Zelko v. Parsons

505 N.E.2d 271, 29 Ohio App. 3d 302, 29 Ohio B. 400, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 10417
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 16, 1985
Docket49659 and 49660
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 505 N.E.2d 271 (Zelko v. Parsons) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zelko v. Parsons, 505 N.E.2d 271, 29 Ohio App. 3d 302, 29 Ohio B. 400, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 10417 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985).

Opinions

Krupansky, J.

On August 15,1980, Nada Zelko, Joseph Zelko and Irene Kozelj (“appellants”) were riding in an automobile which was involved in a collision with an automobile driven by Laura J. Parsons. The total special damages suffered by appellants amounted to approximately $50,000. Laura J. Parsons carried liability insurance in the amount of $12,500 per person, $25,000 per accident. Parsons’ insurance carrier offered to pay appellants the $25,000 per accident limit of the policy. In an effort to receive additional compensation for their injuries, appellants 1 brought a declaratory judgment action against their insurance carrier, State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company (“State Auto”), seeking to recover under the underinsured motorist provision of their policy; State Auto cross-claimed and also sought declaratory judgment. All three appellants are insureds under the State Auto policy.

Both the appellants and State Auto sought summary judgment on the issue of the amount of State Auto’s liability to the appellants under the terms of the underinsured motorist provision of appellants’ policy. State Auto claimed the $25,000 offered by Parsons’ insurance company should be “set off” or deducted from the $35,000 per accident limit of State Auto’s underinsurance provision, thus rendering State Automobile liable to appellants in the amount of $10,000. The appellants, on the other hand, claimed State Auto’s proposed setoff from its policy limit by the amount tendered by the tortfeasor’s insurer was contrary to the intent of R.C. 3937.181 2 and against public policy. Appellants also claimed State Auto was required to consider the claims of each appellant separately and successively rather than setting off the total sum tendered by the tortfeasor from the limits of appellants’ underinsurance policy.

The trial court granted summary judgment for State Auto and concluded its lengthy opinion by holding as follows:

*303 “[Appellants] are to receive from [State Auto] the underinsured policy-limit of $35,000.00 less the amount received from Dairyland Insurance Company, defendant Laura J. Parson’s [sic] insurer.”

Thus, the trial "court clearly approved of the principle of allowing State Auto to set oft sums paid to appellants by the tortfeasor from the underin-surance policy limits. However, the trial court’s holding does not set forth the manner in which the setoff is to be applied. State Auto contends the appellants were to receive a single payment of $10,000 in addition to the $25,000 offered by the tortfeasor’s insurance company. Appellants, alleging both the trial court and State Auto have misapplied the applicable law, assign the following error:

“The trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment based upon the erroneous assumption that the policy behind underin-surance and the public policy of Ohio should be disregarded in order to benefit an insurer.”

Appellants argue this assigned error under alternative theories. Initially, appellants claim the setoff is per se invalid as contravening the public policy behind underinsured motorist coverage. However, appellants argue, if the principle of setoffs is authorized, then the manner of setoff proposed by State Auto must be altered from the collective approach used by State Auto to an approach which considers appellants’ claims separately.

The question of whether an underin-surance carrier may apply payments made by or on behalf of an underinsured motorist as to setoff directly against the limits of its underinsurance motorist coverage was recently answered by the Ohio Supreme Court in James v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co. (1985), 18 Ohio St. 3d 386. The court unequivocally approved of such setoffs if certain conditions exist. An examination of the facts and analysis present in James demonstrates the applicability of James to the case sub judice.

As does the case sub judice, James involved an automobile accident which occurred at a time when R.C. 3937.181 3 was in effect. Billy James suffered damages in excess of $37,500 as a result of an accident with a motorist who had total liability coverage in the amount of $12,500. After receipt of the $12,500 from the tortfeasor, James sought the full $25,000 limit of his underinsurance motorist coverage; his underinsurance carrier set off from the $25,000 policy limit the $12,500 paid by the tortfeasor and paid James the balance of $12,500. The Ohio Supreme Court in James, supra, upheld the setoff by stating in syllabus two as follows:

“An insurer may apply payments made by or on behalf of an underinsured motorist as a setoff directly against the limit of its underinsured motorist coverage, so long as such setoff (1) is clearly set forth in the terms of the underinsured motorist coverage and (2) does not lead to a result wherein the insured receives a total amount of compensation that is less than the amount of compensation that he would have received if he had been injured by an uninsured motorist.” (Emphasis added.)

The conditions set by the court in James are satisfied in the case sub judice.

Appellants’ policy contains the *304 following language under the section entitled “Limit of Liability” of underin-surance motorist coverage:

“We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by a covered person and caused by an accident.
“We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.
“The limit of liability shown in the schedule for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting from any one accident.
“This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of covered persons, claims made, vehicles or premiums shown in the declarations, or vehicles involved in the auto accident. However, the limit of liability shall be reduced by all sums paid because of the bodily injury by or on behalf of persons or organizations who may be legally responsible.” (Emphasis added.)

In discussing virtually identical language in Billy James’ policy, the court in James stated at 389-390:

“* * * Even under a construction most favorable to the insured, this provision is clear and unambiguous, and we would be altering the plain terms of [Billy James’] insurance policy if we were to limit the application of the setoff described herein only to instances where the insured has been fully compensated for all of his injuries. See Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. [(1982), 70 Ohio St. 2d 166 (24 O.O.3d 274)], at 168; cf. Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
505 N.E.2d 271, 29 Ohio App. 3d 302, 29 Ohio B. 400, 1985 Ohio App. LEXIS 10417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zelko-v-parsons-ohioctapp-1985.