Zaslavsky v. Consumer Attorneys Association of Los Angeles

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 29, 2026
• Docket: 24-2367
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 29 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NEAL S. ZASLAVSKY Esquire, Attorney, No. 24-2367 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:23-cv-06460-SPG-RAO v. MEMORANDUM* CONSUMER ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION OF LOS ANGELES, a California non-profit corporation; MINH TRI NGUYEN Esquire, an individual; IBIERE SECK Esquire, an individual; Mr. MARTIN ISAAC AARONS, Attorney, an individual; ELIZABETH ANNE HERNANDEZ, an individual; CHRISTA HAGGAI RAMEY Esquire, an individual; DAN ABIR Esquire, an individual; KATHRYN M. TREPINSKI Esquire, Attorney, an individual; Mr. DAVID HOFFMAN, Attorney, an individual; KEITH LASALLE ALLEN Esquire, an individual; KWEDI MOORE Esquire, an individual; DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Submitted May 27, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: R. NELSON and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, and EZRA, District Judge.***

Plaintiff-Appellant Neal Zaslavsky seeks review of the district court’s order

granting Defendant-Appellee David Hoffman’s special motion to strike under

California anti-SLAPP rules and denying Zaslavsky’s motion for sanctions.1 We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the district court’s order.

We review “an order granting a special motion to strike under California’s

anti-SLAPP statute de novo.” Herring Networks, Inc. v. Maddow, 8 F.4th 1148,

1154–55 (9th Cir. 2021). We review the denial of a discovery motion for abuse of

discretion. See In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 671 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012).

We review an “award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.” Manufactured

Home Comtys., Inc. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 655 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2011). We

review a district court’s “denial of a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 for abuse of

discretion.” Larez v. Holcomb, 16 F.3d 1513, 1521 (9th Cir. 1994).

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation. 1 The immediate appeal is proceeding only as to Hoffman, as Zaslavsky has reached a resolution as to all defendants except Hoffman.

2 24-2367 1. The district court did not violate Zaslavsky’s due process rights by

failing to enforce standing orders and local rules requiring a “meet-and-confer.”

Zaslavsky fails to cite case law (other than generic recitation of what due process is)

supporting his contention that the court violated his due process rights and, as a

result, this claim is waived. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8); United States v. Cazares,

788 F.3d 956, 983 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The failure to cite to valid legal authority waives

a claim for appellate review.”).

At any rate, a good-faith attempt to comply satisfies the meet-and-confer

requirements of the Central District’s Local Rule 7-3. Siegel v. Scripps Networks

Interactive, Inc., 2016 WL 10968139, at *1 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2016). The

record shows a good-faith attempt by Hoffman to comply with the meet-and-confer

requirements. The district court rightly found that “CAALA’s counsel and

Hoffman’s counsel were in consistent communication with Plaintiff and made

various attempts to meet and confer with Plaintiff.” Hoffman’s attempt to comply

with the meet-and-confer requirements of the district court’s standing orders and

Local Rule 7-3 was in good faith, and the district court’s supposed failure to enforce

did not violate Zaslavsky’s due process rights.

2. The district court did not violate Zaslavsky’s due process rights by

failing to allow him to submit a brief opposing Hoffman’s request for attorney’s fees.

Again, Zaslavsky cites no cases that directly support his position that the district

3 24-2367 court violated his due process rights by not giving him the opportunity to brief the

issue of attorney’s fees. See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8). “The failure to cite to valid

legal authority waives a claim for appellate review.” Cazares, 788 F.3d at 983.

In any case, the district court did not abuse its discretion on this issue. It

applied the correct standard to reach a reasonable result. Under California law, trial

courts “use the lodestar method when determining an award of attorney fees under

the anti-SLAPP statute.” Frym v. 601 Main St. LLC, 82 Cal. App. 5th 613, 620

(2022). The district court accurately applied the lodestar method by determining

whether the hourly rate was reasonable and analyzing whether the hours expended

were reasonable. We thus decline to hold that it abused its discretion.

3. The district court did not err in granting Hoffman’s anti-SLAPP special

motion to strike. Generally, de novo review of an anti-SLAPP special motion to

strike is a two-step analysis. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b).

The first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis is satisfied here. California’s

anti-SLAPP statute prevents causes of action “against a person arising from any act

of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech.” Cal.

Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16(b)(1). Hoffman’s conduct as Director of the Board of

Governors for CAALA arose from and was “made before . . . [an] official

proceeding authorized by law” and “made in connection with an issue under

consideration or review by . . . [an] official proceeding authorized by law.”

4 24-2367 § 425.16(e). The “by-laws of a voluntary association . . . [are] the measure of the

authority conferred upon the organization to . . . expel its members.” Smetherham

v. Laundry Workers’ Union, Loc. No. 75, 111 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941).

Courts generally will not disturb an association’s decision to expel members “where

the action is taken in good faith and in accordance with its adopted by-laws and

rules.” Id. Additionally, the act of voting to terminate Zaslavsky’s membership in

the official proceeding “is conduct qualifying for the protections afforded by the

First Amendment.” Schroeder v. Irvine City Council, 97 Cal. App. 4th 174, 183 n.3

(2002).

The standard by which courts review the second prong of the anti-SLAPP

analysis depends on whether the defendant’s motion to strike challenged legal or

factual deficiencies. See Herring Networks, 8 F.4th at 1155. When the motion to

strike is “based on alleged [legal] deficiencies in the plaintiff’s complaint, the motion

must be treated in the same manner as a motion under Rule 12(b)(6).” Planned

Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Ctr. For Med. Progress, 890 F.3d 828, 834 (9th

Cir. 2018) (quoting Rogers v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F.Supp.2d 973, 983

(C.D. Cal. 1999)).

Zaslavsky argues that Hoffman’s motion to strike raised several “significant

factual issues,” including whether Zaslavsky was suspended for “uncivil email

posts” and whether a letter sent by Zaslavsky to CAALA’s Executive Director (Ms.

5 24-2367 Moore) was “offensive.” These are not factual issues, because it was not the role of

the district court under any of Zaslavsky’s claims to inquire into whether the

communications were sufficiently “uncivil” or “offensive” to justify Zaslavsky’s

CAALA membership termination. The court was instead tasked with determining

whether the proper procedures were followed by CAALA in compliance with the

bylaws and California Corporations Code. And the court will not disturb an

association’s decision to terminate membership if the association followed the

procedures authorized in their bylaws (and in compliance with the law). See

Smetherham, 111 P.2d at 951.

Zaslavsky further claims that the motion to strike raised the factual issue of

whether Zaslavsky “was given fair and proper notice.” This is not a factual issue,

because “reasonable notice is a question of law.” See Wallis v. Princess Cruises,

Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2002).

Zaslavsky makes a third argument that Hoffman’s motion raised factual issues

as to whether Zaslavsky had “tenable economic relationships for Mr. Hoffman to

interfere with.” But Hoffman’s motion instead argues that Zaslavsky’s complaint

contains “no allegation of any tenable economic relationship(s) between [Zaslavsky]

and an identifiable third-party lawyer or business.” It raises a purely legal challenge

to the sufficiency of Zaslavsky’s complaint. The motion is therefore treated and

analyzed as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Planned Parenthood, 890 F.3d at 834. The

6 24-2367 complaint must make a plausible claim that the defendant has acted unlawfully.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). As established above, Zaslavsky’s

complaint fails to make a plausible claim that Hoffman acted unlawfully as Director

of the CAALA Board of Governors. The district court did not err in granting

Hoffman’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.

4. The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion in preventing

Zaslavsky from conducting limited discovery to oppose Hoffman’s anti-SLAPP

motion to dismiss. A district court has broad discretion to permit or deny discovery,

and “its decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed except upon the clearest

showing that denial of discovery results in actual and substantial prejudice to the

complaining litigant.” Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quotation omitted). Zaslavsky flags no factual issues raised by Hoffman’s motion

to strike. Zaslavsky was not entitled to discovery to oppose Hoffman’s anti-SLAPP

motion because no factual challenges were made.

5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Zaslavsky’s

motion for Rule 11 sanctions. Rule 11 sanctions are imposed against a defendant

filing an anti-SLAPP motion “when [the] motion is frivolous, legally unreasonable,

or without factual foundation, or is brought for an improper purpose.” Larez, 16

F.3d at 1522 (quotation omitted). As explained above, Hoffman’s anti-SLAPP

motion to strike was not frivolous, legally unreasonable, without factual foundation,

7 24-2367 or brought with an improper purpose. Hoffman’s conduct fell squarely within

§§ 425.16(e)(1) and (2), and Zaslavsky’s complaint did not survive scrutiny. The

district court did not err in denying Zaslavsky sanctions under Rule 11.

Additionally, Zaslavsky’s argument that Hoffman’s failure to comply with the

district court’s standing order and Local Rule 7-3 entitles Zaslavsky to Rule 11

sanctions cannot stand. As stated above, Hoffman made a good-faith attempt to

comply with the standing order and Local Rule 7-3, which satisfies the

meet-and-confer requirements. See Siegel, 2016 WL 10968139, at *1 n.1.

Zaslavsky has no right to Rule 11 sanctions based on these allegations, and the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

AFFIRMED.

8 24-2367