25CA1728 Zimmerman v ICAO 01-29-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1728 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 9492-2025
Deanna Zimmerman,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Yun and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 29, 2026
Deanna Zimmerman, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent ¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, Deanna Zimmerman
seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office
(Panel). The Panel affirmed a hearing officer’s decision denying
Zimmerman’s request to backdate her benefits claim. We affirm the
Panel’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Zimmerman separated from her employer in early November
2023. She did not file a claim for unemployment benefits until late
January 2024 because she had accepted a “severance package”
from her employer, which she understood to postpone her receipt of
benefits. See § 8-73-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (when an individual
receives a “severance allowance,” unemployment benefits are
postponed commensurate with their usual weekly wage).
¶3 Zimmerman then began a new job in February 2024.
¶4 The Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) did not
issue a decision on Zimmerman’s claim until early March 2025. At
that time, a deputy with the Division determined that the payment
Zimmerman had received from her employer was not a “severance
allowance” for purposes of the unemployment statutes. See § 8-70-
103(23.7)(b), C.R.S. 2025 (excluding from the definition of
1 “severance allowance” an employer’s payment made with the
purpose of “induc[ing] the individual to waive rights or claims
against the employer”). Thus, the payment did not trigger section
8-73-110(1)(a)’s benefit postponement as Zimmerman had believed.
¶5 After several attempts to contact the Division, Zimmerman
requested on March 20, 2025, that her claim be “backdate[d]” to
November 12, 2023, which was shortly after her job separation. A
deputy with the Division denied the backdate request because it
was submitted after the 180-day deadline set by the unemployment
regulations. See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Regs. 2.1.10.3, 2.3.4, 7
Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.
¶6 Zimmerman appealed this decision to a hearing officer, who
affirmed the deputy’s decision after a hearing.
¶7 Zimmerman appealed that decision to the Panel. Two
members of the Panel agreed that the hearing officer’s decision
should be affirmed. A third Panel member dissented.
II. Standard of Review
¶8 We may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel
acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was
procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings do not support its
2 decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-
107(6), C.R.S. 2025; Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2013
COA 124, ¶ 9.
III. Legal Principles
¶9 An individual is eligible to receive unemployment benefits for
weeks of unemployment after filing an initial claim. The Division
may “backdate” a claim, enabling the claimant to receive benefits
for weeks of unemployment prior to the effective date of the claim.
See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Regs. 2.1.10.3, 2.3.4, 7 Code Colo.
Regs. 1101-2. However, the Division may backdate a claim only if
the claimant (1) requested the claim be backdated within 180 days
of the “applicable time period,” and (2) “exercised no control over
the circumstances” of the untimely filing. Div. of Unemployment
Ins. Regs. 2.1.10.3, 2.3.4, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. “Being
unaware of the need to timely file shall not be considered a factor
outside of the [claimant’s] control.” Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg.
2.1.10.3, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.
IV. Analysis
¶ 10 Because Zimmerman is now self-represented, we construe her
arguments broadly, focusing on substance rather than form. See
3 Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. But it is not our role to rewrite
a self-represented appellant’s brief or act as their advocate.
Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10; see Minshall v. Johnston,
2018 COA 44, ¶ 21 (“[L]iberal construction does not include
inventing arguments not made by the [self-represented] party.”).1
¶ 11 But before turning to her arguments, we review the hearing
officer’s and the Panel’s decisions. The hearing officer found that
Zimmerman would have had to request a backdate by May 13,
2024, to fall within the 180-day window.2 But Zimmerman
requested her claim be backdated on March 20, 2025, and the
hearing officer therefore concluded she missed the deadline. In
light of this conclusion, the hearing officer determined that the
issue of whether Zimmerman exercised control over the
circumstances of the untimely filing was “moot.”
¶ 12 The Panel agreed with the hearing officer’s conclusion that
Zimmerman made her request after the 180-day time limit had
1 Accordingly, we do not address the due process argument
Zimmerman raised before the Panel but does not reassert here. 2 The hearing officer found that the last date of the “applicable time
period” was November 15, 2023. See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 2.3.5, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. 180 days after that date was May 13, 2024.
4 expired. Unlike the hearing officer’s mootness determination, the
Panel concluded that Zimmerman had control over the
circumstances that led to the late filing. In doing so, the Panel
noted that it was undisputed Zimmerman timed her initial filing
based on her understanding of the law regarding the receipt of
severance pay.
¶ 13 Next, we turn to Zimmerman’s arguments. First, relying on
Regulation 12.1.8, she appears to argue that she had “good cause”
such that her untimely backdate request should have been
permitted. See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.8, 7 Code Colo.
Regs. 1101-2 (listing nonexclusive factors the panel or division
considers when determining whether good cause exists for
permitting certain untimely actions). She also contends that she
had “no knowledge of the need” to submit her backdate request
within 180 days.
¶ 14 It is unclear whether either of these arguments is preserved for
appellate review. See Debalco Enters., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals
Off., 32 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2001) (declining to address issues
that were not raised in the administrative proceedings and not
preserved for appellate review); QFD Accessories, Inc. v. Indus. Claim
5 Appeals Off., 873 P.2d 32, 33-34 (Colo. App. 1993) (arguments not
raised before the Panel are not preserved for appellate review).
Zimmerman’s opening brief does not address preservation, and our
own review of the record confirms that briefing before the Panel
focused on whether the hearing officer’s ruling violated
Zimmerman’s due process rights
¶ 15 Even if we were to assume that the arguments were preserved,
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25CA1728 Zimmerman v ICAO 01-29-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA1728 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado DD No. 9492-2025
Deanna Zimmerman,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Yun and Schock, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced January 29, 2026
Deanna Zimmerman, Pro Se
No Appearance for Respondent ¶1 In this unemployment benefits case, Deanna Zimmerman
seeks review of a final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office
(Panel). The Panel affirmed a hearing officer’s decision denying
Zimmerman’s request to backdate her benefits claim. We affirm the
Panel’s order.
I. Background
¶2 Zimmerman separated from her employer in early November
2023. She did not file a claim for unemployment benefits until late
January 2024 because she had accepted a “severance package”
from her employer, which she understood to postpone her receipt of
benefits. See § 8-73-110(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025 (when an individual
receives a “severance allowance,” unemployment benefits are
postponed commensurate with their usual weekly wage).
¶3 Zimmerman then began a new job in February 2024.
¶4 The Division of Unemployment Insurance (Division) did not
issue a decision on Zimmerman’s claim until early March 2025. At
that time, a deputy with the Division determined that the payment
Zimmerman had received from her employer was not a “severance
allowance” for purposes of the unemployment statutes. See § 8-70-
103(23.7)(b), C.R.S. 2025 (excluding from the definition of
1 “severance allowance” an employer’s payment made with the
purpose of “induc[ing] the individual to waive rights or claims
against the employer”). Thus, the payment did not trigger section
8-73-110(1)(a)’s benefit postponement as Zimmerman had believed.
¶5 After several attempts to contact the Division, Zimmerman
requested on March 20, 2025, that her claim be “backdate[d]” to
November 12, 2023, which was shortly after her job separation. A
deputy with the Division denied the backdate request because it
was submitted after the 180-day deadline set by the unemployment
regulations. See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Regs. 2.1.10.3, 2.3.4, 7
Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.
¶6 Zimmerman appealed this decision to a hearing officer, who
affirmed the deputy’s decision after a hearing.
¶7 Zimmerman appealed that decision to the Panel. Two
members of the Panel agreed that the hearing officer’s decision
should be affirmed. A third Panel member dissented.
II. Standard of Review
¶8 We may only set aside the Panel’s decision if (1) the Panel
acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the decision was
procured by fraud; (3) the factual findings do not support its
2 decision; or (4) the decision is erroneous as a matter of law. § 8-74-
107(6), C.R.S. 2025; Yotes, Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2013
COA 124, ¶ 9.
III. Legal Principles
¶9 An individual is eligible to receive unemployment benefits for
weeks of unemployment after filing an initial claim. The Division
may “backdate” a claim, enabling the claimant to receive benefits
for weeks of unemployment prior to the effective date of the claim.
See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Regs. 2.1.10.3, 2.3.4, 7 Code Colo.
Regs. 1101-2. However, the Division may backdate a claim only if
the claimant (1) requested the claim be backdated within 180 days
of the “applicable time period,” and (2) “exercised no control over
the circumstances” of the untimely filing. Div. of Unemployment
Ins. Regs. 2.1.10.3, 2.3.4, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. “Being
unaware of the need to timely file shall not be considered a factor
outside of the [claimant’s] control.” Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg.
2.1.10.3, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.
IV. Analysis
¶ 10 Because Zimmerman is now self-represented, we construe her
arguments broadly, focusing on substance rather than form. See
3 Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5. But it is not our role to rewrite
a self-represented appellant’s brief or act as their advocate.
Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10; see Minshall v. Johnston,
2018 COA 44, ¶ 21 (“[L]iberal construction does not include
inventing arguments not made by the [self-represented] party.”).1
¶ 11 But before turning to her arguments, we review the hearing
officer’s and the Panel’s decisions. The hearing officer found that
Zimmerman would have had to request a backdate by May 13,
2024, to fall within the 180-day window.2 But Zimmerman
requested her claim be backdated on March 20, 2025, and the
hearing officer therefore concluded she missed the deadline. In
light of this conclusion, the hearing officer determined that the
issue of whether Zimmerman exercised control over the
circumstances of the untimely filing was “moot.”
¶ 12 The Panel agreed with the hearing officer’s conclusion that
Zimmerman made her request after the 180-day time limit had
1 Accordingly, we do not address the due process argument
Zimmerman raised before the Panel but does not reassert here. 2 The hearing officer found that the last date of the “applicable time
period” was November 15, 2023. See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 2.3.5, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. 180 days after that date was May 13, 2024.
4 expired. Unlike the hearing officer’s mootness determination, the
Panel concluded that Zimmerman had control over the
circumstances that led to the late filing. In doing so, the Panel
noted that it was undisputed Zimmerman timed her initial filing
based on her understanding of the law regarding the receipt of
severance pay.
¶ 13 Next, we turn to Zimmerman’s arguments. First, relying on
Regulation 12.1.8, she appears to argue that she had “good cause”
such that her untimely backdate request should have been
permitted. See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 12.1.8, 7 Code Colo.
Regs. 1101-2 (listing nonexclusive factors the panel or division
considers when determining whether good cause exists for
permitting certain untimely actions). She also contends that she
had “no knowledge of the need” to submit her backdate request
within 180 days.
¶ 14 It is unclear whether either of these arguments is preserved for
appellate review. See Debalco Enters., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals
Off., 32 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2001) (declining to address issues
that were not raised in the administrative proceedings and not
preserved for appellate review); QFD Accessories, Inc. v. Indus. Claim
5 Appeals Off., 873 P.2d 32, 33-34 (Colo. App. 1993) (arguments not
raised before the Panel are not preserved for appellate review).
Zimmerman’s opening brief does not address preservation, and our
own review of the record confirms that briefing before the Panel
focused on whether the hearing officer’s ruling violated
Zimmerman’s due process rights
¶ 15 Even if we were to assume that the arguments were preserved,
however, they would still fail. The good cause exception that
Zimmerman relies on doesn’t apply to this backdating issue. See
Div. of Unemployment Ins. Regs. 2.1.10.3, 2.3.4, 12.1.2, 7 Code
Colo. Regs. 1101-2. And, as noted above, a claimant’s showing they
exercised no control over the circumstances of an untimely filing
cannot be based on their lack of knowledge of the relevant filing
deadlines. Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 2.1.10.3, 7 Code Colo.
Regs. 1101-2.
¶ 16 Zimmerman’s other contentions are more clearly preserved,
see In re Estate of Ramstetter, 2016 COA 81, ¶ 68 (“[R]aising the
‘sum and substance’ of an argument is sufficient to preserve it.”
(citation omitted)), but we are not persuaded that they warrant
relief. As best we can tell, both arguments challenge the Panel’s
6 conclusion that she exercised control over the circumstances
surrounding her untimely filing. See Div. of Unemployment Ins.
Regs. 2.1.10.3, 2.3.4, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2.
¶ 17 Zimmerman first asserts that she was unaware that the
payment she received from her employer, for which she had to “give
up [her] rights,” did not qualify as a severance allowance for
benefits purposes. See § 8-70-103(23.7)(b). But like all claimants
for unemployment benefits, she is presumed to know the contents
of the unemployment statutes and regulations. See Boeheim v.
Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 23 P.3d 1247, 1249 (Colo. App. 2001); cf.
Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg. 2.1.10.3, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2
(being unaware of the need to timely file is not a factor outside a
claimant’s control).
¶ 18 Zimmerman also contends that it was the “untimely actions”
of the Division that were “out of [her] control.” It is true that, for
reasons unexplained by the record, the Division did not decide the
“severance” issue until roughly 400 days after Zimmerman filed her
claim. And it is also true, as noted by the dissenting Panel
member, that the Division’s delayed resolution of this issue
occurred despite a deputy’s obligation to “promptly examine all
7 materials submitted” pertinent to a benefits claim. See § 8-74-
102(1), C.R.S. 2025 (emphasis added). However, regardless of
whether Zimmerman had control over the circumstances of the late
filing, Regulation 2.1.10 prohibits backdating when requested
beyond the 180-day deadline. See Div. of Unemployment Ins. Reg.
2.1.10, 7 Code Colo. Regs. 1101-2. The hearing officer found, and
it is undisputed, that Zimmerman filed her request beyond the 180-
day window. See also § 8-74-107(4) (a hearing officer’s factual
findings are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence).
Thus, we are not persuaded by Zimmerman’s arguments.
¶ 19 In sum, the Division lacked regulatory authority to grant
Zimmerman’s backdate request. And the regulations must be
enforced as written. See Dep’t of Revenue v. Agilent Techs., Inc.,
2019 CO 41, ¶ 25 (when a regulation’s language is clear and
unambiguous, it must be applied as written). On review of the
arguments raised and the record, we must affirm the Panel’s order.
See McGrath, ¶ 10; Dep’t of Revenue, ¶ 25.
V. Disposition
¶ 20 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE YUN and JUDGE SCHOCK concur.