Zeller v. Maumee Valley Country Day School
This text of 2019 Ohio 3708 (Zeller v. Maumee Valley Country Day School) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[Cite as Zeller v. Maumee Valley Country Day School, 2019-Ohio-3708.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Dana Zeller, et al. Court of Appeals No. L-19-1085
Appellees Trial Court No. CI0201801681
v.
Maumee Valley Country Day School DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: September 13, 2019
*****
Charles E. Boyk, Michael A. Bruno, and Kathleen R. Harris, for appellee.
Paul R. Bonfiglio, for appellant.
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{¶ 1} This is an accelerated appeal from the judgment of the Lucas County Court
of Common Pleas, compelling appellant, Maumee Valley Country Day School, to
produce certain items in discovery to appellee, Dana Zeller. For the reasons that follow,
we reverse. I. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On Friday, February 19, 2016, appellee’s minor son, S.Z., participated in a
scrimmage between appellant’s 4th and 5th grade basketball teams during the half-time
break of the high school varsity basketball game. Following the scrimmage, the
participants were ushered to an auxiliary gym where they were provided with pizza and
refreshments. While in the auxiliary gym, the unsupervised children began playing
games, including dodgeball. As the dodgeball game progressed, one of the students
struck S.Z. in the head with a basketball, knocking him to the ground. The student then
continued to throw footballs and a weighted medicine ball at S.Z., again striking him in
the head. As a result of the blows to the head, S.Z. suffered a traumatic brain injury that
caused him to miss nearly all of the rest of the school year.
{¶ 3} The following Monday, February 22, 2016, appellant’s administrators began
conducting interviews with all of the students that were present on February 19, 2016, to
determine what occurred. Those interviews continued on Wednesday, February 24,
2016. No audio recordings of the interviews were taken. Instead, one of the
administrators typed notes from the interviews.
{¶ 4} On February 26, 2016, the Head of School, Gary Boehm, sent a letter to all
lower school parents informing them of the February 19, 2016 incident. Boehm stated in
his letter that “the school has been investigating the incident to learn what happened, who
was responsible, and what follow-up makes sense.” Boehm further stated that, “I have
spent hours over the past several days on the phone talking with involved parents as well
2. as with members of my administrative team to try to develop a clear understanding of the
events. * * * Our investigation continues and we will consider further consequences if
we learn that more are called for.”
{¶ 5} Sometime prior to March 2, 2016, appellant contacted its longtime counsel
to assist in responding to the incident. Counsel acknowledged that upon being retained,
she recognized a substantial likelihood that a claim or litigation in some form could
follow. The notes from the interviews were then provided to counsel, who then discussed
with school officials various aspects pertaining to the investigation as it was being
conducted.
{¶ 6} On March 6, 2018, appellee filed a complaint against appellant on behalf of
herself and S.Z. Thereafter, appellee served her first set of written discovery, requesting,
among other things, information and documents related to appellant’s investigation into
the February 19, 2016 incident. Ultimately, appellant refused to provide the requested
information, claiming that it was protected by the attorney-client privilege, the work
product doctrine, and general notions of privacy.
{¶ 7} On October 17, 2018, appellee moved to compel the production of
documents, and on November 14, 2018, appellant moved for a protective order. The
documents in dispute were identified as 21 pages of typed notes, two pages of a summary
graph, and 15 pages of hand-written notes that were taken by Boehm. Following further
briefing by the parties, the matter was submitted to the trial court. The trial court did not
hold a hearing on the matter, and did not conduct an in camera review of the contested
documents.
3. {¶ 8} On April 5, 2019, the trial court entered its decision, granting appellee’s
motion to compel. The trial court reasoned that the attorney-client privilege does not
prevent disclosure of the underlying facts. The trial court found that, in this case, the
notes were taken two years before litigation began, and thus were not taken temporally
near to the litigation. Furthermore, although acknowledging that Boehm may have
considered that litigation was a possibility, the court agreed with appellee that the notes
were primarily a fact-finding mission by Boehm to determine what occurred on February
19, 2016. Given that the contemporaneous accounts from the students as derived from
the notes were likely to be more accurate than any testimony given at a deposition three
years after the incident, the court found that appellee was entitled to those notes in
discovery. However, the trial court also recognized that the notes may contain Boehm’s
thoughts relating to discussions he may want to have with counsel. Thus, the trial court
indicated that it would entertain a motion for an in camera review of specific statements
or comments.
II. Assignments of Error
{¶ 9} Appellant has timely appealed the trial court’s April 5, 2019 judgment, and
now asserts two assignments of error for our review:
1. The trial court erred in holding that the materials at issue in
appellee’s motion to compel and appellant’s motion for protective order
were not protected from discovery by the attorney client privilege.
4. 2. The trial court erred in holding that the materials at issue in
appellee’s motion to compel and appellant’s motion for protective order
were not protected from discovery by the work product doctrine.
III. Analysis
{¶ 10} Because we sua sponte find that the trial court abused its discretion in
ruling on the motions to compel and for a protective order without conducting a hearing
or in camera inspection of the documents, we will not address the parties’ arguments.
{¶ 11} Our conclusion is guided by this court’s decision in Joyce v. Rough, 6th
Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1174, 2008-Ohio-5633, in which we reversed the trial court’s order
granting the plaintiff’s motion to compel because the trial court failed to hold a hearing or
conduct an in camera review of the documents at issue. We reasoned that while trial
courts generally have broad discretion in the management of discovery, it is an abuse of
that discretion to grant a motion to compel without conducting a hearing or in camera
inspection to determine whether the documents are protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Id. at ¶ 6, citing Stegman v. Nickels, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-05-069, 2006-Ohio-
4918, ¶ 17 (“[a]bsent such hearing or inspection, any blanket grant of discovery is an
abuse of discretion”). Here, because the trial court did not hold a hearing or review the
documents in camera, we likewise hold that the trial court’s April 5, 2019 judgment
constituted an abuse of discretion.
{¶ 12} Accordingly, appellant’s assignments of error, which contest the merits of
the trial court’s decision, are moot and are thus not well-taken.
5. IV. Conclusion
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2019 Ohio 3708, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zeller-v-maumee-valley-country-day-school-ohioctapp-2019.