SILVESTRI, Senior Judge.
Zinc Corporation of America and its insurance carrier, Pacific Employers Insurance Company (collectively Zinc), petition for review of an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board) which affirmed the decision of the referee suspending payment of benefits, commencing February 22, 1988, to Edwin J. Byers, Jr. (Byers) pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable filed by St. Joe Minerals Corporation (St. Joe), and granting Byers’ petition against Zinc for compensation benefits commencing March 3, 1988.1
Byers, prior to December 2, 1986, was employed by St. Joe as a refinery utility man which involved working on hot surfaces for considerable periods of time. On December 2, 1986 Byers suffered a work-related injury in the nature of a burn to the bottom of his left foot. Notwithstanding the injury, Byers continued to work at his same job during which time he was treated by the St. Joe plant nurse. Byers’ injury did not improve and on July 9, 1987 Byers went to his family physician, Dr. Herbert Gray, who admit[224] ted him to the Medical Center of Beaver County. On July 10, 1987, Dr. Gray referred Byers to Dr. Saturnino M. Reyes (Dr. Reyes) who undertook the care and treatment of Byers at all times herein relevant.
St. Joe, which was self-insured, pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable filed July 22, 1987, paid benefits to Byers beginning July 9, 1987. St. Joe continued to make payments to Byers until February 22, 1988 when Byers returned to work with Zinc2 at the same job he performed at St. Joe. Byers worked through March 2, 1988. On March 3, 1988 Byers saw Dr. Reyes who, upon examination of Byers, found that the site of Byers’ December 2, 1986 wound, which was healed and the old surface was scar tissue on February 22, 1988 when Byers returned to work, had split open and there was a slight discoloration across from the original site. (R.R. 55a-59a.)3
On March 3, 1988, St. Joe “reinstated payment of benefits” to Byers “based on a recurrence of disability” at the rate of $347.00 per week. (Referee’s Finding of Fact (Finding) 17.) However, on March 28, 1988, St. Joe filed a Petition To Review Notice of Compensation Payable or Compensation Agreement (Petition for Review) under Section 413 of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act),4 77 P.S. § 771, wherein it alleged, “Employer wishes review of this matter as claimant’s present disability is unrelated to the work injury of 12/2/86.” (R.R. 3a.) Byers [225] filed an answer denying St. Joe’s allegation and, in addition, Byers filed a Claim Petition against Zinc.5
Byers alleged that the nature of his injury was an “aggravation of a pre-existing foot injury.” (R.R. la.) Zinc filed an answer denying the allegations of Byers’ Claim Petition.6
Four hearings were held before the referee. Byers testified as to the events between December 2, 1986 and March 2, 1988 and, as to the time period subsequent to March 2, 1988, Byers testified about his medical treatment. Byers also took the deposition of his treating physician, Dr. Reyes, which was placed into evidence by Byers. Neither St. Joe nor Zinc presented any evidence at any of the four hearings to contradict Byers’ testimony, neither did they present any medical testimony in opposition to that of the deposition testimony of Dr. Reyes.7
The referee issued his decision on May 30, 1989. The referee determined that Byers had suffered an aggravation of his December 2, 1986 injury, i.e., a new injury,8 between February 22 and March 2, 1988, and granted Byers’ Claim Petition against Zinc. The referee also granted St. Joe’s Petition for Review by ordering a suspension of the Notice of Compensation Payable as of February 22, 1988 and by ordering Zinc to reimburse St. Joe for pay[226] ments it made on and after March 3, 1988. The Board affirmed the referee’s decision on December 27, 1990.
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, constitutional rights were violated, and whether all necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. King v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Wendell H. Stone Co.), 132 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 292, 572 A.2d 845 (1990).
Before applying the standard set forth in our scope of review, it is significant to note that subsequent to March 3, 1988 and at the time of the hearings herein, Byers was receiving compensation benefits by reason of St. Joe reinstating payment of benefits on March 3,1988. The proceeding now before us was initiated not by Byers but by St. Joe to set aside its reinstatement of payment of benefits to Byers. Byers, at the suggestion of the referee, did file a Claim Petition against Zinc to obtain benefits; however, the purpose thereof was to protect himself against a discontinuance of benefits. By reason of the aforesaid, the only way for Byers to receive benefits from Zinc was if it were first determined that St. Joe, on and after March 3, 1988, was not liable for payment of benefits. With that as background, we address St. Joe’s Petition for Review to ascertain whether the determination of the referee in suspending payments by St. Joe is supported by competent, substantial evidence or whether he committed an error of law.
It is beyond peradventure that St. Joe, in seeking to set aside its reinstatement agreement, had the burden to establish that Byers incurred a new, separate and different disabling injury between February 22 and March 2, 1988 rather than a recurrence of the one he suffered on December 2, 1986. In Forbes Health System v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Washington), 75 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 639, 463 A.2d 83 (1983), the employer, like St. Joe in the present case, claimed that the claimant’s injury was not work related and argued that the referee erred by not placing upon the claimant the burden to [227] establish the causal connection between the injury and his employment. We held that it is the employer seeking to terminate benefits who bears the burden to prove a change in a claimant’s disability and stated that, “[w]e have never held that in termination proceedings the burden shifts at anytime to the claimant to prove the existence of a causal connection between his disability and his injury.” 75 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 642-643, 463 A.2d at 85.
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SILVESTRI, Senior Judge.
Zinc Corporation of America and its insurance carrier, Pacific Employers Insurance Company (collectively Zinc), petition for review of an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board) which affirmed the decision of the referee suspending payment of benefits, commencing February 22, 1988, to Edwin J. Byers, Jr. (Byers) pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable filed by St. Joe Minerals Corporation (St. Joe), and granting Byers’ petition against Zinc for compensation benefits commencing March 3, 1988.1
Byers, prior to December 2, 1986, was employed by St. Joe as a refinery utility man which involved working on hot surfaces for considerable periods of time. On December 2, 1986 Byers suffered a work-related injury in the nature of a burn to the bottom of his left foot. Notwithstanding the injury, Byers continued to work at his same job during which time he was treated by the St. Joe plant nurse. Byers’ injury did not improve and on July 9, 1987 Byers went to his family physician, Dr. Herbert Gray, who admit[224] ted him to the Medical Center of Beaver County. On July 10, 1987, Dr. Gray referred Byers to Dr. Saturnino M. Reyes (Dr. Reyes) who undertook the care and treatment of Byers at all times herein relevant.
St. Joe, which was self-insured, pursuant to a Notice of Compensation Payable filed July 22, 1987, paid benefits to Byers beginning July 9, 1987. St. Joe continued to make payments to Byers until February 22, 1988 when Byers returned to work with Zinc2 at the same job he performed at St. Joe. Byers worked through March 2, 1988. On March 3, 1988 Byers saw Dr. Reyes who, upon examination of Byers, found that the site of Byers’ December 2, 1986 wound, which was healed and the old surface was scar tissue on February 22, 1988 when Byers returned to work, had split open and there was a slight discoloration across from the original site. (R.R. 55a-59a.)3
On March 3, 1988, St. Joe “reinstated payment of benefits” to Byers “based on a recurrence of disability” at the rate of $347.00 per week. (Referee’s Finding of Fact (Finding) 17.) However, on March 28, 1988, St. Joe filed a Petition To Review Notice of Compensation Payable or Compensation Agreement (Petition for Review) under Section 413 of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act),4 77 P.S. § 771, wherein it alleged, “Employer wishes review of this matter as claimant’s present disability is unrelated to the work injury of 12/2/86.” (R.R. 3a.) Byers [225] filed an answer denying St. Joe’s allegation and, in addition, Byers filed a Claim Petition against Zinc.5
Byers alleged that the nature of his injury was an “aggravation of a pre-existing foot injury.” (R.R. la.) Zinc filed an answer denying the allegations of Byers’ Claim Petition.6
Four hearings were held before the referee. Byers testified as to the events between December 2, 1986 and March 2, 1988 and, as to the time period subsequent to March 2, 1988, Byers testified about his medical treatment. Byers also took the deposition of his treating physician, Dr. Reyes, which was placed into evidence by Byers. Neither St. Joe nor Zinc presented any evidence at any of the four hearings to contradict Byers’ testimony, neither did they present any medical testimony in opposition to that of the deposition testimony of Dr. Reyes.7
The referee issued his decision on May 30, 1989. The referee determined that Byers had suffered an aggravation of his December 2, 1986 injury, i.e., a new injury,8 between February 22 and March 2, 1988, and granted Byers’ Claim Petition against Zinc. The referee also granted St. Joe’s Petition for Review by ordering a suspension of the Notice of Compensation Payable as of February 22, 1988 and by ordering Zinc to reimburse St. Joe for pay[226] ments it made on and after March 3, 1988. The Board affirmed the referee’s decision on December 27, 1990.
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether an error of law was committed, constitutional rights were violated, and whether all necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. King v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Wendell H. Stone Co.), 132 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 292, 572 A.2d 845 (1990).
Before applying the standard set forth in our scope of review, it is significant to note that subsequent to March 3, 1988 and at the time of the hearings herein, Byers was receiving compensation benefits by reason of St. Joe reinstating payment of benefits on March 3,1988. The proceeding now before us was initiated not by Byers but by St. Joe to set aside its reinstatement of payment of benefits to Byers. Byers, at the suggestion of the referee, did file a Claim Petition against Zinc to obtain benefits; however, the purpose thereof was to protect himself against a discontinuance of benefits. By reason of the aforesaid, the only way for Byers to receive benefits from Zinc was if it were first determined that St. Joe, on and after March 3, 1988, was not liable for payment of benefits. With that as background, we address St. Joe’s Petition for Review to ascertain whether the determination of the referee in suspending payments by St. Joe is supported by competent, substantial evidence or whether he committed an error of law.
It is beyond peradventure that St. Joe, in seeking to set aside its reinstatement agreement, had the burden to establish that Byers incurred a new, separate and different disabling injury between February 22 and March 2, 1988 rather than a recurrence of the one he suffered on December 2, 1986. In Forbes Health System v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Washington), 75 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 639, 463 A.2d 83 (1983), the employer, like St. Joe in the present case, claimed that the claimant’s injury was not work related and argued that the referee erred by not placing upon the claimant the burden to [227] establish the causal connection between the injury and his employment. We held that it is the employer seeking to terminate benefits who bears the burden to prove a change in a claimant’s disability and stated that, “[w]e have never held that in termination proceedings the burden shifts at anytime to the claimant to prove the existence of a causal connection between his disability and his injury.” 75 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 642-643, 463 A.2d at 85.
In Vann v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 508 Pa. 139, 494 A.2d 1081 (1985), the claimant was denied unemployment compensation benefits based on a determination of willful misconduct. At the hearing before the referee, the employer did not appear; however, the claimant did appear and testified. Notwithstanding the employer had the burden of proving willful misconduet, and the non-appearance of the employer at the hearing, the referee denied benefits to the claimant. The Board affirmed the referee, finding that the claimant’s voluntary testimony carried the employer’s burden of establishing willful misconduct. Upon appeal to this Court, we held that a referee is required to explain that, where the employer has the burden of proof, the claimant is not required to testify and that if the claimant did testify, his/her testimony could be used to support a determination of ineligibility. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court determined that this Court erred in fashioning such a rule and held that a party who by law has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to support a favorable finding, if upon review of the entire record, that party failed in its burden, then the factfinder may rule in favor of the opposing party as a matter of law. The Supreme Court, rather than remanding the matter, reviewed the whole record and found it did not disclose any competent evidence to meet employer’s burden of showing willful misconduct and it vacated this Court’s order and remanded to the Board for computation of benefits.
The transcript of the four hearings in the present case conclusively establishes that St. Joe failed to present any [228] evidence in support of its petition to set aside its agreement reinstating payments to Byers. Thus, there was no competent evidence in the record to meet St. Joe’s burden of proof and the referee erred in not ruling in favor of Byers on St. Joe’s petition for review as a matter of law.
Additionally, the referee’s determination that Byers suffered an aggravation of his December 2, 1986 injury between February 22, 1988 and March 2, 1988 thus rendering Zinc liable for payment of benefits to Byers on and after March 3, 1988 is not supported by substantial competent evidence.
The only expert medical testimony as to whether the disability of Byers on March 3, 1988 was either an aggravation of a prior injury or a recurrence of disability as a result of the prior injury was that of Dr. Reyes. Significantly, in the referee’s Findings of Fact, of which there were 36, there is no finding of fact or conclusion of law that Dr. Reyes was not qualified or credible; nor did the referee find that Dr. Reyes’ testimony was equivocal, self-contradicting or inconsistent.
The referee, under the heading Findings, of Fact, listed the following:
22. That it is obvious from the testimony elicited from Dr. Reyes under direct and cross examination by counsel at his deposition that he had great difficulty in determining the difference between a recurrence of disability as a result of the December 2, 1986 injury or an aggravation of said injury as a result of the claimant’s environmental exposure resulting in disability. The doctor indicated in various parts of his testimony that the disability was caused by either a recurrence or aggravation of his foot problem.