Zedd v. Sandler (In Re Sandler)

143 B.R. 67, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1159, 1992 WL 181167
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedJuly 9, 1992
Docket14-30631
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 143 B.R. 67 (Zedd v. Sandler (In Re Sandler)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zedd v. Sandler (In Re Sandler), 143 B.R. 67, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1159, 1992 WL 181167 (Va. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BLACKWELL N. SHELLEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a complaint by Calvin Zedd and Peggy Zedd (the “Zedds”) to determine the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B) and (a)(6). Said complaint was filed on September 4,1991 and an answer thereto was filed by Harry Sandler on December 9, 1991.

Upon consideration of the arguments of counsel and the evidence presented at trial on March 27, 1992, as well as the briefs of counsel filed thereafter, the Court makes the following findings of facts and conclusions of law.

*68 FINDINGS OF FACT

It appears to the Court that Mr. Zedd and Mr. Sandler were previously associated as partners in a number of business ventures, one of which is more particularly known as S-Z Associates. It further appears to the Court that the restructuring of the S-Z Associates partnership and the acts of the parties related thereto are the subject of the controversy presently before the Court.

On May 28, 1987, the Zedds and Mr. Sandler entered into an agreement (the “settlement agreement”) which purported to settle a number of differences that had arisen between the parties as a result of the operation of the various business entities owned by S-Z Associates. The settlement agreement between Mr. Sandler and Mr. Zedd, together with entities which they controlled, constituted a restructuring of the relationship between the parties, as established in the February 20,1986, partnership agreement which formed S-Z Associates. The settlement agreement purported to divide the assets of the partnership and rewrite the partnership agreement. According to the settlement agreement, Mr. Sandler was to receive, and in fact did receive, new and used furniture inventory resulting from the transfer of corporate assets. Mr. Sandler was to receive all outstanding stock in the various corporate entities, except for Auto Auction, the ownership of which was to remain with Mr. Zedd. The settlement agreement also provided that, with certain exceptions, Mr. Sandler and Mr. Zedd were to be equal owners of the corporate real estate used or owned by the corporate signatories to the settlement agreement. Although Mr. Sandler and Mr. Zedd testified that they were attempting to dissolve their business relationship, Mr. Sandler and Mr. Zedd were to remain equal partners in S-Z Associates, which was to continue as a going concern. The transfer of title to the real estate owned by the various entities was to be by deed, delivered in escrow pending conclusion of future events. The Court has not been apprised of the status of the titles to the real estate, nor whether the parties have complied with the conditions of the settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement called for payments in the amount of $93,138.69, to be made by Mr. Sandler to the Zedds, upon the substantiation by the Zedds of certain expenditures. It appears to the Court that Mr. Sandler was to indemnify the Zedds for expenditures which the Zedds incurred in connection with the liabilities of the various businesses. An additional condition of the settlement agreement was that the Zedds dismiss a lawsuit for an accounting pending against Mr. Sandler.

Connie Sandler’s name appears on the settlement agreement although her testimony at trial, which this Court finds to be credible, was that the signature above her name was not her own, nor had she authorized its use on the agreement. It appears to the Court that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Sandler forged his wife’s name; however, the Court does find that Mr. Sandler was aware that the signature on the settlement agreement was not that of his wife, and the Court further finds that the settlement agreement was presented by Mr. Sandler, to the Zedds, as being endorsed by Mrs. Sandler.

The plaintiffs allege that Mr. Sandler’s actions are sufficient grounds to find any debt arising from the settlement agreement to be nondischargeable. The complaint requests that a judgment of $1,986,-050.47 be entered against Mr. Sandler, and that said judgment be found nondischargeable.

Mr. Sandler filed a voluntary Chapter 11 case on May 31, 1990 which was subsequently converted to a Chapter 7 case on April 22, 1991. Mr. and Mrs. Zedd have filed and presently remain in a Chapter 11 case.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In a complaint brought to determine the dischargeability of a debt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2) or (a)(6) the plaintiff carries the burden of proof and the standard of proof to be used to determine dis-chargeability is the ordinary preponderance of the evidence standard. Grogan v. Garner, *69 - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991).

The plaintiffs seek relief pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) which states in pertinent part that a debt is not discharged if it was incurred in an exchange for—

(2)money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained, by—
(B) use of a statement in writing—
(i) that is materially false
(ii) respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s financial condition
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with an intent to deceive.

As the elements of § 523(a)(2)(B) are stated in the conjunctive, and not in the alternative, it is the burden of the plaintiff to prove the existence of each element. There is no evidence before the Court of a written financial statement reflecting the financial condition of Mr. or Mrs. Sandler. The only document admitted into evidence is the settlement agreement which in no way reflects the financial position of Mr. or Mrs. Sandler. The Court therefore finds that the Zedd’s have failed to meet their burden of persuasion regarding the existence of such a written financial statement and consequently the court need not address the remaining elements required under § 523(a)(2)(B).

For the Court to find a debt to be nondis-chargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), the plaintiffs must prove:

(1) an injury to the plaintiffs or their property;
(2) that such an injury was the result of an act of the debtor;
(3) that said act was willful; and
(4) that said act was malicious. 1

Section 523(a)(6) is sufficiently broad to encompass any injury that was willful and malicious. In re Criswell, 52 B.R. 184, 203 (E.D.Va.1985). While the Court finds that Mr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Salehsari v. Aalam (In re Aalam)
538 B.R. 812 (C.D. California, 2014)
Shappy v. Scott (In Re Scott)
201 B.R. 424 (E.D. Virginia, 1996)
Harmon v. Scott (In Re Scott)
203 B.R. 590 (E.D. Virginia, 1996)
Household Finance Corp. v. Kahler (In Re Kahler)
187 B.R. 508 (E.D. Virginia, 1995)
Western Union Corp. v. Ketaner (In Re Ketaner)
154 B.R. 459 (E.D. Virginia, 1992)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
143 B.R. 67, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 1159, 1992 WL 181167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zedd-v-sandler-in-re-sandler-vaeb-1992.