Zissu, Lore, Halper & Robson v. Siegel

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Zissu, Lore, Halper & Robson v. Siegel

60 A.D.2d 531, 400 N.Y.S.2d 45, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14439

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedDecember 13, 1977

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 60 A.D.2d 531 (Zissu, Lore, Halper & Robson v. Siegel) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Zissu, Lore, Halper & Robson v. Siegel, 60 A.D.2d 531, 400 N.Y.S.2d 45, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14439 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered August 5, 1977, which granted defendants’ motion to vacate a default judgment entered on April 5, 1977, is unanimously modified, on the law, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion to impose the following conditions on the grant of the motion to vacate, to be satisfied within 20 days of service upon defendants of a copy of the order to be entered herein with notice of entry: (a) that defendants’ attorney personally pay $1,000 to plaintiff; (b) that defendants furnish a bond of $20,000 to secure payment of any judgment up to that amount and (c) that defendants pay to plaintiff all costs in the action to date including costs and disbursements on this appeal; and otherwise affirmed, with $40 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. If these conditions are not met, the order is reversed and the motion to vacate denied, with $40 costs and disbursements payable to plaintiff. Defendants’ attorney, over a period of six months and 10 separate trial dates (at which plaintiff answered "ready”) successfully exhausted the patience of the court, which on April 4, [532]*5321977, rejected defendants’ request for further adjournment, refused to vacate the defendants’ default and directed an inquest which was held on that date. Throughout, defendants’ counsel has manifested a callous disregard for the function of the trial court, while remaining sensitive to every other personal, legal and business commitment he had made over this six-month period. It is impossible to translate counsel’s conduct into the type of excusable default contemplated by CPLR 5015 (subd [a], par 1); he has played the cavalier and procrastinated to his own detriment. Nevertheless, policy favors disposition of actions on the merits. Consequently, we have imposed the above conditions on the grant of the vacatur of the default judgment giving the defendants one last chance before they are "out of court” because of the outrageous tactics of their attorney. Concur—Lupiano, J. P., Birns, Silverman and Evans, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered August 5, 1977, which granted defendants’ motion to vacate a default judgment entered on April 5, 1977, is unanimously modified, on the law, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion to impose the following conditions on the grant of the motion to vacate, to be satisfied within 20 days of service upon defendants of a copy of the order to be entered herein with notice of entry: (a) that defendants’ attorney personally pay $1,000 to plaintiff; (b) that defendants furnish a bond of $20,000 to secure payment of any judgment up to that amount and (c) that defendants pay to plaintiff all costs in the action to date including costs and disbursements on this appeal; and otherwise affirmed, with $40 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. If these conditions are not met, the order is reversed and the motion to vacate denied, with $40 costs and disbursements payable to plaintiff. Defendants’ attorney, over a period of six months and 10 separate trial dates (at which plaintiff answered "ready”) successfully exhausted the patience of the court, which on April 4, [532]*5321977, rejected defendants’ request for further adjournment, refused to vacate the defendants’ default and directed an inquest which was held on that date. Throughout, defendants’ counsel has manifested a callous disregard for the function of the trial court, while remaining sensitive to every other personal, legal and business commitment he had made over this six-month period. It is impossible to translate counsel’s conduct into the type of excusable default contemplated by CPLR 5015 (subd [a], par 1); he has played the cavalier and procrastinated to his own detriment. Nevertheless, policy favors disposition of actions on the merits. Consequently, we have imposed the above conditions on the grant of the vacatur of the default judgment giving the defendants one last chance before they are "out of court” because of the outrageous tactics of their attorney. Concur—Lupiano, J. P., Birns, Silverman and Evans, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

60 A.D.2d 531, 400 N.Y.S.2d 45, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14439, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zissu-lore-halper-robson-v-siegel-nyappdiv-1977.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack