14 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 “[T]he amount in controversy is the amount at stake in the underlying litigation.” Fritsch 16 v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Gonzales v. CarMax 17 Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 2016)) (citation and internal quotation marks 18 omitted). “[T]his includes any result of the litigation, excluding interests and costs, that entails a 19 payment by the defendant.” Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 793 (citations and internal quotation marks 20 omitted). “Among other items, the amount in controversy includes damages (compensatory, 21 punitive, or otherwise) . . . and attorneys’ fees awarded under fee-shifting statutes or contract.” Id. 22 (citations omitted). 23 III. ANALYSIS 24 A. Defendants Fail to Demonstrate the Amount in Controversy by a Preponderance of the Evidence 25 Because Plaintiff contests Defendants’ allegations regarding the amount in controversy 26 (Dkt. 11 at 7-8), Defendants bear the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 27 the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. Dart, 574 U.S. at 88; Arakji, 2019 WL 1 5386239, at *3. Defendants argue that the complaint itself is evidence that the amount in 2 controversy exceeds the $75,000.00 jurisdictional threshold. Dkt. 15 at 6-9. They point to the 3 complaint’s allegations and argue that “Plaintiff specifically claimed he hired Defendants to 4 provide competent tax representation in order to ‘resolve’ and ‘set aside’ the ‘improper’ ‘tax lien’ 5 of $21,000,000.” Id. at 8 (quoting Dkt. 1-1 at 6). Defendants also point to the damages section of 6 Plaintiff’s complaint, where they allege that “Plaintiff specifically states two items of damages 7 beyond the $63,500 paid to Defendant Wall & Associates: (i) Defendants’ failure to provide 8 ‘competent representation ‘against’ the “tax lien’ of $21,000,000 and (ii) damage to ‘Plaintiff’s 9 business interests’ which were ‘severely jeopardized’ by Defendants’ alleged fraud.” Dkt. 15 at 8 10 (quoting Dkt. 1-1 at 7). Defendants argue that “[a]ll of this is apparent on the face of the 11 [c]omplaint.” Id. 12 Defendants further suggest that “[i]f Plaintiff’s sole request for damages was the return of 13 the $63,500 paid to Defendant Wall & Associates . . . Plaintiff’s response to the prompt in the 14 state form complaint requesting Plaintiff to specify the damages sought in the Complaint would 15 have contained one sentence: ‘Plaintiff is seeking the return of the $63,500 paid to Defendant Wall 16 & Associates.’” Dkt. 15 at 8. Instead, Defendants argue, Plaintiff’s complaint states “that 17 Defendants’ failed to provide competent representation ‘to proceed’ against and ‘set aside’ the 18 $21,000,000 tax lien and that Defendants’ failure to provide competent representation, including 19 ‘inaccurate tax advice,’ ‘severely jeopardized’ Plaintiff’s business interests.” Id. (quoting Dkt. 1-1 20 at 7). Defendants argue that the “[c]omplaint’s allegations show that Plaintiff is seeking 21 compensation in the amount of the tax lien that Defendants were allegedly supposed to resolve.” 22 Dkt. 15 at 9. 23 Defendants’ arguments, while not unreasonable, rest entirely on Plaintiff’s articulations in 24 the form complaint. However, the complaint, far from a model pleading, can be read to either 25 include the $21,000,000.00 tax lien or to exclude it. See Dkt. 1-1 at 6-8. Consequently, the 26 complaint, by itself, does not sustain Defendants’ substantial burden. Defendants provide no other 27 1 evidentiary support that the amount in controversy includes the $21,000,000.00 tax lien.1 Because 2 removal statutes are strictly construed against removal and the burden is squarely placed on the 3 party seeking removal (see Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244 (citation omitted)), the Court finds 4 that Defendants have not carried their burden. 5 B. Plaintiff’s Clarification of the Amount in Controversy is Appropriate 6 Plaintiff avers that “he is willing to stipulate that he will not claim any more than $10,000 7 in punitive damages, and shall not exceed $74,900.00.” Dkt. 10-1 ¶ 6. As argued by Defendants, 8 it is well established that a plaintiff may not deprive a court of jurisdiction with a post-removal 9 reduction of the amount in controversy. Dkt. 15 at 11 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indemnity, 303 10 U.S. at 291-92). However, Defendants fail to acknowledge further direction from the Ninth 11 Circuit, which provides, in critical part, that where it is unclear from the face of the complaint 12 whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, the parties may submit proof of the 13 amount in controversy through summary-judgment-type evidence. See Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416. 14 Where a post-removal stipulation simply “clarifies an ambiguity in the amount in 15 controversy, a court may consider the stipulation as evidence of a failure to satisfy the amount in 16 controversy.” Soules v. Farmersonly.com, No. CV 16-1289-R, 2016 WL 10966409, at *2 (C.D. 17 Cal. Mar. 16, 2016) (citing Gillette v. Peerless Ins. Co., No. CV 13-03161 DDP (RZx), 2013 WL 18 3983872, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2013)) (emphasis added). More specifically, “Courts consider 19 stipulations that clarify the amount in controversy in situations where (1) state pleading rules leave 20 plaintiffs with no other option but to specify an ambiguous amount in controversy in the 21 complaint, or (2) where the stipulation indicates that the amount in controversy at the time of 22 removal fell below the jurisdiction[al] limit.” Soules, 2016 WL 10966409, at *2 (citing Gillette, 23 2013 WL 3983872, at *4). 24 As noted above, Plaintiff’s complaint is not well-drafted. Additionally, when Plaintiff 25 filed his complaint in state court, he did not assert a dollar amount for damages. See generally 26

27 1 The only support provided for Defendants’ opposition are the declarations of Defendant Yates 1 Dkt. 1-1. The California Civil Code bars Plaintiff from identifying a monetary amount sought 2 because Plaintiff claimed punitive damages. Cal. Civ. Code § 3295(e) (“No claim for exemplary 3 damages shall state an amount or amounts.”). In sum, the amount in controversy was ambiguous 4 at the time the case was removed from state court. See Soules, 2016 WL 10966409, at *2. 5 Plaintiff’s statement through his lawyer that he will not claim more than $10,000.00 in punitive 6 damages and will not exceed $74,900.00 in damages was thus a statement of clarification rather 7 than a statement of reduction and is therefore permissible to show that the amount in controversy 8 does not exceed $75,000.00. 9 C. Defendants Fail to Demonstrate Any Amount of Punitive/Exemplary Damages2 10 Defendants contend that Plaintiff seeks punitive damages in an unspecified amount and 11 that California law prohibits Plaintiff from identifying a specific sum of punitive damages. Dkt. 1 12 at 7; Dkt. 15 at 9-10. Defendants further contend that because California does not limit the 13 amount of punitive damages that Plaintiff could receive, Plaintiff could obtain $63,500.00 in 14 punitive damages in addition to the $63,500.00 in actual damages, thus exceeding the amount in 15 controversy requirement. Dkt. 1 at 7-8. Plaintiff, in contrast, contends that Defendants have failed 16 to meet their burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy 17 exceeds $75,000.00 because Defendants have not offered evidence of the amount of possible 18 punitive damages. Dkt. 17 at 5. The Court agrees with Plaintiff. 19 Punitive damages are generally part of the amount in controversy in a civil action. See 20 Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001). But “simply pointing out that 21 Plaintiff is seeking punitive damages without proffering any evidence regarding the amount is 22 insufficient to establish that the potential punitive damage award will more likely than not increase 23 the amount in controversy.” Conrad Assocs. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 994 F. Supp. 24 1196, 1201 (N.D. Cal. 1998). “To properly include punitive damages in an amount in controversy 25 calculation, the party with the burden must present evidence of a possible punitive damage award, 26

27 2 “Punitive damages” and “exemplary damages” are the same under California law. 23 Cal. Jur. 1 usually in the form of punitive damage awards in factually analogous cases.” Chavez v. Pratt 2 (Robert Mann Packaging), LLC, No. 19-cv-00719-NC, 2019 WL 1501576, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3 5, 2019) (citing Petkevicius v. NBTY, Inc., 3:14-cv-02616-CAB-(RBB), 2017 WL 1113295, *9 4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2017)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 5 Defendants are correct that California pleading rules barred Plaintiff from demanding a 6 dollar amount of punitive damages in his complaint. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3295(e). However, the 7 Court does not find that Defendants have met their burden of showing, by a preponderance of the 8 evidence, that punitive damages would thrust the amount in controversy over $75,000.00. 9 Defendants neither provided evidence of a possible punitive damage award nor provided factually 10 analogous cases to support their contention. See Pratt, 2019 WL 1501576, at *5. Accordingly, 11 the Court finds that punitive damages may not be used to calculate the amount in controversy 12 because Defendants failed to establish that a potential punitive damage award would more likely 13 than not increase the amount in controversy. 14 D. Defendants Fail to Demonstrate That Plaintiff Seeks Nonmonetary Relief 15 Defendants also argue that even if the amount of compensatory damages is no more than 16 $63,500.00, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 in part because Plaintiff seeks 17 nonmonetary relief. Dkt. 1 at 6; Dkt. 15 at 9-10. As support for this claim, they identify 18 Plaintiff’s civil cover sheet, where the words “[r]emedies sought (check all that apply)” are stated 19 and the box next to the words “nonmonetary; declaratory or injunctive relief” is “checked.” 20 Dkt. 15 at 10 (citing Dkt. 1-1 at 11). “A civil cover sheet, however, is merely an administrative 21 document designed to facilitate the court’s management of a trial.” Campbell v. Handlery Union 22 Square Hotel, No. C 12–2466 MEJ, 2012 WL 3158840, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2012) (quoting 23 Wall v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 718 F.2d 906, 909 (9th. Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks 24 omitted). “A [c]ivil [c]over [s]heet does not supplant the complaint” (McKinney v. Law Office of 25 James Duncan, No. CV 09–2605 NJV, 2010 WL 668027, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2010)) and 26 “[c]hecking boxes on the civil cover sheet is not a substitute for alleging facts establishing 27 jurisdiction in a complaint.” Campbell, 2012 WL 3158840, at *2 (citing Wall, 718 F.2d at 909). 1 declaratory or injunctive relief in an amount that would exceed the amount in controversy. As 2 there is no mention of declaratory or injunctive relief in Plaintiff’s complaint (see Dkt. 1-1), the 3 Court finds that Defendants have failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 4 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00 based on declaratory or injunctive relief. 5 E. Complete Diversity of Citizenship is Present 6 In the notice of removal and again in the opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand, 7 Defendants contend that Plaintiff is a citizen of California. Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 3. Defendants 8 also contend that Defendant Wall & Associates, Inc. is a citizen of Virginia (Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 9 3; Dkt. 15-1 ¶ 3); Defendant Cable is a citizen of Virginia (Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 3); Defendant 10 Yates is a citizen of Virginia (Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 3; Dkt. 15-1 ¶ 2); and Defendant Thorson is a 11 citizen of Washington (Dkt. 1 at 4; Dkt. 15 at 3; Dkt. 15-2 ¶ 2). Plaintiff has neither contested the 12 truth of these allegations, nor has he argued that Defendants’ allegations are insufficient. 3 13 Diversity jurisdiction dictates that “each plaintiff must be of a different citizenship from 14 each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Mills ex rel. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th Cir. 2018). The 15 Court finds that Defendants’ allegations are sufficient to support that Plaintiff is diverse from all 16 Defendants and that complete diversity of citizenship is present. However, as noted in Sections 17 III.A-D, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant case because the 18 amount in controversy requirement has not been met. 19 IV. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 20 Plaintiff requests $1,400.00 in attorney’s fees that were incurred in bringing the instant 21 motion to remand. Dkt. 10-1 ¶ 7; Dkt. 11 at 9; Dkt. 17 at 9. Defendants do not provide any 22 argument regarding this request. 23 “An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, 24 including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “Absent 25 unusual circumstances, courts may award attorneys’ fees under § 1447(c) only where the 26 3 Plaintiff instead argues that “Remand is Required Because Diversity Jurisdiction is Inapplicable 27 As Defendants’ Contacts With the State of California Establish Specific Personal Jurisdiction 1 removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal” and “[c]onversely, 2 || when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital 3 Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). “In applying this rule, district courts retain discretion to 4 || consider whether unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case.” Id. 5 “[R]emoval is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party’s arguments lack 6 || merit, or else attorney’s fees would always be awarded whenever remand is granted.” Lussier v. 7 Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). Instead, the objective 8 || reasonableness of removal depends on the clarity of the applicable law and whether such law 9 || “clearly foreclosed” the arguments in support of removal. Id. at 1066-67. 10 For the reasons discussed in this order, Defendants were not without an objectively 11 reasonable basis to remove the action, notwithstanding this Court’s ultimate finding that diversity 12 || jurisdiction did not attach. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for attorney’s fees is DENIED. 5 13 V. CONCLUSION 14 Though Defendants have plausibly alleged that there is complete diversity of citizenship, 3 15 they have not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds 16 $75,000.00 such that this Court may exert jurisdiction over this case. The Court concludes that it 3 17 lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the instant action. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 18 Plaintiff's motion to remand and REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of California for 19 the County of Santa Clara. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED AS MOOT and □□□□□□□□□□□ 20 || request for attorney’s fees incurred in bringing the instant motion is DENIED. 21 SO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: February 13, 2020 23 Season va ful 25 SUSAN VAN KEULEN United States Magistrate Judge 26 27 28