Zivkovic v. Laura Christy LLC

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 8, 2023·No. 1:17-cv-00553·Unknown

Opinion

November 7, 2023 USDC SDNY DOCUMENT VIA ECF ELECTRONICALLY FILED Honorable Gregory H. Woods DOC #: United States District Court DATE FILED: 11/8/ 2023 Southern District of New York MEMORANDUM ENDORSED 500 Pearl Street New York, NY 10007 Re: Zivkovic v. Laura Christy LLC, et al., No.: 17-cv-553 (GHW) Dear Judge Woods, Plaintiffs and non-party Rosey Kalayjian submit this joint letter to raise a dispute about the scope of discovery of Ms. Kalayjian and her assets following this Court’s decision granting Plaintiffs’ motion for attachment. In an effort to resolve this dispute, the parties held a preliminary discussion on October 26, Plaintiffs sent Ms. Kalayjian a list of their proposed areas of discovery on October 26, and the parties met and conferred about the above issues on October 31. Plaintiffs’ proposed eight areas of discovery (or “Topics”) are attached as Exhibit A. Plaintiffs seek an affidavit from Ms. Kalayjian confirming all requested information/documents have been produced and a deposition of Ms. Kalayjian concerning the existence and location of assets after the documents/information have been produced. Following the meet and confer, Ms. Kalayjian agreed to produce the requested information and documents responsive to Topics 1-4, but only as to accounts located within New York, real property held in New York, and entities/businesses that do business in New York. Ms. Kalayjian also agreed to produce documents responsive to Topic 7 regarding the source of funds used to make payments into OGR in 2021 and 2022, but not with respect to transactions prior thereto. Ms. Kalayjian objects to producing documents/information responsive to Topics 5, 6, and 8, and also objects to a deposition. The parties’ positions are set forth below. Plaintiffs’ Position Plaintiffs are entitled to the targeted discovery they seek. First, because they are judgment creditors, Plaintiffs are entitled to “broad” post-judgment discovery in aid of execution pursuant to C.P.L.R. Article 52. See EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2012). This includes discovery of non-party assets to determine whether the judgment debtor has concealed or transferred assets applicable to satisfying the judgment. See Phoenix Bulk Carriers (BVI) Ltd. v. Triorient, LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29582, at *5-6, 7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2021). Second, because they have an order of attachment, Plaintiffs are entitled to discovery under C.P.L.R. § 6220. In arguing that the Court’s attachment order has already been satisfied, Kalayjian betrays her basic misunderstanding what “attachment” is. An “attachment” is not synonymous with a restraining order. An attachment “effects the . . . seizure of a debtor’s property, to be held by the sheriff [(or the Marshals in this case)], actually or constructively, so as to apply the property to the creditor’s judgment if the creditor should prevail in court.” Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 312 (N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added). Until enough assets to satisfy the order have actually been seized, the order remains “outstanding and unsatisfied” and, per § 6220, “a plaintiff is entitled to learn of assets to enable a sheriff to seize sufficient property to comply with the order.” Etalon Imob S.R.L. v. Schoenbach, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144005, at *17-18 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2012) (emphasis added). Here, not a penny of the assets the Court ordered attached has been “attached” because nothing has been seized (and cannot be seized until its location is known). Contrary to her argument below, Kalayjian does not get to choose which component of the attachment order will be enforced. This Court ordered attachment of $3.9 million in monetary assets in addition to Kalayjian’s interest in OGR and the Southampton House. Kalayjian also presents no proof that the value of OGR or the Southampton House when sold at auction after a turnover proceeding, will satisfy the judgment. Discovery in aid of attachment is therefore essential because Plaintiffs do not know the current location of any monetary assets. The Kalayjian Account (into which millions of Ghatanfard’s assets were transferred) was closed in March 2022, when Kalayjian transferred more than $1.5 million from that account. See Ex. B. Plaintiffs have been prevented from discovery of Kalayjian’s Citibank account, which is the subject of a pending motion to quash. See ECF No. 364-67. And Kalyajian admits she transferred the $1.4 million refinance proceeds out of state. Kalayjian’s argument that Plaintiffs should be precluded from learning of the location of any assets that may be seized simply because they have identified substantial fraudulent transfers makes no sense. If Plaintiffs are not allowed to learn the location of Kalayjian’s monetary assets, an entire component of the Court’s attachment order cannot be satisfied, and its very purpose would be defeated. Topics 1-5 (Out of State Assets) Kalayjian should be required to identify and produce documents about accounts, property, and entities outside of New York (Topics 1-4), and produce information concerning the transfer and present location of the $1.4 million refinance proceeds (Topic 5). These issues are intertwined because Kalayjian admits she already transferred the $1.4 million refinance proceeds out-of-state.1 Plaintiffs are entitled to discover out-of-state assets to learn of assets transferred from Ghatanfard that may satisfy the judgment and to discover assets of Kalayjian that may be attached. Nothing in C.P.L.R. § 5223 (the Article 52 disclosure provision) or § 6220 limits discovery to New York. Instead, § 5223 authorizes discovery of “all matter relevant to the satisfaction of a judgment,” while § 6220 broadly authorizes discovery of “any property” in which the defendant has an interest. Nor is there any basis to limit discovery under a theory that the Court cannot direct turnover or attachment of out-of-state assets. Because this Court has personal jurisdiction over Kalayjian, it clearly has authority to order her to turn over assets even if they are located out-of-state. Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 541 (N.Y. 2009) (“a New York court with personal jurisdiction over a defendant may order him to turn over out-of-state property regardless of whether the defendant is a judgment debtor or a garnishee”). Similarly, a court with personal jurisdiction also: (a) “has jurisdiction over that individual’s tangible or intangible property, even if the situs of that property is outside of New York”; and (b) has “the authority to order prejudgment attachment of the property [the garnishee] owned and/or controlled.” Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC, 14 N.Y.3d at 312. So far as Plaintiffs can tell, every court in this Circuit to have considered the 1 To be clear, despite Kalayjian’s attempt to muddy the waters by asserting that Plaintiffs are seeking discovery from “out-of-state entities,” that simply is not the case. Plaintiffs are simply seeking discovery from Kalayjian about entities in which she holds an interest, be they in state or out of state. question has held that where personal jurisdiction exists, § 6220 permits discovery of extraterritorial assets. Royal Bank & Trust Co. v. Vermes, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26484, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 1985); Lumbard v. Shasha, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12243, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1985); Michelsen v. Brush, 233 F. Supp. 868, 869, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). Under both Article 52 and § 6220, Plaintiffs are entitled to discover extraterritorial assets. Kalayjian’s actions demonstrate the essential need for this discovery as she has removed from the state at least one of the assets (the $1.4 million refinance proceeds) that (a) formed the basis of the attachment order, and (b) the Court found Plaintiffs were likely to succeed in voiding and having turned over. Cf. Lumbard, 1985 U.S. Dist.

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