Zebroski v. State

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 6, 2025
• Docket: 55, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

WILLIAM ZEBROSKI, § § No. 55, 2024 Defendant Below, § Appellant, § Court Below—Superior Court § of the State of Delaware v. § § Cr. ID No. 2102000190A/B (N) STATE OF DELAWARE, § § Appellee. §

Submitted: December 11, 2024 Decided: February 6, 2025

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices. ORDER On this 6th day of February 2025, after careful consideration of the parties’

briefs and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:

(1) A jury convicted Appellant William Zebroski of carrying a concealed

deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by a person prohibited. The jury heard

testimony at trial of a high-speed car chase with a police task force created by the

Governor. Zebroski was a passenger in the vehicle involved in the chase. The chase

culminated in the discovery of a firearm under a seat in the pursued vehicle. The

jury also heard testimony regarding DNA evidence obtained from the firearm. The

State did not present DNA evidence from Zebroski to link him directly to the firearm. (2) On appeal, Zebroski contends that the DNA evidence obtained from the

firearm had no probative value. He argues that because the State did not collect

admissible DNA evidence from him, the State should be precluded from admitting

the DNA evidence obtained from the firearm. Zebroski also contends that the

specific details surrounding his arrest were irrelevant. He argues that allowing the

details made him seem more culpable of criminal activity to the jury. We find no

merit to these arguments and affirm.

(3) On February 21, 2021, Detectives Brian Holl and Philip Digati were

searching for Zebroski as he had an active warrant out for his arrest.1 The detectives

were members of a task force created by the Governor to execute on arrest warrants

(“Governor’s Task Force”).2 Near the evening hours, the detectives received a tip

that Zebroski was possibly near the Country Cupboard, a gas station near the

Delaware and Maryland border.3 While surveilling the gas station in separate

vehicles, the detectives located Zebroski sitting in the front-passenger seat of a

White Buick SUV.4 The Buick was driven by a woman named Linda Reynolds.5

1 App. to Opening Br. at A59–60. 2 Id. at A58, A105. As members of the Governor’s Task Force, Detectives Holl and Digati handle narcotics and firearms investigations, and search for persons with active arrest warrants. Id. 3 Id. at A60. 4 Id. at A61–63, A107. 5 Id. 2 Reynolds eventually drove away from the gas station with Zebroski still in the front-

passenger seat.6 The detectives gave chase. Detective Holl turned on his sirens to

signal to Reynolds to pull over.7 She did not stop. Instead, she accelerated, making

her way from Delaware to Maryland.8 The detectives suspended pursuit at the

Delaware border.9 They expected the Buick to return to Delaware eventually. They

strategically positioned themselves at the Delaware border and waited.10

(4) About two and a half hours later, the Buick reappeared, driving across

the intersection between Route 301 and 299.11 This time, Detective Digati pulled

ahead of the Buick while Detective Holl boxed in the Buick from behind.12 This

maneuver let them make a successful tactical stop of the vehicle.13 After the stop,

Detective Holl arrested and searched Zebroski.14 Detective Holl found three nine-

millimeter rounds in Zebroski’s jacket pocket.15 Detective Digati searched the

6 Id. at A63–64. 7 Id. 8 Id. at A65. 9 Id. at A65–66. 10 Id. 11 Id. at A67. 12 Id. at A69, A114. 13 Id. 14 Id. at A74, A117–18. 15 Id. 3 Buick.16 There, he found a Ruger nine-millimeter firearm under the front-passenger

seat—the same seat where Zebroski had been sitting.17

(5) Reynolds was charged with hindering prosecution, disregarding a

police signal, and driving with a suspended or revoked license.18 The State later

dismissed the charges against Reynolds. The State went to trial against Zebroski for

carrying a concealed deadly weapon (“CCDW”) and possession of a firearm by a

person prohibited (“PFBPP”). The Superior Court severed the charges into a

bifurcated trial, with an “A trial” for a jury on the CCDW charge, and a “B bench-

trial” on the PFBPP charge.

(6) At the pretrial conference, the parties raised evidentiary issues with the

trial court relating to two warrants—the active arrest warrant that led to the car chase,

and a warrant issued for the collection of DNA evidence from Zebroski.

(7) As to the first warrant, the State moved to admit evidence of the active

arrest warrant to explain why the detectives were searching for Zebroski on the night

of the car chase. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the mention of the arrest

warrant was prejudicial to Zebroski. Over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court

allowed for its admission. But its admission was limited. The State was prohibited

16 Id. at A71, A116–17. 17 Id. 18 Id. at A126. 4 from stating the basis for the warrant. The State was also advised that the court

would provide a limiting instruction to the jury. The instruction would inform the

jury to not consider the arrest warrant as evidence that Zebroski had a propensity to

commit criminal acts.19

(8) As to the second warrant, the State conceded that it could not locate a

physical copy—this warrant authorized the collection of DNA from Zebroski.20

Without a copy of the warrant, the court ruled that the State could not use DNA

evidence collected from Zebroski. The State then moved to admit the DNA results

from the firearm, given that DNA from the firearm itself did not require a warrant.

Defense counsel objected, arguing that without DNA from Zebroski, the jury would

have no way to make a determination as to whether the DNA results from the firearm

matched those taken from Zebroski. The State countered that the DNA results from

the firearm showed a mixed profile of at least two individuals, one of whom was

male. The State pointed out that the DNA results tracked this case as both male and

female occupants were in the vehicle. Even though there would be no direct

evidence linking Zebroski’s DNA to the firearm, the trial judge allowed the

19 Id. at A191. 20 Id. at A16–17. The record is unclear as to what happened to this warrant. 5 admission of the DNA evidence from the firearm. The court found it probative as

the evidence tracked the genders of the occupants of the Buick.

(9) At trial, the State presented the DNA evidence of the firearm through

the testimony of Lesley Shipe, a DNA analyst at the Delaware Department of

Forensic Science. Shipe testified that because of insufficient DNA on the firearm,

she could not make comparisons and “include or exclude any individual.”21 Despite

this limitation, the DNA collected from the firearm established “a two-person

mixture, where at least one contributor was male.”22

(10) The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the CCDW charge in the “A-

trial.” The court found Zebroski guilty of the PFBPP in the “B bench-trial.” The

trial judge sentenced Zebroski to five years of incarceration with decreasing levels

of probation. On appeal, Zebroski argues that the Superior Court exceeded its

discretion in admitting the following evidence: a) the active arrest warrant; b)

references to the task force; and c) the details of the high-speed pursuit. He also

claims that the Superior Court exceeded its discretion in admitting the DNA

evidence derived from the firearm.

21 Id. at A103. 22 Id. at A99. The other evidentiary issue raised during the conference was defense counsel’s request to admit Reynolds’ nolle prosequi form to show that the charges against her were dismissed. The trial court granted its admission on the basis that Reynolds’ dropped charges were relevant to the case. 6 (11) The parties dispute the applicable standard of review for this appeal.

The State contends that because defense counsel only objected to the arrest warrant

and DNA evidence, an abuse of discretion standard should apply to those issues

alone, with the other claims warranting heightened review. The State argues that

plain error review applies to the testimony regarding references to the task force.

And, as to the testimony of the pursuit, the State contends that Zebroski waived

appellate review altogether by defense counsel’s strategic reliance on the dismissed

charges against Reynolds. In the State’s view, Zebroski’s reliance on the dismissed

charges against Reynolds equates to reliance on the testimony of the pursuit, thereby

requiring waiver of appellate review. Zebroski counters that his pre-trial objection

to the admission of his active warrant should extend to all evidence leading to the

stop.23

(12) Zebroski made timely objections to the active arrest warrant and the

DNA evidence and so we review those issues for an abuse of discretion. Objecting

to the introduction of the arrest warrant, however, did not encompass the testimony

about the task force or the high-speed pursuit. Defense counsel never mentioned the

23 Reply Br. at 1 (“The State presents a false impression that the totality of the evidence related to Zebroski’s warrant status was not covered by defense counsel’s objection. This is simply not true. As reflected by her inquiry following defense counsel’s objection, it is clear the judge understood the objection was to evidence leading up to the stop.”). 7 identity of the task force that the officers belonged to, nor the details of the pursuit.

We therefore review for plain error.24

(13) The trial judge’s admission of Zebroski’s active arrest warrant was not

an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when “a court has exceeded

the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules of

law or practice so as to produce injustice.”25 Here, evidence of the active arrest

warrant explained why the officers were searching for Zebroski. The trial judge also

prohibited the State from explaining the basis of the warrant, and later issued an

instruction to the jury for it not to consider the warrant as propensity evidence. The

instruction limited any improper inferences the jury could make from the

background information. Given these circumstances, we see no abuse in permitting

limited evidence of the arrest warrant.

(14) We also find no plain error in letting the State present evidence of the

task force or the pursuit. To reverse for plain error, “the error complained of must

be so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and

24 We also do not find that defense counsel waived plain error review regarding the testimony of the pursuit. Moving to admit a certified copy of the dismissed charges against Reynolds is not equivalent to affirmatively relying on the testimony of the pursuit. Although the charges arose from the circumstances of the flight, defense counsel relied on the fact that the charges were dismissed, not the flight itself. See App. to Opening Br. at A53, A124–26, A177–78. 25 McNair v. State, 990 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 2010).

8 integrity of the trial process.”26 Even so, a party may waive appellate review by

making a strategic decision not to object.27 Background information “may fill in

gaps in ‘interwoven events’” of a narrative, letting the jury see a “complete picture”

of a case.28 “An arresting or investigating officer should not be put in the false

position of seeming just to have happened upon the scene,” but should be “allowed

some explanation of his presence and conduct.”29 It may, however, be prejudicial

to the defense and require balancing under Rule 403.30

(15) Here, the detectives’ testimony describing the pursuit gave the jury a

full picture. It explained why the detectives were on notice for a Buick re-entering

the State line, and the reason for the tactical stop. Without these details, the

detectives’ presence and actions would have lacked context and distorted the

narrative.

(16) Zebroski argues to the contrary. He claims that he suffered prejudice

from the admission of this testimony because it made him seem guilty of more

26 Hastings v. State, 289 A.3d 1264, 1270 (Del. 2023) (quoting Lowther v. State, 104 A.3d 840, 845 (Del. 2014)). 27 Stevenson v. State, 149 A.3d 505, 516 (Del. 2016) (citing King v. State, 239 A.2d 707, 709 (Del. 1968)). 28 Sanabria v. State, 974 A.2d 107, 112 (Del. 2009) (quoting People v. Resek, 821 N.E.2d 108, 109–110 (N.Y. 2004)). 29 Id. (quoting McCormick, Evidence § 249 at 734 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984)). 30 D.R.E. 403; Sanabria, 974 A.2d at 112. 9 serious offenses. But we do not find this alleged prejudice amounted to plain error.

The testimony of the pursuit served as relevant background information, and the jury

needed only consider the crimes for which Zebroski was charged. Zebroski showed

that the police only charged Reynolds for the pursuit. Zebroski was also able to

show that Reynolds’ charges were dropped completely. This evidence reduced any

seriousness the jury may have attributed to the pursuit.

(17) Next, Zebroski claims that the testimony revealing the detectives’

participation on the Governor’s Task Force was unfairly prejudicial. Testimony

about an officer’s division is relevant to providing context to the jury about the

witness’s experience and duties. The detectives also testified that searching for

people with active arrest warrants was one of the primary purposes of the task force.

There was no inference that the task force was searching for Zebroski as a part of a

larger investigation or for more serious offenses. We find no prejudice here.

(18) Last, Zebroski claims the Superior Court exceeded its discretion in

admitting the DNA evidence taken from the firearm. He argues that the inconclusive

evidence had no probative value in proving his possession of the firearm and unfairly

prejudiced his case. We find no abuse of discretion.

(19) The DNA evidence was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial to

Zebroski. The DNA results showed a two-person mixture in which one contributor

was male. In a factual scenario where one of the two occupants of the vehicle was 10 a male, this evidence was probative for that limited reason. That there was an

insufficient amount of DNA to make any comparisons to allow for inclusion or

exclusion of a specific individual did not justify the exclusion of the evidence.

Defense counsel was able to (and did) effectively challenge the weight of the DNA

evidence by cross examining the DNA witness on this point. 31 We do not find that

the Superior Court exceeded its discretion in admitting the DNA evidence.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ N. Christopher Griffiths Justice

31 See App. to Opening Br. at A102–03. It was also defense counsel’s intent to argue that there was no DNA match. But to rebut the suggestion that this was due to the State’s failure to conduct a DNA investigation at all, or that the DNA evidence conclusively excluded Zebroski, the court allowed testimony from the DNA expert that there was an insufficient amount of data to exclude or include a particular individual. See id. at A21–22. 11