Zero Motorcycles, Inc. v. Pirelli Tyre S.P.A.

Ninth Circuit

Zero Motorcycles, Inc. v. Pirelli Tyre S.P.A.

517 F. App'x 589

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedApril 26, 2013

Docket11-16984, 12-16187

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 517 F. App'x 589 (Zero Motorcycles, Inc. v. Pirelli Tyre S.P.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Zero Motorcycles, Inc. v. Pirelli Tyre S.P.A., 517 F. App'x 589 (9th Cir. 2013).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

Plaintiff-Appellant Zero Motorcycles (“Zero”) appeals the district court’s order dismissing its action against Pirelli & C.S.pA. and Pirelli Tyre S.p.A. (collectively, “Pirelli-Defendants”) for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse, because the district court erred in concluding that it lacked specific jurisdiction over the Pi-relli-Defendants. The district court held that the trademark proceedings the Pirel-li-Defendants instituted before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) were not “purposefully directed” at California. The Pirelli-Defendants, however, knew that Zero’s principal place of business was in California. See Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir.2012); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.2000). Any harm that Zero suffered from the allegedly improper USPTO proceedings would therefore be felt by Zero in California. See CollegeSource, Inc. v. Academy-One Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir.2011) (“We have repeatedly held that a corporation incurs economic loss, for jurisdictional purposes, in the forum of its principal place of business.”). Because the Pirelli-Defendants should reasonably expect that any harm from the USPTO proceedings would occur in California, they can “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in California. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

We accordingly dismiss as moot Zero’s appeal of the district court’s order denying Zero’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, and we do not consider Zero’s request for leave to amend its complaint to assert additional facts regarding jurisdiction.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM *

Plaintiff-Appellant Zero Motorcycles (“Zero”) appeals the district court’s order dismissing its action against Pirelli & C.S.pA. and Pirelli Tyre S.p.A. (collectively, “Pirelli-Defendants”) for lack of personal jurisdiction. We reverse, because the district court erred in concluding that it lacked specific jurisdiction over the Pi-relli-Defendants. The district court held that the trademark proceedings the Pirel-li-Defendants instituted before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) were not “purposefully directed” at California. The Pirelli-Defendants, however, knew that Zero’s principal place of business was in California. See Washington Shoe Co. v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir.2012); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir.2000). Any harm that Zero suffered from the allegedly improper USPTO proceedings would therefore be felt by Zero in California. See CollegeSource, Inc. v. Academy-One Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th Cir.2011) (“We have repeatedly held that a corporation incurs economic loss, for jurisdictional purposes, in the forum of its principal place of business.”). Because the Pirelli-Defendants should reasonably expect that any harm from the USPTO proceedings would occur in California, they can “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” in California. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

We accordingly dismiss as moot Zero’s appeal of the district court’s order denying Zero’s motion for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, and we do not consider Zero’s request for leave to amend its complaint to assert additional facts regarding jurisdiction.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

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517 F. App'x 589, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zero-motorcycles-inc-v-pirelli-tyre-spa-ca9-2013.

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