Ziglar v. City of Winston-Salem

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedJanuary 8, 1998
DocketI.C. No. 128709.
StatusPublished

This text of Ziglar v. City of Winston-Salem (Ziglar v. City of Winston-Salem) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ziglar v. City of Winston-Salem, (N.C. Super. Ct. 1998).

Opinion

The Full Commission has reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Theresa B. Stephenson and the briefs and oral arguments before the Full Commission. The appealing party has shown good ground to reconsider the evidence in this matter. Having reconsidered the evidence of record, the Full Commission reverses the Deputy Commissioner's denial of benefits and enters the following Opinion and Award.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing, and following, and in a Pre-Trial Agreement, as:

STIPULATIONS
1. All parties are properly before the North Carolina Industrial Commission and are bound by the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

2. An employer-employee relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant-employer on 8 April 1991.

3. The City of Winston-Salem is self-insured.

4. Plaintiff's average weekly wage of $340.80 per week yields a compensation rate of $227.21 per week.

5. Plaintiff entered into a Form 21 Agreement with defendant-employer on 21 April 1991, approved by the Commission 20 May 1991. Pursuant to this agreement plaintiff was paid temporary total disability from 9 April 1991 through 4 August 1991 at his compensation rate of $227.21.

6. Plaintiff and defendant-employer executed a Form 26 Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement as to Payment of Compensation on 1 August 1991, approved by the Commission 30 August 1991. Plaintiff received payment for a ten percent (10%) permanent partial disability to his back, 30 weeks at his compensation rate of $227.21.

7. On 15 March 1994 plaintiff and defendant-employer entered into a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement as to Payment of Compensation, approved by the Commission 23 March 1994. Pursuant to the terms of this agreement, plaintiff was compensated for thirty (30) weeks at his compensation rate of $227.21 per week beginning 15 February 1994, for an additional ten percent (10%) permanent partial disability rating to his back. Plaintiff now seeks to set aside this agreement. This agreement is admitted into evidence as Stipulated Exhibit #1.

8. A one page letter from the Personnel Supervisor at defendant-employer to plaintiff, dated 14 April 1991, is admitted as Stipulated Exhibit #2.

9. The Pre-Trial Agreement between the parties is admitted as Stipulated Exhibit #3.

10. The medical records of plaintiff from Dr. Brown, Dr. Jones and Dr. De la Torre concerning this claim are received into evidence.

11. The issues to be determined are whether the Form 26, approved 23 March 1994, should be set aside; whether plaintiff has suffered a change of condition; and what additional benefits, if any, is plaintiff entitled to.

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RULINGS ON EVIDENTIARY MATTERS
The objections contained within the deposition of Kathryn Ann Krupa is ruled upon in accordance with the applicable provisions of the law and the Opinion and Award in this case and the testimony of Rocky Schuyler at the hearing is ruled upon in accordance with the applicable provisions of the law and the Opinion and Award in this case.

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Based upon all of the competent evidence adduced in this case and reasonable inferences drawn therefor, the Full Commission makes the following additional:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On 8 April 1991 plaintiff was a 31 year old male employed by defendant-employer as a crew leader with defendant-employer.

2. On 8 April 1991 plaintiff suffered a compensable injury to his back while lifting a fifty (50) pound bag of grass seed from his truck.

3. Conservative treatment was unsuccessful; as a result of plaintiff's compensable injury, he underwent a laminectomy in April, 1991, performed by Dr. De la Torre.

4. Plaintiff received temporary total disability compensation from 9 April 1991 thorough 4 August 1991, pursuant to the Form 21 Agreement approved 20 May 1991.

5. Plaintiff first reached maximum medical improvement in August, 1991 and received a ten percent (10%) permanent partial disability to his back. Plaintiff was compensated for this disability pursuant to a Form 26 Agreement approved by the Commission 30 August 1991.

6. Plaintiff returned to work for defendant-employer in a modified duty capacity. Plaintiff again went out of work and underwent surgery on 20 September 1993, performed by Dr. William Brown. This surgery freed up nerve roots and scar tissue which had formed as the result of the previous surgery.

7. Plaintiff received temporary total disability for that time period he was unable to earn wages. Plaintiff again reached maximum improvement in February, 1994 and received an additional ten percent (10%) permanent partial disability rating on 15 February 1994.

8. Plaintiff was compensated for this additional ten percent (10%) rating pursuant to a Form 26 Agreement, approved by the Commission 23 March 1994. At the time plaintiff signed this agreement he was on light duty with the City of Winston-Salem and reasonably believed his employment with the City would continue. However, within a month of the Commission's approval of the Form 26, Plaintiff was notified that his temporary light duty job would soon end and that he would have to take medical retirement if a suitable permanent job could not be found for him among the City's available jobs. He was forced to take medical retirement shortly thereafter. Under these circumstances, the Commission's approval of the Form 26 agreement was improvident. There is no showing on this record that Plaintiff made a knowing decision between collecting his disability rating or collecting continuing compensation, which was the more beneficial of the two remedies available to him under the law. The plaintiff's testimony that if had known of the two different remedies available he would have chosen the more beneficial one is eminently credible. A person would have to be bereft of sense to chose otherwise, and the Deputy Commissioner's finding of no credibility is therefore set aside by the Commission.

9. Other testimony in the record tended to show that the City either has an unwritten policy of placing its injured workers on temporary light duty until they are rated and have signed a Form 26 agreeing to accept the rating and then telling them the temporary job has expired and no permanent job is available or else has structured its personnel, disability and workers compensation divisions such that its injured workers are not fully appraised of their rights.

10. Kathryn Krupa, the Workers' Compensation Analyst for the defendant-employer dealt personally with plaintiff with respect to the March, 1994 Form 26. Ms. Krupa testified that her practice was to go over the agreement with the injured worker and explain that he had two (2) years from the last payment of compensation to claim a change of condition or additional medical expenses. However, there was no evidence the injured worker was told that he had an option of not accepting the Form 26 compensation and instead obtain continuing disability payments in the event he was not provided permanent employment when his temporary job expired.

11.

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Related

§ 97-17
North Carolina § 97-17

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Bluebook (online)
Ziglar v. City of Winston-Salem, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ziglar-v-city-of-winston-salem-ncworkcompcom-1998.