Zenitherm Co. v. Art Marble Co. of America

45 F.2d 208, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 276, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Mississippi
DecidedNovember 29, 1930
DocketNo. 307
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 45 F.2d 208 (Zenitherm Co. v. Art Marble Co. of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zenitherm Co. v. Art Marble Co. of America, 45 F.2d 208, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 276, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495 (S.D. Miss. 1930).

Opinion

HOLMES, District Judge.

This is a suit in equity alleging infringement of claims 1 and 4 of Sutter patent, No. 1,183,694, issued May 16, 1916, praying for an injunction and an accounting.

The patent relates to a process of producing fireproof insulating building material, recited to be of great structural strength, requiring no supporting walls, and of equal or greater insulating value than any such in general use when the patent was issued, with the additional advantages stated that it is nonhygroseopie, sound-deadening, nonwarping, may be worked as wood, and readily takes any finish that may be placed on wood or any enamel baking such as is used on enameled iron ware; also, that the material may be cast or molded into any shape or form.

The plaintiff’s product is known as Zenitherm, the defendant’s as X-ite. The fin[209]*209ishod article as manufactured by each is not a stone, but is essentially a wood .product, though it may be made more nearly a stone product by varying the proportions of the materials used.

The defenses are invalidity and noninfringement, the former with a double and thf latter with a triple aspect.

That of invalidity is based upon (1) vagueness in the specification and claims, and (2) anticipation by prior expired patents.

That of noninfringement asserts: (1) That the defendant omits the third essential step of the process by not pressing its product; (2) that defendant is justified by prior art patents which forbid a construction of plaintiff’s patent to cover defendant’s process and product; and (3) that generally neither the plaintiff nor defendant is practicing the process or producing the product of the patent.

The third defensive aspect of noninfringement is stísceptibie of a further analysis:

(a) That the Sutter patent is limited to insulating building material of a character which excludes X-ile, the defendant’s product.

(b) That it is limited to a “building block” requiring “no supporting walls,” and that X-ite and the present Zenitherm are thin, decorative slabs requiring supporting walls.

(e) That it is limited to a product using “fireproof” cement and the defendant uses magnesium oxychloride cement which decomposes under a low heat.

(d) That it is limited to a binder which is of itself an adhesive substance, whieh neither party uses.

(e) That the patent does not specify either as an alternative or otherwise a single ingredient used by the defendant in producing X-ite.

Out of the facts the law arises, but a brief preliminary statement of the law is often helpful in analyzing facts. There is a remarkably succinct one in Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 727, 26 L. Ed. 279. It is the following quotation from a former opinion by the chief justice which the court says will afford the key to almost every ease that can arise:

“Whoever discovers that a certain useful result will he produced, in any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, by the use of certain means, is entitled to a patent for it; provided he specifies the means he uses in a manner so full and exact that any one skilled in the science to which it appertains can, by using the moans he specifies, without any addition to or subtraction from them, produce precisely the result he describes. And if this cannot be done by the means he describes, the patent is void. And if it can be done, then the patent confers on him the exclusive right to use the means he specifies to produce the result or effect he describes, and nothing more. And it makes no difference, in this respect, whether the ei'feci is produced by chemical agency or combination ; or by the application of discoveries or principles in natural philosophy, known or unknown before Ms invention;” or by machinery acting altogether upon mechanical principles. In either case, he must describe the manner or process as above mentioned, and the end it accomplishes. And any one may lawfully accomplish the same end without infringing the patent, if he uses means substantially different from those described.”

The claims in suit are as follows:

“1. The process of making a fireproof insulating material of great structural strength which consists in mixing granulated vegetable matter in its natural state with granulated mineral matter until each particle of vegetable matter is coated with the mineral matter, mixing the product with a hinder in fluid condition and compressing the material into a homogeneous mass.”

“4. As a new product a composition of matter consisting of finely ground or granulated vegetable matter, retaining all its natural resins, each particle coated with a fireproof clay and some suitable binder, the coated particles being in close contact with each other in one homogeneous mass of great structural strength, fireproof and possessing high insulating, non-hygroscopie and sound-deadening properties, substantially as described.”

The process, it is said, has three essential steps: First, the coating of every particle of the cork, wood chips, or shavings with magnesia; second, wetting the mixture with a liquid binder such as magnesium chloride solution; and, third, compressing these mixed materials into a homogeneous mass.

In the first step, no quantities or propor ■ tions for the mixture are given in the specification or claims except “sufficient powdered oxid of magnesia * T * to completely cover or coat each particle of cork.” In practicing the process plaintiff claims to use a minimum amount of cement, but this is denied; testimony for the defendant being to [210]*210the effect that twenty times the minimum amount is used in what is known as Zenitherm’s typical mix and ten times the minimum amount in the production of X-ite.

In the second step, no quantities or proportions are given for the hinder to be used. The illustration in the specification simply says: “And then add a solution of acetyl cellulose as a binder.” This solution admit-' tedly is not used by either plaintiff or defendant. The claim in suit only provides for “mixing the product with a binder in fluid condition.”

With reference to the third step, the most definite provision in either specification or claims is to subject the mixture “to sufficient pressure to form one homogeneous mass.” The plaintiff practices this step by using hydraulic pressure of about 2,509 to 3,000 pounds per squaire inch, but is seeking to restrain the defendant from the use of any pressure, mechanical or otherwise, even such slight pressure as is involved in packing the material into a mold by hand.

After hearing the witnesses orally, and reading the transcribed testimony, I have reexamined the nearly one hundred exhibits and am convinced that the products to be obtained by operating under the vague terms of the plaintiff’s patent may differ widely in outward appearance, material ingredients, and commercial utility, so widely as to duplicate many articles well known in the prior art, and that regardless 'of how skilled one might be in the art he could not learn to manufacture the plaintiff’s product from the specification and claims of the patent in suit without experimenting under it. In fact, the inference is strong from the testimony that the plaintiff itself experimented for several years after the issuance of the Sutter patent before evolving its present product.

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Bluebook (online)
45 F.2d 208, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 276, 1930 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zenitherm-co-v-art-marble-co-of-america-mssd-1930.