Zayas v. Enslee

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: February 20, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-05346
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 AT SEATTLE 10 11 MYRIAM ZAYAS, CASE NO. 3:24-cv-05346-TL 12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS v. 13 ROBERT ENSLEE, 14 Defendant. 15

17 This case arises from the collection of federal funding pursuant to Title IV-E of the 18 Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 470–479B, for Plaintiff’s child who was placed into foster 19 care. This matter is before the Court on Defendant Robert Enslee’s motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 20 15. Having considered Plaintiff’s response (Dkt. No. 18) and the relevant record, the Court 21 GRANTS Defendant’s motion. 22 I. BACKGROUND 23 On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in 24 this action. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff’s application for IFP status was granted and her complaint was 1 subsequently filed on the docket. Dkt. Nos. 4 (order granting IFP), 5 (complaint). Upon review 2 of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 3 complaint as lacking sufficient factual detail to plausibly state a claim. Dkt. No. 6. 4 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 7, 2024. Dkt. No. 7. In her complaint,

5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, by and through a subordinate employee, improperly filed for 6 Title IV-E funding related to Plaintiff’s two children in foster care. See id. at 4. Plaintiff contends 7 that one of her children has been improperly removed from her custody due to Defendant’s 8 failure to add Plaintiff as a party to a state court case. Id. at 5. She alleges that Defendant “knows 9 or reasonably should have known that [RCW 26.44.053(3)] provides Plaintiff[’]s rights are being 10 violated actively by judges in King County Superior Court and does not report these crimes to 11 the proper authorities.” Id. As to Plaintiff’s second child, Plaintiff alleges that she “won her 12 termination trial as her child’s attorney in July 2022,” after two years of the child “being 13 withheld from Plaintiff[’]s custody, care, and control.” Id. She asserts that Defendant “lacked 14 Plaintiff[’]s signature and consent on the shelter care hearing order, dependency order, [and]

15 dependency order review,” despite federal and state law requiring her signature on those 16 documents. Id. 17 Plaintiff alleges that the removal of her two children is part of a larger scheme by 18 Defendant and his subordinate employees to misapply Washington state law and remove children 19 from the custody of their parents, thereby allowing Defendant to apply for Title IV-E funding on 20 behalf of those children. See generally id. at 5–6. She alleges that Defendant misapplies RCW 21 13.34.030(6) by interpreting subsections (a)–(d) as a “list,” which Plaintiff contends is 22 incorrect—she argues that “[t]he only time any state official is allowed to remove a child is when 23 there is no parent physically present.” Id. at 6.

24 1 Plaintiff seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for violation of her First and Fourteenth 2 Amendment rights. Id. at 7, 10. She seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 11. 3 Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of 4 Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or, alternately, for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See

5 Dkt. No. 15. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 A motion to dismiss may be brought where subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking. See 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Court must dismiss a case if it determines that it lacks subject- 9 matter jurisdiction “at any time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 10 A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be either a facial attack 11 (challenging the sufficiency of the pleadings) or a factual attack (presenting evidence contesting 12 the truth of the allegations in the pleadings). See Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 13 2004). “When reviewing a [facial] dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) . . . , ‘we accept as true all 14 facts alleged in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to plaintiff[ ], the

15 non-moving party.’” DaVinci Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2019) 16 (second alteration in original) (quoting Snyder & Assocs. Acquisitions LLC v. United States, 859 17 F.3d 1152, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2017)). However, “[i]f the moving party converts the motion to 18 dismiss into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before 19 the court, the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to 20 satisfy its burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 362 (quotation 21 and citation omitted). When addressing a factual attack, a court may consider evidence outside of 22 the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 23 Am. Diabetes Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 938 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Safe

24 Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. Standing under Rule 12(b)(1) 3 Defendant argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction “because Plaintiff has not pleaded 4 facts sufficient to establish the existence of an injury, much less one caused by Defendant’s

5 actions.” Dkt. No. 15 at 6. 6 “Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction to certain ‘Cases’ and 7 ‘Controversies.’” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). “‘One element of the 8 case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that they have standing to 9 sue.’” Id. (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). “Standing” examines whether a 10 plaintiff is entitled to bring their claims before the court. See Perry v. Newsom, 18 F.4th 622, 11 630–31 (9th Cir. 2021). For a plaintiff to have standing to bring a lawsuit, they must demonstrate 12 an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent” (also known as the “injury-in- 13 fact”), that the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action,” and that such injury is 14 “redressable by a favorable ruling.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. For an injury-in-fact to be

15 “concrete,” the injury “must actually exist” and be “particularized,” and the injury must affect 16 the claimant “in a personal and individual way.” Perry, 18 F.4th at 631 (quoting Spokeo v. 17 Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 1548 (2016)). The second element, traceability, demands that there be “a 18 causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 19 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Plaintiff “bear[s] the burden of pleading and proving concrete facts 20 showing that the defendant’s action has caused the substantial risk of harm.” Clapper, 568 U.S. 21 at 414 n.5. A “speculative chain of possibilities” or “speculation about ‘the unfettered actions 22 made by independent actors not before the court’” is insufficient to establish traceability. Id. 23 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). The final element, redressability, requires that a plaintiff seek a

24 1 remedy that will give them relief from the alleged injury. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 592 2 U.S. 279, 282 (2021). 3 Defendant first argues that “Plaintiff has no legally protected right to sue over the 4 spending of Title IV-E federal funds by the State and lacks injury within the zone of protected

5 interest.” Dkt. No. 15 at 7. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act provides for federal funding for 6 “foster care maintenance payments, adoption assistance payments, related foster care and 7 adoption administrative and training expenditures, and the independent living services program” 8 administered by individual states. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.10; see also Native Village of Stevens v. 9 Smith, 770 F.2d 1486, 1487 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff contends that the improper collection of this 10 funding constitutes an injury-in-fact. See Dkt. No. 17 at 4. 11 But Plaintiff does not explain how she was injured by the State’s collection of federal 12 funding. Standing cannot be conferred by Defendant’s collection of federal funding without 13 Plaintiff’s notice or consent, because Plaintiff has not made any allegations that she was entitled 14 to notice of the collection of Title IV-E funding or was required to consent to the collection of

15 such funding—nor could she, as no notice or consent requirement by biological parents for the 16 collection of Title IV-E funding appears in the requirements applicable to Title IV-E. See 17 generally Dkt. No. 7; 45 C.F.R. §§ 1356.10–.86. Further, the federal reimbursements are for a 18 percentage of the cost of providing maintenance payments for children who are removed from 19 their homes and placed in foster care, but the claims for this funding are not submitted in the 20 name of any individual child. Dkt. No. 15 at 7, 45 C.F.R. §§ 1356.10–.86. And Plaintiff’s 21 standing cannot arise from her status as a taxpayer, as the Supreme Court has held that the 22 expenditure of public funds in an allegedly unlawful manner is not an injury sufficient to confer 23 standing, even where the plaintiff is a taxpayer. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United

24 for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 477 (1982). Finally, Plaintiff’s standing 1 could not stem from any financial harm to herself, as she has made no allegations that the State 2 attempted to garnish her wages or otherwise attempt to seek reimbursement from her for any 3 costs related to her children’s foster care. See generally Dkt. No. 7. 4 Because Plaintiff also makes allegations as to the impropriety of the dependency

5 proceedings for her children, the Court addresses whether standing may derive from any alleged 6 termination of Plaintiff’s parental rights. See Dkt. No. 17 at 5 (“Defendant’s role in [the 7 termination] proceedings has had a direct and adverse effect on my parental rights.”). First, as 8 Defendant points out (Dkt. No. 15 at 8), any judicial review of the state dependency proceedings 9 referenced by Plaintiff (see Dkt. No. 7 at 7) is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which 10 “prevents federal courts from second guessing state court decisions by barring the lower court 11 from hearing de facto appeals from state court judgments.” Zayas v. Walton, No. C22-18, 2022 12 WL 1468997, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2022) (quoting Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 13 898 (9th Cir. 2003)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal lawsuits seeking to overturn 14 state judgments. Id. Thus, any injury to Plaintiff arising from the dependency proceedings in

15 state court cannot form the basis for standing in this action. Id. (“To the extent that Plaintiff is 16 challenging the termination of her parental rights and that decision is final, then she is seeking 17 a de facto appeal of the sort that Rooker-Feldman forbids.”). Finally, the availability of Title IV- 18 E funding is not related to the dependency proceedings for any particular child—its availability 19 is dependent on the State’s ability to develop compliant programs for foster care and adoption as 20 a whole. See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.10. 21 22 23

24 1 Accordingly, Plaintiff has not alleged any cognizable injury sufficient to confer standing 2 in this case. The Court therefore lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims, and 3 Defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) must be granted.1 4 B. Whether Amendment is Futile

5 This motion is before the Court on Plaintiff’s amended complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 5 6 (complaint), 7 (amended complaint). “If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, 7 leave to amend should be granted unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts 8 consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Or. Clinic, PC v. 9 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 75 F.4th 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. 10 Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). However, when a district court 11 has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to 12 amend is “particularly broad.” Griggs v. Pace Am. Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 13 1999). The Court may deny leave to amend if the proposed amendment is futile or would be 14 subject to dismissal. Carrico v. City and County of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir.

15 2011). “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is 16 entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal 17 of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). 18 Here, the Court has already provided Plaintiff with notice of the complaint’s deficiencies. 19 Dkt. No. 6. The Court previously determined that Plaintiff did not provide factual details as to 20 any monetary losses she may have suffered or Defendant’s relation to any injury she alleges to 21 have suffered. See id. at 3. Further amendment would be futile. To the extent that Plaintiff’s 22 claims arise form the final state dependency proceedings, they are barred by the Rooker-Feldman 23 1 Because the Court has determined it does not have jurisdiction over this action, it may not address Defendant’s 24 Rule 12(b)(6) challenges to Plaintiff’s claims. 1 doctrine and amendment would be futile. Accordingly, it is appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s 2 claims with prejudice. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff’s complaint is

5 DISMISSED with prejudice. 6 Dated this 20th day of February 2025. 7 A 8 Tana Lin United States District Judge 9

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