Zanders, V. v. Ransom, K.

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 11, 2025
Docket977 MDA 2024
StatusUnpublished

This text of Zanders, V. v. Ransom, K. (Zanders, V. v. Ransom, K.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zanders, V. v. Ransom, K., (Pa. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

J-S10040-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

VICTOR ZANDERS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : KEVIN RANSOM, SUPERINTENDENT : No. 977 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered June 11, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Civil Division at No(s): 2023-09083

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORDANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2025

Victor Zanders (“Zanders”) appeals pro se from the order transferring

his self-titled petition for writ of habeas corpus from Luzerne County to

Philadelphia County. We affirm.

In 1996, Zanders was convicted of second-degree murder, and the

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to life imprisonment.1

Zanders is serving his sentence in SCI-Dallas, located in Luzerne County. In

August 2023, Zanders filed the instant petition in Luzerne County and raised

sixteen claims, the essence of which are as follows: (1) he was not sentenced

to life without the possibility of parole; (2) there was no legal sentencing order

to hold him in prison; and (3) his continued detention without the possibility

of parole violated state and federal constitutional protections. See Pet.,

____________________________________________

1 Zanders does not allege that he was a juvenile at the time of the murder. J-S10040-25

8/30/23, unnumbered at 2-4. Zanders asserted that all of his claims “test the

legality of his commitment and detention.” Id. at 4. The defendant, the then-

superintendent of SCI-Dallas, filed an answer as well as a motion for transfer

or dismissal of the petition. On June 11, 2024, the trial court transferred the

petition to Philadelphia County. Zanders timely appealed.2

Prior to reviewing the merits of Zanders’s appeal, we must first

determine whether we have jurisdiction over this case. See Smith v.

O’Brien, 321 A.3d 1034, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2024). Appellee, the then-

superintendent of SCI-Dallas, argues that this Court should quash this appeal

because: (1) the order is not a final order; (2) the trial court transferred the

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103, see Pa.R.Crim.P.

108, cmt.; and (3) while Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) permits an interlocutory appeal as

of right from an order in a civil proceeding changing venue or transferring a

matter to a court of coordinate jurisdiction, the comment to Pa.R.A.P. 311(c)

states that a transfer pursuant to section 5103 is not immediately appealable,

see Pa.R.A.P. 311, cmt. to 311(c). See Appellee’s Br. at 6-7.

Because a petition for writ of habeas corpus is civil in nature, Pa.R.A.P.

311(c) affords a basis to exercise appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise non-

final order transferring venue. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) (noting, in relevant part, ____________________________________________

2 The trial court ordered the filing and service of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Although neither the record nor the docket indicates Zanders filed a Rule 1925(b)statement, we decline to find waiver because the docket does not establish when the trial court’s order for a Rule 1925(b) statement had been served on Zanders. Cf. In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 510 (Pa. Super. 2007).

-2- J-S10040-25

that “[a]n appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or

proceeding changing venue” or “transferring the matter to another court of

coordinate jurisdiction”); Com. ex rel. Paylor v. Claudy, 77 A.2d 350, 351

(Pa. 1951) (noting that habeas corpus is “a civil remedy rather than a criminal

proceeding regardless of whether the prisoner is detained under civil or

criminal process”). As noted by Appellee, the relevant rule for transferring

venue of the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus are set forth in

Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, the comment to which states, “[a] petition misfiled in the

wrong judicial district under this rule may be transferred to the proper judicial

district pursuant to . . . 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5103(a).” Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, cmt. In

turn, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103 states, “If [a] matter is . . . brought in a court . . .

which does not have jurisdiction . . ., the court . . . shall not . . . dismiss the

matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this

Commonwealth . . ..” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a). The comment to Pa.R.A.P.

311(c) further states subdivision(c) “does not relate to a transfer under . . .

42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 5103, or any other similar provision of law, because such a

transfer is not to a ‘court of coordinate jurisdiction’ within the meaning of this

rule.” See Pa.R.A.P. 311, cmt. to 311(c). The comment continues, “[I]t is

intended that there shall be no right of appeal from a transfer order based on

improper subject matter jurisdiction.” See Pa.R.A.P. 311, cmt. to 311(c).

The present transfer of the petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(a) constitutes a change of

venue. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6502(b) (stating that venue for petitions for writ

-3- J-S10040-25

of habeas corpus under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6501-6505 shall be prescribed by

general rule); Pa.R.Crim.P. 108, cmt. (stating that “[t]his rule implements

[s]ection 6502(b) . . . as it applies to the venue for petitions for writs of

habeas corpus in criminal matters”) (emphasis and italics added). Moreover,

such a transfer does not implicate improper subject matter jurisdiction.

Rather, it involves a transfer between courts of coordinate jurisdiction. See

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6501(a) (authorizing any judge of a court of record to issue a

writ of habeas corpus); see also Commonwealth v. Bethea, 828 A.2d 1066,

1074 (Pa. 2003) (noting subject matter jurisdiction and venue are distinct).

Accordingly, this appeal falls within the explicit wording of Pa.R.A.P. 311(c),

and we reject Appellee’s claim that the comments to Pa.R.Crim.P. 108 and

Pa.R.A.P. 311(c) preclude this Court from exercising jurisdiction.3 See

Pa.R.A.P. 107; see also Pa.R.J.A. 108 (a)-(c). Having concluded that this

Court has jurisdiction over this appeal, we proceed to review the trial court’s

order transferring Zanders’s petition.

This Court reviews a transfer of venue for an abuse of discretion. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Nicoletti, 328 A.3d 85, 90 (Pa. Super. 2024). As noted

3 We note that a recent Commonwealth Court decision has agreed with Appellee’s argument to quash. See Barnett v. Ransom, 337 A.3d 986, 2025 WL 763690 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) (mem. op. at *2) (quashing an appeal from an order transferring a petition for writ of habeas corpus based on the comment to Pa.R.A.P. 311(c)). Although we may cite that decision for persuasive value, it is neither precedential nor binding on this Court. See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b); Peter Daniels Realty, Inc. v. N. Equity Inv’rs, Grp., Inc., 829 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. 2003). For the reasons stated above, we respectfully decline to follow the Barnett decision.

-4- J-S10040-25

above, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 108 governs venue in habeas

actions in criminal matters and states:

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Related

Commonwealth v. Bethea
828 A.2d 1066 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)
Peter Daniels Realty, Inc. v. Northern Equity Investors, Group, Inc.
829 A.2d 721 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Paylor v. Claudy
77 A.2d 350 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1951)
In re L.M.
923 A.2d 505 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2007)

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