Ziarah Quincy-Kamazz Broadus-Bynum v. De Los Santos, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 8, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02717
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ZIARAH QUINCY-KAMAZZ No. 2:25-cv-02717-CKD P BROADUS-BYNUM, 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER v. 14 DE LOS SANTOS, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 18 U.S.C. § 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 19 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 20 Plaintiff has requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff’s 21 declaration in support of the motion makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The 22 motion is granted. By separate order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in 23 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The order will direct the appropriate 24 agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the 25 Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent 26 of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will 27 be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in 28 plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 I. Screening Requirement 2 The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss a case if the 3 action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 4 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(e)(2). 6 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 7 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th 8 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an 9 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 10 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully 11 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th 12 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227. 13 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 14 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 15 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 16 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 17 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 18 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 19 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 20 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 21 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, 22 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and 23 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 24 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 25 II. Allegations in the Complaint 26 In Claim I, plaintiff alleges that on May 1, 2025, “Modesto Police Department peace 27 officers Muoz and Magubot conducted an illegal search and seizure at 222 Locust Street in 28 Modesto.” ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was “awoken and arrested for no reason” in 1 violation of his right to be free from illegal search and seizure. Id. 2 In Claim II, plaintiff alleges “entrapment,” asserting that officers used a pretext of looking 3 for “Ceno” which he believes to be a lie based on his observation of his name on the computer in 4 the police car. Id. at 5. 5 In Claim III, plaintiff alleges “planted evidence and failure to preserve evidence.” Id at 6. 6 Plaintiff alleges that despite defendant Munoz searching him twice, Stanislaus County Deputy 7 “William B.” claimed that he found 3 pieces of foil on the ground while “he was cutting off my 8 ankle monitor,” and when Sergeant De Los Santos was “walking in.” Id. Plaintiff also claims that 9 “only 2 of the 3 pieces of evidence made it to the evidence locker; 1 piece of evidence is missing 10 which is a failure to preserve evidence.” Id. 11 In Claim IV, plaintiff alleges “inhumane and hazardous conditions,” asserting that 12 defendant De Los Santos placed him in a cell with feces on “the wall, floor, door and the air 13 vent.” Id at 7. Plaintiff alleges that the cell had “the previous inmate’s bedding, clothing and used 14 food trays.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he required medical attention on May 11, 2025, 15 because of the conditions, suffering from shortness of breath, nausea, headaches, tiredness, “and 16 later for a skin rash that spread and turned into an infection/open wound.” Id. 17 In Claim V, plaintiff alleges that defendant “Singh G. grabbed [him] very aggressively 18 and pushed [him] up the stairs and into [his] cell.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff alleges that, based on a prior 19 shooting injury, the incident caused him “severe pain for about two weeks.” Id. 20 In Claim VI, plaintiff alleges that he is receiving inadequate legal counsel from his 21 attorney, defendant Schied. Id. at 11. 22 In Claim VII, plaintiff alleges he has been denied access to the courts regarding the mail 23 process at the Stanislaus County Jail. Id. at 15. 24 In Claim VIII, plaintiff alleges retaliation and bias, claiming that his mail was delayed, 25 and he was denied showers and yard time. Id. at 27. 26 Plaintiff demands compensatory damages, release from custody, or the setting of bail. Id. 27 at 29. 28 ///// 1 III. Legal Standards 2 A. Linkage 3 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the violation 4 of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person 5 acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. 6 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil 7 rights claim unless the facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional 8 deprivation or a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged 9 constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. 10 Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). 11 B. Supervisory Liability 12 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their 13 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009) 14 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, 15 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own 16 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between 17 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a 18 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or 19 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act 20 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 21 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). 22 C. Medical Care 23 Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 24 violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 25 97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 26 deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 27 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 28 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 1 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 2 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 3 grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 4 plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 5 condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 6 pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 7 existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 8 comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 9 individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 10 at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 11 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 12 indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 13 or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 14 indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 15 which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 16 “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 17 approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 18 showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 19 Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 20 difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 21 a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 22 treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 23 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 24 medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 25 indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 26 Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 27 prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 28 known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 1 D. Equal Protection 2 The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 3 alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), superseded by 4 statute on other grounds; Hartmann v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 5 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008). It applies both inside and 6 outside of prison walls. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 333 (1968). To state a claim, plaintiff 7 must show that defendant intentionally discriminated against him based on his membership in a 8 protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123. Under this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff 9 must show that the defendant's actions were a result of the plaintiff's membership in a suspect 10 class, such as race, religion, or alienage. Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001). 11 The Fourteenth Amendment also prevents disparate treatment based on sexual orientation. United 12 States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013). 13 If the challenged action does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish 14 an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated 15 differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook 16 v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 17 (1973). To state an equal protection claim under this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the 18 plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently 19 from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. 20 Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. 21 E. Counsel’s Performance 22 A plaintiff may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress violations of “rights, 23 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws” by a person or entity 24 acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a 25 plaintiff must show (1) the defendant committed the alleged conduct while acting under color of 26 state law; and (2) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right as a result of the defendant’s 27 conduct. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 28 A plaintiff cannot state a claim for damages under § 1983 against the attorney who 1 represented him in his criminal case. A public defender representing a client in the lawyer’s 2 traditional adversarial role is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 3 U.S. 81, 91 (2009) (“assigned counsel ordinarily is not considered a state actor”) (citing Polk 4 County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)). 5 F. Access to Courts 6 Plaintiff has a constitutional right of access to the courts and prison officials may not 7 actively interfere with his right to litigate. Silva v. Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 8 2011). Prisoners also enjoy some degree of First Amendment rights in their legal 9 correspondence. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824-25 (1977). However, to state a viable 10 claim for relief, plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect 11 to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a 12 non-frivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 13 G. Habeas Corpus 14 When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks is the 15 determination of his entitlement to an earlier or immediate release, his sole federal remedy is a 16 writ of habeas corpus which plaintiff would seek under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 17 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). Also, to the extent plaintiff seeks damages, plaintiff is informed he 18 cannot proceed on a §1983 claim for damages if the claim implies the invalidity of his conviction 19 or sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). 20 H. Joinder of Parties and Claims 21 A plaintiff may properly assert multiple claims against a single defendant in a civil action. 22 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 18. In addition, a plaintiff may join multiple defendants in one action where 23 “any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to 24 or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and occurrences” and 25 “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 20(a)(2). However, unrelated claims against different defendants must be pursued in separate 27 lawsuits. See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). This rule is intended “not only 28 to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to 1 ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 2 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the 3 required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).” Id. 4 I. Excessive Force 5 A pretrial detainee may not be subjected to restrictions and/or conditions of confinement 6 that amount to “punishment” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 7 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37 (1979); Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 8 1246 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016). 9 In order to state a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, plaintiff must allege 10 specific facts showing (1) a defendant purposely and knowingly used force against him; and (2) 11 the force used was objectively unreasonable. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 12 (2015). 13 J. First Amendment Retaliation 14 “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five 15 basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 16 because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 17 exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 18 correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 19 Filing an inmate grievance is a protected action under the First Amendment. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 20 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003). A prison transfer may also constitute an adverse action. See 21 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005) (recognizing an arbitrary confiscation and 22 destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault as retaliation for filing inmate 23 grievances); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that a retaliatory prison 24 transfer and double-cell status can constitute a cause of action for retaliation under the First 25 Amendment). 26 K. Conditions of Confinement 27 Pretrial detainee rights concerning conditions of confinement are outlined in Castro v. 28 Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-1068 (9th Cir. 2016). A prison official’s failure to 1 protect a pretrial detainee is actionable if four conditions are met: 2 1. The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under 3 which the plaintiff was confined; 4 2. Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; 5 3. The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even 6 though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree 7 of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and 8 4. By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 9 Id. at 1071. As to the third element, the defendant’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable. 10 Id. 11 IV. Analysis 12 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon 13 which relief can be granted under federal law. The court will, however, grant leave to file an 14 amended complaint. 15 V. Amended Complaint 16 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 17 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 18 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in 19 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. 20 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the 21 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 22 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of 23 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 24 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 25 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 26 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 27 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 28 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 1 | longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 2 || complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 3 VI. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 4 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 5 || intended as legal advice. 6 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not 7 || state any claim against any defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being 8 | given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order. Although you are not 9 || required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30 days from the date of this order. 10 || If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular attention to the legal standards 11 || identified in this order which may apply to your claims. 12 VU. Conclusion 13 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 14 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2, 6) is granted. 15 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees 16 || shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California 17 || Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 18 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. 19 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended 20 | complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 21 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 22 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an 23 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action 24 || be dismissed. 25 | Dated: April 8, 2026 □□ I / dle ae

27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE CKD.broadus.2717.screen 28 10