Z.C., a Child v. Commonwealth of Kentucky

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: January 24, 2025
• Docket: 2024-CA-0694
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JANUARY 24, 2025; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals

NO. 2024-CA-0694-ME

Z.C., A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF EIGHTEEN APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM CAMPBELL CIRCUIT COURT FAMILY COURT DIVISION V. HONORABLE ABIGAIL E. VOELKER, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-J-00106-001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION AFFIRMING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, ECKERLE, AND KAREM, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: The Appellant, Z.C., a child under the age of eighteen

(“Child”), appeals from the Campbell Family Court’s Order finding Child in

contempt. Child was sentenced to ten days in juvenile detention, with eight of

those days conditionally discharged. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During the 2023-2024 school year, Child was a freshman in high

school. On February 7, 2024, a Juvenile Complaint for Status Offense alleging

habitual truancy was filed by a family court liaison with Child’s school. On

February 15, 2024, the Court Designated Worker (“CDW”) determined the case

was appropriate for informal processing. But the Campbell County Attorney

recommended the case for formal processing eleven days later. The petition was

filed with the family court on March 8, 2024.

Child was arraigned on April 4, 2024. At arraignment, the family

court entered a denial on Child’s behalf. At this hearing, the family court outlined

the pre-adjudicative terms to Child, which included being in school every day and

being on time for school, not leaving home without permission, obeying the law,

working on improving grades, and following the rules of the school. The form

titled Pre-Adjudicative Court Ordered Terms-Status Offense was signed by Child,

Child’s mother, the Child’s court-appointed attorney, and the County Attorney.

On April 26, 2024, the County Attorney filed a Motion for Contempt,

alleging Child had violated the April 4 court order. The motion indicated Child

had violated the written rules of the school and had five unexcused absences since

the order was entered. A pretrial conference and contempt hearing was held on

May 9, 2024.

-2- At the contempt hearing, the family court liaison who initially filed

the truancy charges testified that Child had been involved in a physical altercation

at school, in which several students and adult staff members were injured. Child

was suspended, and later expelled, from school due to this incident, leading to the

unexcused absences. The County Attorney indicated he intended to file a petition

for a public offense due to this incident. He requested 30 days of detention for

violating the court’s order.

Child’s counsel objected to the contempt hearing occurring at all, as

he argued there was not a valid court order in place that the Child could have

violated. Both the County and the family court disagreed. Child additionally

argued that Child was not willfully refusing to go to school; Child was not allowed

to go because of the suspension.

Child’s counsel also belatedly argued during closing arguments that

some of the testimony presented was hearsay, as there was no testimony that the

witness personally observed the altercation. Yet the witness could testify about the

documented unexcused absences and the documented reasons for them. Child then

requested graduated sanctions in lieu of detention.

The family court found Child to be in contempt of a valid court order

and sentenced Child to ten days in juvenile detention, with eight of those days

conditionally discharged. This appeal follows.

-3- STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Contempt is the willful disobedience toward, or open disrespect for,

the rules or orders of a court.” Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 808

(Ky. 1996). Appellate review of a finding of contempt is governed by the abuse of

discretion standard. Meyers v. Petrie, 233 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Ky. App. 2007).

“The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound reasonable principles.”

Penner v. Penner, 411 S.W.3d 775, 779-80 (Ky. App. 2013). The clear error

standard applies to the findings of fact by the family court. Cabinet for Health and

Family Services v. Ivy, 353 S.W.3d 324, 332 (Ky. 2011). We review a family

court’s legal conclusions under the de novo standard. Brewick v. Brewick, 121

S.W.3d 524, 526 (Ky. App. 2003). “The construction and application of a statute

is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Petitioner F v. Brown, 306

S.W.3d 80, 86 (Ky. 2010).

ANALYSIS

Child claims the family court made several errors in its finding of

contempt. First, Child claims the family court lacked jurisdiction because the

statutory pretrial procedures were not followed prior to the petition being filed in

court. Child argues the family court did not have authority to find Child in

contempt and detain Child in custody because a valid court order did not exist.

-4- Child contends there was insufficient evidence to find contempt. Finally, Child

argues it was error for the family court to fail to hold a separate Disposition

Hearing. The Attorney General argues this Court should dismiss the appeal as

moot. Child responds that this Court should not dismiss, even if the case is moot,

because the issue is one capable of repetition, yet evading review. Child further

argues this case should be reviewed based on the public interest exception to the

mootness doctrine.

“Our courts have long recognized that ‘[a] ‘moot case’ is one which

seeks to get a judgment . . . upon some matter which, when rendered, for any

reason, cannot have any practical legal effect upon a then existing controversy.’”

Beshear v. Goodwood Brewing Co., LLC, 635 S.W.3d 788, 797 (Ky. 2021)

(emphasis in original) (citing Benton v. Clay, 233 S.W. 1041, 1042 (Ky. 1921)).

“The long-standing general rule is that ‘where, pending an appeal, an event occurs

which makes a determination of the question unnecessary or which would render

the judgment that might be pronounced ineffectual, the appeal should be

dismissed.’” Id. at 797-98 (citing Louisville Transit Co. v. Dep’t of Motor Transp.,

286 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Ky. 1956)).

The Attorney General argues this case should be dismissed as moot

for several reasons. Child was charged with a public offense for the actions which

led to the finding of contempt, thus the family court transferred the case to district

-5- court. The family court therefore is no longer exercising jurisdiction over this

action. During the course of briefing for this appeal, Child’s cases, including both

the original truancy charge and the subsequent public offense, were adjudicated,

and a separate Disposition Order has been entered. The contempt order from the

family court was not incorporated into the district court’s Disposition Order, and

therefore the additional eight days cannot be imposed.

Child seems to concede the issue is moot but argues that this Court

should still issue a decision on the merits because it meets two exceptions to the

mootness doctrine. Child contends the issue is “capable of repetition, yet evading

review” and it also meets the public interest exception.

Whether to apply the exception to the rule that a case will be dismissed when the issues are moot which we have recognized when the issues are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” involves more than just an important public question that is difficult to review. Our courts do not function to give advisory opinions, even on important public issues, unless there is an actual case in controversy. The decision whether to apply the exception to the mootness doctrine basically involves two questions: whether (1) the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and [2] there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subject to the same action again.

Philpot v. Patton, 837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1992) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

-6- Child is fifteen and argues the family court will have jurisdiction over

any future status offenses until Child reaches age eighteen, meaning this issue is

capable of repetition. Child claims it is possible for the same circumstances to

arise again. Child further argues that because the duration of juvenile contempt

sentencings is very short, the exception applies.

“‘Capable of repetition, yet evading review’ is a well-recognized

exception to the mootness doctrine, although one to be used sparingly.” Riley v.

Gibson, 338 S.W.3d 230, 233 (Ky. 2011). We do not believe this exception should

be applied here. First, it is unlikely, albeit possible, that Child will undergo these

same circumstances again in the next two and one-half years. This Court has

determined in the past that juvenile contempt cases can meet this exception. See

C.S. v. Commonwealth, 559 S.W.3d 857, 865 (Ky. App. 2018) (“Contempt orders,

especially ones involving juveniles, are often of very limited duration”). However,

the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in C.S.

In C.S., the juvenile was found to be in contempt and was ordered to

be detained for a “time period not to exceed six months.” Id. at 864. C.S.

appealed the contempt finding but was released from detention during the

pendency of the appeal. The family court still maintained jurisdiction over C.S.

and could have still enforced the prior contempt sentence.

-7- In the current action, the family court is no longer exercising

jurisdiction over Child’s case. The case was transferred to district court upon the

filing of the public offense charge, and that district case is ongoing. The contempt

finding with the conditionally discharged eight days was not incorporated into the

district court’s Disposition Order. Furthermore, both Child’s initial status offense

and subsequent public offense have been adjudicated. If Child is again charged

with contempt for violations of a valid court order relating to the public offense,

the district court will be the court to hear it. Many of the errors Child asserts the

family court made in this case would not be applicable, as Child has now been

adjudicated as a public offender in district court.

Child additionally argues the public interest exception applies. “The

public interest exception allows a court to consider an otherwise moot case when

(1) the question presented is of a public nature; (2) there is a need for an

authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers; and (3) there

is a likelihood of future recurrence of the question.” Morgan v. Getter, 441

S.W.3d 94, 102 (Ky. 2014). “[T]he public interest exception must not only involve

public questions and be capable of repetition. We must be vigilant and use our

discretion only when a demonstrated need justifies a ruling from this Court.

Otherwise, the public interest exception would be so broad as to virtually eliminate

the notion of mootness. Consequently, we have carefully cabined our review for

-8- instance to matters of first impression[.]” Commonwealth v. Collinsworth, 628

S.W.3d 82, 87 (Ky. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

It is within this Court’s discretion to consider a moot case under the

public interest exception when we determine a case involves “matters of the utmost

public importance.” Muhammad v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 468 S.W.3d 331, 338

(Ky. 2015). We decline to exercise that discretion in this instance. There is

sufficient case law addressing the substantive issues involved here. Such issues

will arise again in some future case, and if different circumstances require present

a matter of first impression, then an opinion will be necessary to determine a ripe

controversy.

While we recognize that the later events in the related public offense

prosecution did not incorporate this prior contempt finding, there are still collateral

consequences pertaining to this finding of contempt. Collateral consequences of a

decision, although otherwise moot, may still justify an appellate court in

determining the appeal. See Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. App. 2017).

While juvenile records may not impact Child the same as records of future adult

offenses, the family or district court still dealing with Child until aged eighteen

will know of the prior contempt conviction, and this may influence future decisions

about penalties to be imposed. Child has sufficient ongoing personal interest in

-9- whether the contempt ruling was proper to avoid dismissal of this appeal on

mootness grounds. At any rate, we determine Child’s arguments have no merit.

Child first alleges the family court did not have subject matter

jurisdiction to hear this case at all. Child argues that KRS1 610.030 requires the

CDW to take certain measures prior to filing a petition in court and that those

measures were not taken in this action. While Child is correct that the statute does

require certain actions to be taken before a CDW can file a status offense petition

in court, Child overlooks the final portion of the statute. KRS 610.030(12) states

“[a]t any stage in the proceedings described in this section, the court or the county

attorney may review any decision of the court-designated worker. The court upon

its own motion or upon written request of the county attorney may refer any

complaint for a formal hearing.” That is precisely what occurred in this action.

While the CDW initially determined the case was appropriate for informal

processing, the County Attorney disagreed, and referred the petition for formal

processing. This is clearly allowed and anticipated by the statute.

Child next argues there was no valid court order in place and further

makes the assertion that a valid court order cannot exist for a juvenile who is pre-

adjudication. This argument also has no merit.

“Valid court order” means a court order issued by a judge to a child alleged or found to be a status offender:

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. -10- (a) Who was brought before the court and made subject to the order;

(b) Whose future conduct was regulated by the order;

(c) Who was given written and verbal warning of the consequences of the violation of the order at the time the order was issued and whose attorney or parent or legal guardian was also provided with a written notice of the consequences of violation of the order, which notification is reflected in the record of the court proceedings; and

(d) Who received, before the issuance of the order, the full due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States[.]

KRS 600.020(71).

Child argues that because the order was issued pre-adjudication, Child

did not receive full due process rights. We disagree. At arraignment, Child was

advised of the charges in the status offense petition, was appointed counsel who

was present, was advised of constitutional rights, and was explicitly informed of

the conduct that was prohibited by the pre-adjudicative order. Written in the order

is a warning that violating the terms of the order could lead to contempt and

detention. Child, Child’s mother, Child’s attorney, and the County Attorney all

acknowledged the terms by signing the order. The required due process was met

here.

If we accept Child’s argument, then it would deny courts the ability to

enforce any orders or prohibit any behavior prior to a case being adjudicated. This -11- cannot be the intended result of the legislature. “In construing statutory provisions,

it is presumed that the legislature did not intend an absurd result.” Commonwealth,

Cent. State Hosp. v. Gray, 880 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1994). Furthermore, this

interpretation ignores the first sentence of the definition for a valid court order,

which defines it as a “court order issued by a judge to a child alleged or found to

be a status offender[.]” If a valid court order can only exist post-adjudication, the

term “alleged” would not have been included in the statute.

Child argues the evidence submitted to the family court was

insufficient to find Child in contempt. We disagree. Child was ordered to obey the

rules of the school and to not have any unexcused absences. There was testimony

that Child was suspended, and later expelled, from school due to Child’s role in a

physical altercation involving multiple people. This was clearly sufficient

evidence of contempt. The weighing of evidence is within the exclusive province

of the trial court. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003).

Finally, Child argues it was error for the family court to not hold a

separate Disposition Hearing after finding Child in contempt. The statute requiring

bifurcated proceedings, KRS 610.080, applies to the underlying offense, not

contempt hearings. There is no support cited for the argument that a contempt

hearing in juvenile cases requires two separate hearings. KRS 600.060 states

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of KRS Chapter 600 to 645, the inherent

-12- contempt power of the court shall not be diminished, except that an order of

detention for a child found in contempt shall not exceed thirty (30) days.”

Additionally, while the discussion was brief, the family court did discuss options

other than detention, but it determined detention was appropriate in this case, based

on the behavior of Child. The family court also found Child to be a danger to both

Child and to others. The family court committed no error in this instance.

CONCLUSION

Regardless of any argument for mootness in this case, which has

required our application of multiple mootness doctrines, we conclude that the

contentions of error relating to the contempt ruling are without merit. The County

Attorney properly called for formal processing as allowed by law. Child clearly

violated a valid court order because of unexcused absences, and proper evidence

submitted at the contempt hearing sustained the decision of the family court. We

affirm the Campbell Family Court.

ALL CONCUR.

-13- BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Sarah D. Langer Russell Coleman Frankfort, Kentucky Attorney General of Kentucky

J. Grant Burdette Assistant Solicitor General Frankfort, Kentucky

-14-