OPINION
DOUGLAS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder with malice. Punishment was assessed by the jury at forty-five years.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged. A summary of the facts is set out for a better understanding of the grounds of error presented.
On the evening of May 3, 1971, Kathryn Soefje, a dispatcher for the Sequin police department, received a call at approximately 10:00 p.m. from one of appellant’s children saying that there was a domestic quarrel at the family residence. Officers Layne Dietz and Mike Rosas were dispatched to investigate the call. Both officers testified that appellant threatened to kill her husband in their presence. After calming the two, the officers left.
At approximately 11:30 p.m. the same evening, Officers Roy Paez and Kenneth Strong were summoned to the Zapata residence to investigate an alleged shooting. Upon their arrival at the home they were met by the appellant. She told the officers that she had shot her husband, and then she handed them a pistol.
Initially, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a separate hearing on her present competency to stand trial. She argues that the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Gon-zaba raised sufficient question as to her incompetency for a period of three years prior to this offense.
No motion for a preliminary hearing on the issue of competency to stand trial under the provisions of Article 46.02, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., was filed. In fact, appellant’s counsel announced ready and the appellant personally entered her own plea. Counsel then announced that the appellant did not deny shooting her husband and stated that she did it in self-defense. During the trial and after the State had rested, appellant called Dr. William Gonzaba as a witness. He testified that appellant had suffered from hallucinations and various other symptoms of depression prior to and immediately after the shooting occurred. Nowhere does it appear that he considered appellant incompetent to stand trial nor that she was unable to distinguish right from wrong. In fact, at the trial appellant, testifying in her own behalf, gave no indication that she was mentally incompetent. She answered all questions fully and completely with the assistance of an interpreter. Nor is there anything in the record to indicate that appellant’s counsel ever requested that she be examined by a psychiatrist. Further, there is no request by appellant’s counsel for a competency hearing during the trial.
Appellant, by announcing that she was ready and entering her plea without any suggestion of insanity to the court, waived her right to a separate hearing before the trial. A trial judge is not required to conduct such a hearing on his own motion absent any significant facts being brought to his attention or absent circumstances and actions which should have indicated a need for a separate determination. Boss v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 580. We hold that the testimony of Dr. Gonzaba did not give rise to an issue of appellant’s competency to stand trial, especially when analyzed in compari[804]*804son with appellant’s own actions and testimony during the trial.
Next, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her motion to quash the indictment. She argues that the failure to use the word “did” in the charging portion of the indictment is fatal. It is her contention that such omission is in violation of Articles 21.02(7), 21.03 and 21.04, V.A.C.C.P.
The indictment appears in the record as follows:
“The Grand Jurors for the County of Guadalupe, State of Texas, duly selected, impaneled, sworn, charged and organized as such at the May Term, A.D.1971, of the 25th Judicial District Court of said County, upon their oaths present in and to said Court, that Mrs. Tules Zapata, on or about the 3rd day of May, A.D.1971, and before the presentment of this indictment, in said County and State, then and there unlawfully, with malice aforethought, kill Luis Zapata by shooting him with a gun, against the peace and dignity of the State.”
Appellant, relying on Mesa v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 462 S.W.2d 600, argues that the word “did” is an essential word in the indictment. It is her position that the word “did” must appear just prior to “ . . . then and there unlawfully,” or before “ . . . kill Luis Zapata,” in order that the indictment contain everything that is necessary to be proved with the required degree of certainty.
The real issue is whether the indictment sets out the offense charged in plain and intelligible language. We are mindful of our holding in Moore v. State, Tex Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 523 (1971), where Presiding Judge Onion, speaking for the majority, said:
“It is, of course, not sufficient to say that the accused knew with what offense he was charged, but the inquiry must be whether the charge in writing furnished that information in plain and intelligible language.”
Before analyzing the language of the indictment in the present case, it is necessary that we look at the definition of “malice aforethought.” The legal definition of such, as defined by the Court, is “the voluntary and intentional doing of an unlawful act by one of sound memory and discretion with the purpose, means, and ability to accomplish the reasonable and probable consequences of the act.” Witty v. State, 75 Tex.Cr.R. 440, 171 S.W. 229 (1915). Now a careful reading of the charging portion of the indictment shows “that Mrs. Tules Zapata, on or about the 3rd day of May, A.D.1971, and before the presentment of this indictment, in said County and State, then and there unlawfully, with malice aforethought, kill Luis Zapata by shooting him with a gun.” (Emphasis Supplied)
Considering the definition of malice aforethought in connection with the indictment, we hold that the indictment sets forth the offense in plain and intelligible words as required under the provisions of Article 21.02(7), V.A.C.C.P. The insertion of “did” in one of the two places or both would make the charging portion read smoother and more grammatically correct. To the extent that other cases are in conflict with this holding, they are overruled. See Edmondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496.
Also, the appellant claims that the indictment should have been quashed because Mexican Americans were systematically excluded from grand juries in Guadalupe County. She relies on the grand jury list for the years 1967 through 1971. Those lists show that twelve percent of the grand jurors, during those years, had Mexican American names. Counsel for appellant argues that since Guadalupe County has approximately a fifty percent Spanish surname population, such percentage should reflect in the make-up of the grand [805]*805juries. What appellant has failed to show is how many females with Spanish surnames may have married other than Spanish surname males and served on such juries. Nor does her evidence reflect how many Spanish surname persons were summoned for such duty and requested to be excused because of job requirements or health reasons. Also, we note from the record that three Mexican Americans served on the grand jury which indicted appellant. We perceive no harm to appellant.
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OPINION
DOUGLAS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder with malice. Punishment was assessed by the jury at forty-five years.
The sufficiency of the evidence is not challenged. A summary of the facts is set out for a better understanding of the grounds of error presented.
On the evening of May 3, 1971, Kathryn Soefje, a dispatcher for the Sequin police department, received a call at approximately 10:00 p.m. from one of appellant’s children saying that there was a domestic quarrel at the family residence. Officers Layne Dietz and Mike Rosas were dispatched to investigate the call. Both officers testified that appellant threatened to kill her husband in their presence. After calming the two, the officers left.
At approximately 11:30 p.m. the same evening, Officers Roy Paez and Kenneth Strong were summoned to the Zapata residence to investigate an alleged shooting. Upon their arrival at the home they were met by the appellant. She told the officers that she had shot her husband, and then she handed them a pistol.
Initially, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a separate hearing on her present competency to stand trial. She argues that the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Gon-zaba raised sufficient question as to her incompetency for a period of three years prior to this offense.
No motion for a preliminary hearing on the issue of competency to stand trial under the provisions of Article 46.02, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P., was filed. In fact, appellant’s counsel announced ready and the appellant personally entered her own plea. Counsel then announced that the appellant did not deny shooting her husband and stated that she did it in self-defense. During the trial and after the State had rested, appellant called Dr. William Gonzaba as a witness. He testified that appellant had suffered from hallucinations and various other symptoms of depression prior to and immediately after the shooting occurred. Nowhere does it appear that he considered appellant incompetent to stand trial nor that she was unable to distinguish right from wrong. In fact, at the trial appellant, testifying in her own behalf, gave no indication that she was mentally incompetent. She answered all questions fully and completely with the assistance of an interpreter. Nor is there anything in the record to indicate that appellant’s counsel ever requested that she be examined by a psychiatrist. Further, there is no request by appellant’s counsel for a competency hearing during the trial.
Appellant, by announcing that she was ready and entering her plea without any suggestion of insanity to the court, waived her right to a separate hearing before the trial. A trial judge is not required to conduct such a hearing on his own motion absent any significant facts being brought to his attention or absent circumstances and actions which should have indicated a need for a separate determination. Boss v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 580. We hold that the testimony of Dr. Gonzaba did not give rise to an issue of appellant’s competency to stand trial, especially when analyzed in compari[804]*804son with appellant’s own actions and testimony during the trial.
Next, appellant alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her motion to quash the indictment. She argues that the failure to use the word “did” in the charging portion of the indictment is fatal. It is her contention that such omission is in violation of Articles 21.02(7), 21.03 and 21.04, V.A.C.C.P.
The indictment appears in the record as follows:
“The Grand Jurors for the County of Guadalupe, State of Texas, duly selected, impaneled, sworn, charged and organized as such at the May Term, A.D.1971, of the 25th Judicial District Court of said County, upon their oaths present in and to said Court, that Mrs. Tules Zapata, on or about the 3rd day of May, A.D.1971, and before the presentment of this indictment, in said County and State, then and there unlawfully, with malice aforethought, kill Luis Zapata by shooting him with a gun, against the peace and dignity of the State.”
Appellant, relying on Mesa v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 462 S.W.2d 600, argues that the word “did” is an essential word in the indictment. It is her position that the word “did” must appear just prior to “ . . . then and there unlawfully,” or before “ . . . kill Luis Zapata,” in order that the indictment contain everything that is necessary to be proved with the required degree of certainty.
The real issue is whether the indictment sets out the offense charged in plain and intelligible language. We are mindful of our holding in Moore v. State, Tex Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 523 (1971), where Presiding Judge Onion, speaking for the majority, said:
“It is, of course, not sufficient to say that the accused knew with what offense he was charged, but the inquiry must be whether the charge in writing furnished that information in plain and intelligible language.”
Before analyzing the language of the indictment in the present case, it is necessary that we look at the definition of “malice aforethought.” The legal definition of such, as defined by the Court, is “the voluntary and intentional doing of an unlawful act by one of sound memory and discretion with the purpose, means, and ability to accomplish the reasonable and probable consequences of the act.” Witty v. State, 75 Tex.Cr.R. 440, 171 S.W. 229 (1915). Now a careful reading of the charging portion of the indictment shows “that Mrs. Tules Zapata, on or about the 3rd day of May, A.D.1971, and before the presentment of this indictment, in said County and State, then and there unlawfully, with malice aforethought, kill Luis Zapata by shooting him with a gun.” (Emphasis Supplied)
Considering the definition of malice aforethought in connection with the indictment, we hold that the indictment sets forth the offense in plain and intelligible words as required under the provisions of Article 21.02(7), V.A.C.C.P. The insertion of “did” in one of the two places or both would make the charging portion read smoother and more grammatically correct. To the extent that other cases are in conflict with this holding, they are overruled. See Edmondson v. State, 41 Tex. 496.
Also, the appellant claims that the indictment should have been quashed because Mexican Americans were systematically excluded from grand juries in Guadalupe County. She relies on the grand jury list for the years 1967 through 1971. Those lists show that twelve percent of the grand jurors, during those years, had Mexican American names. Counsel for appellant argues that since Guadalupe County has approximately a fifty percent Spanish surname population, such percentage should reflect in the make-up of the grand [805]*805juries. What appellant has failed to show is how many females with Spanish surnames may have married other than Spanish surname males and served on such juries. Nor does her evidence reflect how many Spanish surname persons were summoned for such duty and requested to be excused because of job requirements or health reasons. Also, we note from the record that three Mexican Americans served on the grand jury which indicted appellant. We perceive no harm to appellant. See Ex parte Woods, Tex.Cr.App., 483 S.W.2d 464, and Jaquez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 473 S.W.2d 530.
The appellant next contends that the prosecutor suppressed evidence. She argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her motion for discovery of a tape recording taken at the grand jury proceedings. She argues that the contents of that recording would show that the prosecutor had information concerning a knife allegedly found on the deceased’s body, such information being vital to the issue of self-defense.
The record shows that in the hearing on his motion, appellant called Officers Paez and Strong as witnesses. Both officers denied the existence of such a knife. Also, the district attorney denied that he had any knowledge of a knife being found on the deceased. The trial judge called for the inventory of deceased’s clothing and personal items taken from his body. It did not reflect the existence of a knife. After the trial judge denied the motion for discovery, he instructed the district attorney to bring him the tape recording and he would listen to it. If the recording produced any information about a knife, he said that he would change his previous denial. Nothing further is shown. Appellant has not shown any harm.
Lastly, appellant contends that even if she is not entitled to hear the tape recording of the testimony before the grand jury, the tape recording itself violated the provisions of Article 20.02, V.A.C. C.P. Even if such were a violation, it would not require a reversal of this cause.
No reversible error being shown, the judgment is affirmed.