Zechariah Brian James v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

121 N.E.3d 139
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 22, 2019
DocketCourt of Appeals Case 18A-CR-1086
StatusPublished

This text of 121 N.E.3d 139 (Zechariah Brian James v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zechariah Brian James v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 121 N.E.3d 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Opinion

Barnes, Senior Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Zechariah James appeals from his conviction of one count of dealing in a narcotic drug 1 as a Level 2 felony, contending that the trial court abused its discretion or committed fundamental error by allowing an officer to testify as a skilled witness during his bench trial. We affirm.

Issue

[2] The sole issue presented for appeal is as follows: whether the trial court erred in allowing a detective with more than twenty years of experience in law enforcement, including supervising undercover narcotics purchases, to testify as a skilled witness.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On the afternoon of July 6, 2016, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Detectives Michael Condon and Gabriel Cuevas went to America's Best Value Inn with an active warrant to arrest James for murder. Prior to arriving at that location, the officers were alerted that James had exited the east side of the building and had entered a vehicle.

[4] Law enforcement officers approached James, who was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle and arrested him without incident pursuant to the warrant. The officers performed a search incident to arrest that resulted in the seizure of approximately fifty-five grams of heroin located in the left front pocket of James' pants. The heroin had been packaged in knotted plastic baggies and was divided into quantities of 41.45 grams, 10.46 grams, 1.17 grams, and .52 grams and placed in a larger plastic bag. During that search, officers also seized approximately $2,800 in cash that was folded and wrapped with a rubber band, identification cards, and cell phones. There were no items of paraphernalia recovered as part of the search.

[5] On July 8, 2016, James was charged with dealing in a narcotic drug and possession of a narcotic drug, and was alleged to be an habitual offender. A bifurcated bench trial took place on April 6 and April 9, 2018. During the bench trial, Detectives Condon and Cuevas testified about their experience with encountering narcotics during investigations. A forensic scientist from the Marion County Crime Lab testified about his findings and report after testing, identifying, and weighing the heroin submitted for his review in this case. 2 James was convicted of dealing in a narcotic drug and possession of a narcotic drug. 3 The trial court sentenced James to eighteen years in the Department of Correction for dealing in a narcotic drug. James now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] James argues that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Detective Condon to testify as a skilled witness that James' possession of that quantity of heroin and cash was consistent with amounts possessed by heroin dealers. James argues in the alternative that if Detective Condon's continued testimony as a skilled witness, despite James' objections, is considered to be a waiver of the argument, the error was nonetheless fundamental error. In either event, James urges this Court to reduce his conviction to possession of a narcotic drug for which he should be resentenced by this Court or the trial court.

[7] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Dycus v. State , 108 N.E.3d 301 , 303 (Ind. 2018). Ordinarily, a reviewing court will disturb a trial court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence only where it has abused its discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or if it misapplies the law. Id.

[8] In Kubsch v. State , 784 N.E.2d 905 , 922 (Ind. 2003), the Supreme Court stated the following about skilled and expert witnesses:

Although a witness may not be qualified to offer expert testimony under Indiana Evidence Rule 702, the witness may be qualified as a 'skilled witness' (sometimes referred to as a 'skilled lay observer'), ...under Indiana Evidence Rule 701. A skilled witness is a person with a 'degree of knowledge short of that sufficient to be declared an expert under [Indiana Evidence] Rule 702, but somewhat beyond that possessed by the ordinary jurors.' Under Indiana Evidence Rule 701, a skilled witness may provide an opinion or inference that is '(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.'

(internal citations omitted). Perception and perceive have been defined, respectively, as "the process, act, or faculty of perceiving....insight, intuition, or knowledge gained by perceiving," and "to become aware of directly through any of the senses," especially sight or hearing. Id. The Supreme Court concluded the officer's testimony should not have been admitted in Kubsch because it was not rationally based upon his perceptions at the scene of the crime.

[9] In Davis v. State , 791 N.E.2d 266 , 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied , the condition that a skilled witness's opinion be rationally based was defined as meaning that "the opinion must be one that a reasonable person could normally form from the perceived facts." For an opinion to be helpful, it means in pertinent part that "the testimony gives substance to facts, which are difficult to articulate." Id. at 269 . The officer's testimony in Davis was properly admitted because the State had laid an appropriate foundation supporting the officer's training and expertise for his opinion about what someone possessing a package of that quantity of narcotics would intend to do with the substance. Id.

[10] At the time of his testimony, Detective Condon had worked in law enforcement for twenty years and had worked for IMPD for sixteen of those twenty years.

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Related

Kubsch v. State
784 N.E.2d 905 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2003)
Davis v. State
791 N.E.2d 266 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 2003)
Bruce Ryan v. State of Indiana
9 N.E.3d 663 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2014)
Monica Dycus v. State of Indiana
108 N.E.3d 301 (Indiana Supreme Court, 2018)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
121 N.E.3d 139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zechariah-brian-james-v-state-of-indiana-mem-dec-indctapp-2019.