OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Utah Code Ann. § 20-3-2(g)(2) (Supp. 1971) requires new political associations to secure the signatures of 500 registered voters, including at least ten signatures of registered voters from each of ten counties, in order to qualify as a political party with the accompanying right to place candidates on the bal-
lot. Plaintiffs ask this court for declaratory and injunctive relief, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, on the grounds that the Utah law, insofar as it requires ten signatures of registered voters from each of ten counties, is unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs’ standing to raise this issue is clear.
E. g.,
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). A three-judge court was convened to hear the matter in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.
Plaintiff Human Rights Party, of which plaintiff Zautra is a prospective candidate, sought to gain recognition as a political party, with accompanying access to a place on the ballot, by complying with the provisions of Utah law.
The signatures of 500 registered voters apparently were obtained in accordance with the statute, and the validity of this provision is not contested.
But included among those signatures were at least ten voters’ signatures from each of only nine counties, plus nine voters’ signatures from a tenth county and two from an eleventh county. Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 4, June 15, 1972. Thus plaintiff Human Rights Party fell one signature short of compliance with the statute’s requirement of ten voters’ signatures from each of ten counties and plaintiff Zautra was denied a place on the ballot.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they could have complied with the statute had they realized in time that certain of their signatures were invalid. But they claim that under the present circumstances the requirement in question has denied them equal protection of the laws. In illustration of this proposition, they note that over half of the persons in Utah reside in two of the state’s 29 counties. Thus, to take the extreme example, a party heavily concentrated in a few counties might represent a majority of Utah voters but nevertheless not have power enough to muster ten signatures in ten counties and might therefore be denied recognition as a result of the provision in question. In effect, a small number of registered voters in 20 sparsely-settled counties would thus have prevented the appearance on the ballot of a party having substantial voter support.
Plaintiff rely principally upon the ease of Moore v. Ogilvie,
supra.
There the United States Supreme Court struck down an Illinois law which required independent candidates to obtain 25,000 signatures including the signatures of 200 qualified voters from each of at least 50 of the state’s 102 counties in order to obtain a place on the ballot. By overruling the earlier case of MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 1, 93 L.Ed. 3 (1948), the court also invalidated a similar provision applicable to candidates for new political parties. In taking this action, the court noted that the Illinois population was (as is Utah’s) highly concentrated in a few counties thereby admitting of the possibility that voters in sparsely-populated counties might block access to the ballot by large numbers of the state’s voters who supported an independent or new party candidate. As a result, the law was found to be discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Utah law questioned by plaintiffs differs substantially in the force of its impact upon political candidacies from that encountered by the court in
Moore.
The Utah law requires only 10 signatures from each of 10 counties. On a basis proportional to the two states’ populations, this signature requirement is about one-ninth as burdensome as that of Illinois’.
In addition, signatures are required from only about one-third of
Utah’s counties (10 of 29), while the Illinois requirement approaches one-half (50 of 102). Furthermore, Utah’s geographical requirement applies only to the qualification of political parties — not to the qualification of independent candidates as did the Illinois statute. Utahans may gain an independent place on the statewide ballot by merely gathering the signatures of 300 voters without any geographical restriction. Utah Code Ann. § 20-3-38 (Replacement Vol. 3, 1969).
As may be seen, in contrast to the Illinois statute struck down in
Moore,
the Utah statute places only minimal burden upon prospective candidates and parties. Nevertheless, the geographical signature distribution requirement does impose some disproportionate weight upon the voter signatures which may appear on petitions seeking party recognition in Utah. The question before this court is whether the Fourteenth Amendment mandates the elimination of even minimal geographical burdens of conceivably discriminatory effect «upon the formation of political parties.
For circumstances such as these which affect the franchise somewhat obliquely, we believe the answer must now be found in the recent instructions of the United States Supreme Court in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). There, in the process of striking down' lhrge Texas candidate registration fees, the court first required a showing that the alleged discriminatory law have “a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise” before the court would apply the strict test of reasonable necessity to determine its validity.
Bullock, supra
at 144, 92 S.Ct. at 856. In effect, the court said that those laws which created no “real and appreciable impact ... on the franchise” were subject to lower standards of review requiring only a showing of some “rational basis” for their existence rather than the stricter requirement of “reasonable necessity.”
See, Bullock, supra
at 142, 144, 92 S.Ct. 849.
We hold that the Utah law requiring of prospective political parties ten signatures from each of ten counties has not exerted and continues to exert no real or appreciable impact upon the franchise in Utah. We hold further that this law rests upon a rational basis.
New political parties have been successfully formed in Utah through compliance with the law.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Utah Code Ann. § 20-3-2(g)(2) (Supp. 1971) requires new political associations to secure the signatures of 500 registered voters, including at least ten signatures of registered voters from each of ten counties, in order to qualify as a political party with the accompanying right to place candidates on the bal-
lot. Plaintiffs ask this court for declaratory and injunctive relief, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, on the grounds that the Utah law, insofar as it requires ten signatures of registered voters from each of ten counties, is unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs’ standing to raise this issue is clear.
E. g.,
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). A three-judge court was convened to hear the matter in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.
Plaintiff Human Rights Party, of which plaintiff Zautra is a prospective candidate, sought to gain recognition as a political party, with accompanying access to a place on the ballot, by complying with the provisions of Utah law.
The signatures of 500 registered voters apparently were obtained in accordance with the statute, and the validity of this provision is not contested.
But included among those signatures were at least ten voters’ signatures from each of only nine counties, plus nine voters’ signatures from a tenth county and two from an eleventh county. Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 4, June 15, 1972. Thus plaintiff Human Rights Party fell one signature short of compliance with the statute’s requirement of ten voters’ signatures from each of ten counties and plaintiff Zautra was denied a place on the ballot.
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they could have complied with the statute had they realized in time that certain of their signatures were invalid. But they claim that under the present circumstances the requirement in question has denied them equal protection of the laws. In illustration of this proposition, they note that over half of the persons in Utah reside in two of the state’s 29 counties. Thus, to take the extreme example, a party heavily concentrated in a few counties might represent a majority of Utah voters but nevertheless not have power enough to muster ten signatures in ten counties and might therefore be denied recognition as a result of the provision in question. In effect, a small number of registered voters in 20 sparsely-settled counties would thus have prevented the appearance on the ballot of a party having substantial voter support.
Plaintiff rely principally upon the ease of Moore v. Ogilvie,
supra.
There the United States Supreme Court struck down an Illinois law which required independent candidates to obtain 25,000 signatures including the signatures of 200 qualified voters from each of at least 50 of the state’s 102 counties in order to obtain a place on the ballot. By overruling the earlier case of MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 1, 93 L.Ed. 3 (1948), the court also invalidated a similar provision applicable to candidates for new political parties. In taking this action, the court noted that the Illinois population was (as is Utah’s) highly concentrated in a few counties thereby admitting of the possibility that voters in sparsely-populated counties might block access to the ballot by large numbers of the state’s voters who supported an independent or new party candidate. As a result, the law was found to be discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Utah law questioned by plaintiffs differs substantially in the force of its impact upon political candidacies from that encountered by the court in
Moore.
The Utah law requires only 10 signatures from each of 10 counties. On a basis proportional to the two states’ populations, this signature requirement is about one-ninth as burdensome as that of Illinois’.
In addition, signatures are required from only about one-third of
Utah’s counties (10 of 29), while the Illinois requirement approaches one-half (50 of 102). Furthermore, Utah’s geographical requirement applies only to the qualification of political parties — not to the qualification of independent candidates as did the Illinois statute. Utahans may gain an independent place on the statewide ballot by merely gathering the signatures of 300 voters without any geographical restriction. Utah Code Ann. § 20-3-38 (Replacement Vol. 3, 1969).
As may be seen, in contrast to the Illinois statute struck down in
Moore,
the Utah statute places only minimal burden upon prospective candidates and parties. Nevertheless, the geographical signature distribution requirement does impose some disproportionate weight upon the voter signatures which may appear on petitions seeking party recognition in Utah. The question before this court is whether the Fourteenth Amendment mandates the elimination of even minimal geographical burdens of conceivably discriminatory effect «upon the formation of political parties.
For circumstances such as these which affect the franchise somewhat obliquely, we believe the answer must now be found in the recent instructions of the United States Supreme Court in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). There, in the process of striking down' lhrge Texas candidate registration fees, the court first required a showing that the alleged discriminatory law have “a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise” before the court would apply the strict test of reasonable necessity to determine its validity.
Bullock, supra
at 144, 92 S.Ct. at 856. In effect, the court said that those laws which created no “real and appreciable impact ... on the franchise” were subject to lower standards of review requiring only a showing of some “rational basis” for their existence rather than the stricter requirement of “reasonable necessity.”
See, Bullock, supra
at 142, 144, 92 S.Ct. 849.
We hold that the Utah law requiring of prospective political parties ten signatures from each of ten counties has not exerted and continues to exert no real or appreciable impact upon the franchise in Utah. We hold further that this law rests upon a rational basis.
New political parties have been successfully formed in Utah through compliance with the law.
The plaintiffs in this case, whose support is apparently concentrated in a few counties, have stipulated that they failed to comply with the law only because they did not learn until the filing deadline was upon them that some of their signatures were not those of registered voters. Furthermore, political groups which do not qualify as parties have reasonably unfettered access to the ballot by alternate means, thereby minimizing the effect of the law in question upon the franchise.
Plaintiffs have supplied no indication
that the Utah law has any real, or appreciable, discriminatory effect upon the franchise in Utah.
Utah law contemplates the establishment of political parties with detailed, statewide organizations. During the first year of operations, the law questioned by plaintiffs contemplates the holding of conventions in at least the minimum ten counties in which signatures were obtained. Utah Code Ann. § 20-3-2(g)(2) (Supp. 1971), set out in note 1,
supra.
After the first year, a new political party must hold organizational conventions in every county in the state. Utah Code Ann. § 20-4-1 (Supp. 1971). Thus the political party qualification requirements rest upon a rational basis: they are an intermediate step adapted to the orderly establishment of a statewide party organization. The requirement of such a statewide organization is a legitimate state purpose so long as it imposes no undue burden on the election process.
See,
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971);
cf., supra
note 5.
Traditionally political parties have exerted the greatest of influence upon state and national government. It is not unreasonable for a state to require such parties to provide even the residents of sparsely-settled counties with an opportunity to involve themselves in party machinery which may ultimately control their state or county policies. In return for a party’s commitment to statewide operation, the State of Utah sanctions primary elections for the parties and provides state recognition of party decisions concerning the selection of candidates.
E. g.,
Utah Code Ann. § 20-4-1 to 20-4-9 (Supp. 1971). Should statewide responsibility appear oppressive to any political group, the state provides an opportunity for independent access to the ballot, but requires those who elect this less circumscribed alternative to forego party perquisites such as candidate recognition. Utah Code Ann. § 20-3-38 (Replacement Yol. 3, 1969). This scheme is fundamental to Utah’s representative democracy. Its newly-integrated requirement that prospective political parties obtain the signatures of ten registered voters from each of ten counties does not violate plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The above shall be considered findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Judgment for defendants.