Zia Shaikh v. New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance Div

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: January 22, 2026
• Docket: 25-2445
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2445 ___________

ZIA HASSAN SHAIKH, Appellant

v.

STATE OF NEW JERSEY-DEPARTMENT OF BANKING & INSURANCE, DIVISION OF INSURANCE; JOHN/JANE DOE, Employee Defendants; MARLENE CARIDE, Commissioner, in Her Official & Individual Capacity; STATE OF NEW JERSEY-REAL ESTATE COMMISSION; MR. AURELIO ROMERO, Executive Di- rector in Her Official & Individual Capacity; MS. LAUREN GLANTZBERG, Supervisor of Investigations in Her Official & Individual Capacity; BRIAN M. THORN, ESQ., At- torney; WHITE, FLEISCHNER & FINO LAW FIRM; NEW JERSEY- DAG RYAN SCHAFFER ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-14092) District Judge: Honorable Georgette Castner ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 19, 2025

Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 22, 2026) ____________________________________ ___________

OPINION* ___________

PER CURIAM

Zia Shaikh appeals pro se from the District Court’s order denying his motion filed

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and (d) as well as its order denying re-

consideration of that decision and imposing a filing injunction. For the reasons that fol-

low, we will affirm.

I.

In 2019, Shaikh filed a complaint in the District Court related to the revocation of

his New Jersey licenses to produce insurance and to sell real estate. His complaint named

the state defendants involved in the revocation, and he later named as defendants the pri-

vate attorneys who represented him in connection with the revocation. Among other

things, Shaikh alleged that the defendants’ actions were wrongfully motivated by his eth-

nicity and religious beliefs.

In April 2024, the District Court dismissed some of Shaikh’s claims with preju-

dice, dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice, and permitted Shaikh to seek

leave to file an amended complaint as to those claims, which were brought under state

tort law and under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. In December 2024, the District Court

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 2 denied Shaikh’s motion to amend and dismissed the remaining claims with prejudice,

concluding that Shaikh had not cured the deficiencies identified in the original complaint.

Among other deficiencies, the District Court determined that the claims against the

private attorneys were time-barred, the claims against the state defendants were mostly

barred on immunity grounds, and the claims against the state employees in their individ-

ual capacities failed because Shaikh did not plead sufficient facts to show their personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs. Shaikh then filed a motion for reconsideration, which

the District Court denied on April 30, 2025, concluding that Shaikh’s arguments were

primarily “regurgitations of prior arguments” that the court had considered and rejected.

ECF No. 81 at 12. The District Court’s order also denied Shaikh’s motion to recuse the

District Judge based on a separate lawsuit that Shaikh had filed against her. And the Dis-

trict Court denied the defendants’ motion for a broad filing injunction, but warned that

the court was “troubled” by Shaikh’s “repeated efforts to file frivolous motions in this

case.” Id. at 15. The District Court stated that Shaikh “is on notice” that the court would

impose a filing injunction if he continued “to abuse the judicial process.” Id. at 15.

Shaikh did not then file a timely notice of appeal from the April 30, 2025 order.

Over two months later, on July 12, 2025, Shaikh filed a motion to reopen the case

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(6), and (d)(3). On July 15,

2025, the District Court entered a text order denying the motion and concluding that

Shaikh had merely repeated his disagreement with the District Court’s prior rulings. The

order warned Shaikh that “the Court will issue a filing injunction” if he continued to file

repetitive motions based on the same disagreements with the District Court’s rulings.

3 ECF No. 84. That same day, Shaikh filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 15,

2025 order. Shaikh also made arguments for why a filing injunction should not issue.

On July 17, 2025, the District Court entered a text order denying the motion for reconsid-

eration, explaining that Shaikh had again merely repeated his prior disagreement with the

District Court’s rulings. The District Court’s order also imposed a filing injunction “in

this case.” ECF No. 86. On July 27, 2025, Shaikh filed a notice of appeal.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d

157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011). Because Shaikh’s notice of appeal is timely only as to the Dis-

trict Court’s July 15, 2025 order denying his Rule 60 motion, and the July 17, 2025 order

denying reconsideration of that motion and imposing a filing injunction, our jurisdiction

is limited to reviewing those orders. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. 205, 209–14 (2007); see also Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S.

257, 263 n.7 (1978) (“[A]n appeal from [the] denial of Rule 60(b) relief does

not bring up the underlying judgment for review.”).1 We review for abuse of discretion

the District Court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) and (d) motion in this case, the denial of re-

consideration, and the imposition of the filing injunction. See Jackson, 656 F.3d at 162;

1 After filing his notice of appeal in this case, Shaikh was denied relief that he sought from District Court Chief Judge Bumb, who denied his request via a letter order on July 28, 2025. Because Shaikh did not file a new or amended notice of appeal from that order, we lack jurisdiction to review it. Cf. Manivannan v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 42 F.4th 163, 169 n.1 (3d Cir. 2022). 4 Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901

F.2d 329, 331 (3d Cir. 1990).

III.

We agree with the District Court’s determination that Shaikh failed to set forth any

grounds for relief under Rule 60(b) and (d). Shaikh merely repeated arguments that he

had previously made regarding the merits of his complaint. For example, he argued that

his claims were timely and that the District Court had erred in its sovereign immunity

analysis. These are arguments that he could have raised via a timely appeal of the Dis-

trict Court’s order dismissing his complaint with prejudice. See Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d

333, 343 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that Rule 60(b) may not be used as a substitute for

appeal); see also Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 538 (2022) (declining to define

Rule 60(b)’s “reasonable time” standard but noting that Courts of Appeals have used it to

deny Rule 60(b) motions alleging errors that could have been raised in a timely appeal).

To the extent that Shaikh’s motion was based on alleged fraud or misconduct due

to the District Judge’s failure to recuse, we agree that this was not a basis for relief here.

See Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (rejecting argu-

ment that district judge should have recused herself simply because the plaintiff had sued

her in another case).2 Because Shaikh’s motion for reconsideration merely repeated the

same arguments, the District Court properly denied it. See Lazaridis, 591 F.3d at 669

2 To the extent that Shaikh has requested mandamus relief based on his argument that the District Judge’s recusal was warranted, we deny the request, for the same reasons we pro- vided when we denied his prior mandamus petition seeking the same relief. See C.A. No. 25-1928. 5 (holding, where litigant “advanced the same arguments that were in his complaint and

motions,” that “this is not a proper basis for reconsideration”).

Finally, the District Court’s imposition of a limited filing injunction in this case

was not an abuse of discretion. A court may impose an injunctive order on a litigant if:

(1) the litigant has been continuously abusing the judicial process; (2) the court provides

notice and an opportunity to respond; and (3) the scope of the injunction is “narrowly tai-

lored to fit the particular circumstances of the case before the District Court.” Brow v.

Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993).

Here, on the first prong, we agree with the District Court’s repeated observations

that Shaikh had abused the judicial process by submitting repetitive and frivolous filings.

With respect to notice, in April 2025, when the District Court denied the defendants’ re-

quest for a broad filing injunction, the court stated that Shaikh “is on notice” that the

court would impose a filing injunction if he continued “to abuse the judicial process.”

ECF 81 at 15. The District Court reiterated that notice in its July 15, 2025 order, which

specifically stated that “the Court will issue a filing injunction” if Shaikh continued to file

repetitive motions based on the same disagreements with the District Court’s rulings.

ECF No. 84. Shaikh’s motion for reconsideration included a response arguing why the

injunction should not issue, and in the July 17, 2025 order imposing the filing injunction,

the District Court cited that document. While it may be preferable, in the ordinary

course, to issue “an order to show cause why the injunction should not issue,” Brow, 994

F.2d at 1039, the lack of such formal proceedings is not dispositive under the specific cir-

cumstances of this case. Cf. Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323,

6 334–35 (2d Cir. 1999). Here, where Shaikh in fact filed a response that was considered

by the District Court, we conclude that he was afforded notice and the “occasion to re-

spond” to the potential filing restriction. Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d

Cir. 1987) (per curiam). As to the third prong, the filing injunction that the District Court

imposed was narrowly tailored to this specific case. See Brow, 994 F.2d at 1038. Thus,

the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the injunction.

Accordingly, we will affirm. In light of our disposition, all of Shaikh’s motions

are denied, including his motions seeking relief from the District Court’s filing injunction

and seeking sanctions against the Appellees.