J-A09020-15
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
BARBARA ZAMSKY AND DODGE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PREMIER, INC. AND PREMIER : PENNSYLVANIA PLATFORM TENNIS, INC., : : Appellants : : v. : DAVID DODGE AND CHRISTINE : ANTHONY AND JEFFERY SHERMAN, : ESQUIRE AND PREMIER PLATFORM : TENNIS, LLC, : : Appellees : No. 2107 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order June 30, 2014, Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County, Civil Division at No. 11-2637
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JUNE 23, 2015
Barbara Zamsky (“Zamsky”), Dodge Premier, Inc., and Premier
Platform Tennis, Inc. (collectively, “Appellants”), appeal from the order
entered on June 30, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County,
granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth
herein, we affirm.
A summary of the relevant facts and procedural history is as follows.
Zamsky and David Dodge (“Dodge”) were married from May 1998 until May
2008. During the marriage, Zamsky and Dodge formed Premier Platform
Tennis, Inc. (“Premier Corporation”). Premier Corporation operated a J-A09020-15
business that involved building and maintaining platform tennis courts.1
Zamksy retained control of Premier Corporation following her separation
from Dodge.
In late 2008, Dodge and Christine Anthony (“Anthony”) formed
Premier Platform Tennis, LLC (“Premier LLC”). Premier LLC, like Premier
Corporation, built and maintained platform tennis courts. Dodge and
Anthony held themselves out as president and vice president respectively.
Dodge and Anthony retained Attorney Jeffrey Sherman (“Attorney
Sherman”) to form and register Premier LLC. In the course of forming and
registering Premier LLC in Pennsylvania, Attorney Sherman’s business
address was listed in the formation papers for initial tax purposes, and was
also listed at one time as the “President” of Premier LLC on the Corporation
Bureau’s records.
On April 5, 2011, Appellants filed a complaint against Premier LLC,
Dodge, Anthony, and Attorney Sherman.2 With respect to Attorney Sherman
1 “Platform tennis is an outdoor court game played with paddles and a rubber ball on a raised and fenced wooden floor that is smaller than a tennis court.” See Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 6 n.1 (citing THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1387 (3d ed. 1996)). 2 At oral argument, this Court determined that outstanding claims remained undecided in the trial court concerning Premier LLC, rendering this appeal interlocutory. See Pa.R.A.P. 341 (“any order or other form of decision that adjudicates fewer than all the claims and parties shall not constitute a final order.”). On March 23, 2015, this Court issued an Order providing Appellants with ten days to dismiss the action against Premier LLC. See Order of Court, 3/23/15, at 1-2. The Order further provided that failure to comply would result in our quashing of the appeal. Appellants complied with
-2- J-A09020-15
in particular, Appellants alleged that he was the president and sole officer of
Premier LLC and lodged the following claims against him: conspiracy,
conversion by agent, unfair competition, tortious interference with business
relations, unjust enrichment, accounting, and violation of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act.
On August 30, 2013, Attorney Sherman filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that he only acted as an attorney for Premier LLC, and
that since all claims against him arose solely from Appellants’ erroneous
belief that he had a personal interest in Premier LLC, they should be
dismissed. The trial court granted Attorney Sherman’s motion for summary
judgment on June 30, 2014.3 Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration
on July 9, 2014 and a notice of appeal on July 23, 2014. The trial court
denied Appellants’ motion for reconsideration on July 30, 2014.
On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review:4
1. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment stated at page 11 "Dodge and Anthony retained the service of [Attorney] Sherman, to act as their attorney and assist with the formation of Premier, LLC. Complaint ¶ 24, without considering the allegations of various
our Order by filing a Praecipe to Discontinue/Dismiss Action as to Premier LLC on March 30, 2015. Accordingly, we will address the merits of Appellants’ claims. 3 The trial court also granted Dodge and Anthony’s motion for summary judgment on June 30, 2014, but that decision is not the subject of this appeal. 4 We have rearranged Appellants’ issues on appeal for ease of disposition.
-3- J-A09020-15
wrongful acts by [Attorney] Sherman and the two named Defendants?
2. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment only considered the argument of [Attorney] Sherman that his services were as a facilitator only, omitting the information that Defendant [Attorney] Sherman was paid $1500.00 by check dated 1/13/09 with Dodge Corp on the memo line, a usual and customary fee for the formation of an LLC in this area. There were subsequent payments long after formation of the LLC was completed totaling in excess of $8000, that is $8654.23?
3. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment omitted informing the Court that Defendant [Attorney] Sherman was listed on the records of the Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Business Entity Filing History, as President of [Premier] LLC, on the date of the formation of the LLC, December 24, 2008 and continued being shown on the Business Entity Filing History as President of [Premier] LLC, on the records of Department of State of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, until at least March 10, 2011?
4. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment admits at Paragraph 26[,] "Appellants can conceivably maintain a claim of conspiracy against [Attorney] Sherman only if his alleged conduct was other than as a lawyer for his clients?"
5. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count I CONSPIRACY, when the various paragraphs of Count I specifically allege the Defendants including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman conspired to acquire the business of Plaintiff Premier [Corp.], took confidential and proprietary information as to customers, collected accounts receivable,
-4- J-A09020-15
withdrew funds from the bank account of plaintiff DPI, took equipment and other assets without permission or consent of any authorized party?
6. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count I CONSPIRACY as the movants counsel for Defendant [Attorney] Sherman advised the Court, because there was a release of two co- defendants; Dodge and Anthony, there could not be a conspiracy of one, that is Defendant [Attorney] Sherman alone, when there was an additional Defendant Premier [] LLC still in the case?
7. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count II CONVERSION BY AGENT, when the facts in the various paragraphs of Count II specifically allege Dodge while still an officer and an employee of Plaintiff [Premier Corp.] and DPI with the assistance of Anthony and [Attorney] Sherman formed Defendant [Premier] LLC; further acting, in concert with Defendants misappropriated assets of the Plaintiff’s herein?
8. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count III UNFAIR COMPETITION. The facts in the various paragraphs of Count III specifically allege all of the Defendants including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman, conspired to acquire the business of the Plaintiffs [Premier Corp.] and DPI took and used business and proprietary information of Plaintiffs [Premier Corp.] and DPI, engaged in deceptive selling practices using the name of Plaintiff Premier [Corp.] and used forms, cards and other material similar to that used by [Premier Corp.]
9. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count IV DEFENDANT [] DODGE VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES. The facts in the various paragraphs of Count IV specifically allege
-5- J-A09020-15
that from and after May 1, 2008, Defendant [] Dodge --- in concert with the other named Defendants (Anthony and [Attorney] Sherman) converted took and misappropriated assets of the Plaintiffs herein.
10. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count VI DEFENDANTS TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE PLAINTIFFS BUSINESS RELATIONS. The facts in the various paragraphs of Count IV specifically allege that the engagement/employment of Defendant Dodge by Plaintiffs was never terminated and that he, in concert with the other Defendants, including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman, willfully solicited customers and suppliers of Plaintiffs for his and their own purposes.
11. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count VII UNJUST REINRICHMENT [sic]. The facts in the various paragraphs of Count VII specifically allege that Defendant Dodge in concert with the other named Defendants including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman took and misappropriated assets of the Plaintiffs.
12. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count VIII. The facts in the various paragraphs of Count VIII specifically allege that the paragraphs 1 through 58 of the Complaint were incorporated in Count VIII by reference and Defendant Dodge, in concert with the other named Defendants, including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman took including [sic] and misappropriated assets of the Plaintiffs.
13. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment was granted as to Count IX. The facts in the various paragraphs of Count IX specifically allege Defendant Dodge in concert with the other named Defendants
-6- J-A09020-15
including Defendant [Attorney] Sherman took and misappropriated assets of the Plaintiffs.
14. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment did not address that discovery had not yet been completed?
15. Was the Court in error in not considering that the aforesaid Motion for Summary Judgment omitted informing the Court that despite Defendant [Attorney] Sherman's assertion that all electronic records were lost, one e-mail from Defendant [Attorney] Sherman came into Plaintiffs’ possession by reason of being transmitted on Plaintiffs' computer, stating that [Attorney] Sherman was recovering the business of Premier Platform Tennis for Defendant Dodge?
Appellants’ Brief at 4-6.5
Appellants also raise in their Statement of Errors Complained of on
Appeal the following: “the trial court ‘was in error as to not giving full impact
to the following issues of fact’:”
5 Attorney Sherman argues that Appellants’ appeal should be dismissed for failing to conform to the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Attorney Sherman’s Brief at 17-18. Attorney Sherman specifically argues that Appellants deviated from the briefing requirements in Rules 2172, 2174, 2117, and 2116(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, by failing to “include a cover page, alphabetically arranged table of citations, statement of case with no arguments, name of judge whose determinations are to be reviewed, concise questions and answers after the questions.” Id. Attorney Sherman further argues that Appellants’ argument section in its brief “was not divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued (fifteen), and there was no particular point treated in parts of the argument, as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).” Id. at 18. We agree that the brief is defective. However, while this Court has authority to dismiss an appeal for defects in the brief, we conclude that the defects in this instance do not impede our ability to conduct meaningful review of the issues on appeal, and therefore, we will address the merits of Appellants’ claims.
-7- J-A09020-15
1[.] Defendant [Attorney] Sherman was President of [Premier] LLC for a period of almost three (3) years.
2. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman has not presented facts of proof that he is still not the President of [Premier] LLC.
3. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman was the Responsible Party In the Docketing Statement of the Department of Revenue.
4. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman has not presented facts of proof that he is still not the Responsible Party in the Docketing Statement of the Department of Revenue.
5. The release of Defendants Dodge and Anthony has not been finalized by an agreement as required by the Divorce Court.
6. Such agreement prepared in accordance with the directions of the Court is required to that [sic] provide the case shall continue against Defendant [Attorney] Sherman and Defendant [Premier] LLC.
7. The discovery of Defendant [Attorney] Sherman has not been completed.
8. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman [sic] refusal to produce electronic and hard copy records claiming all such records were “lost” subjects [Attorney] Sherman to all adverse inferences under the Doctrine of Spoilation. See, Transportation Law Update, Rawle and Henderson, LLP, vol. 13; and Spoilation of Evidence, Georgia Bar Journal, Lee Wallace, 2002.
9. Defendant [Attorney] Sherman cannot assert there can be no conspiracy, if Defendants Dodge and Anthony are released, based on the concept that there can be no conspiracy of one, where Defendant [Premier] LLC is not released and remains as one (1)
-8- J-A09020-15
of two (2) defendants, along with Defendant [Attorney] Sherman.
10. Defendant [Premier] LLC was included in the notes of testimony attached to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as being a party to the case going forward.
Id. at 6.
Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision to grant a motion for
summary judgment is well settled:
A reviewing court may disturb the order of the trial court only where it is established that the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. As with all questions of law, our review is plenary.
In evaluating the trial court's decision to enter summary judgment, we focus on the legal standard articulated in the summary judgment rule. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2. The rule states that where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to relief as a matter of law, summary judgment may be entered. Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely on his pleadings or answers in order to survive summary judgment. Failure of a non[- ]moving party to adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which it bears the burden of proof establishes the entitlement of the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Lastly, we will view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party.
Thompson v. Ginkel, 95 A.3d 900, 904 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citing J.P.
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 63 A.3d 1258, 1261-62 (Pa. Super.
-9- J-A09020-15
2013)). This standard of review implicates a three-step process, which
requires the appellate court to determine
whether the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case. If so, the second step is to determine whether there is any discrepancy as to any facts material to the case. Finally, it must be determined whether, in granting summary judgment, the trial court has usurped improperly the role of the jury by resolving any material issues of fact.
Reilly v. Tiergarten, Inc., 633 A.2d 208, 209-210 (Pa. Super. 1993)
(citing Dudley v. USX Corp., 606 A.2d 916, 920 (Pa. Super. 1992)).
On appeal, Appellants direct the first three of their fifteen issues to
their claim that the trial court erred in its determination that Attorney
Sherman did not act other than as a lawyer. Appellants assert that the trial
court failed to consider that Attorney Sherman was listed as the President of
Premier LLC for nearly three years and that Attorney Sherman received
payments after the formation of Premier LLC.
With regard to Appellants’ claim that Attorney Sherman acted as more
than a lawyer, the trial court held:
There is no issue of fact that [Attorney] Sherman benefited personally in any way from the formation and registration of Premier LLC or participated in any way in the business of Premier LLC. The record before this court revealed that Anthony, at all times, was the sole member and held all interests in Premier LLC. The listing with the Pennsylvania Department of State, Corporations Bureau identifying Sherman as the president of Premier LLC was a technical error caused by the Pennsylvania Department of State not by [Attorney] Sherman. It
- 10 - J-A09020-15
was ultimately corrected by the Pennsylvania Department of State. There is no basis for Appellants’ contention [Attorney] Sherman was the president of Premier LLC or was acting other than as a lawyer.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 10.
Appellants state, “At trial, [Appellees] may be able to establish by the
relevant evidence that [Attorney] Sherman was not the President. But that
remains a matter for trial, not the basis for an award of summary
judgment.” Appellants’ Brief at 17. Appellants fail to acknowledge,
however, that “[i]n response to a summary judgment motion, the
nonmoving party cannot rest upon the pleadings, but rather must set forth
specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.” Bank of
America, N.A. v. Gibson, 102 A.3d 462, 464 (Pa. Super. 2014); Pa.R.C.P.
1035.3. Our review of the record reveals that Appellants have not set forth
specific facts establishing that Attorney Sherman was the President of
Premier LLC or that Attorney Sherman acted other than as a lawyer to
satisfy their burden of demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact.
To the contrary, at her deposition, Zamsky testified that she was not
aware of whether Premier LLC employed Attorney Sherman other than as a
lawyer, and was not “aware of any relationship between [Attorney] Sherman
and Dodge which would compel Premier [] LLC, to pay Sherman other than
legal fees for work services he provided[.]” N.T., 3/14/13, at 29-30, 48-49.
When questioned as to the basis for her belief that Attorney Sherman had an
- 11 - J-A09020-15
ownership interest in Premier LLC, Zamsky responded, “Because he was
listed as president on the state documents, and when he – it was brought to
his attention, he never changed it for several years.” N.T., 1/25/13, at 155.
Zamsky was also questioned whether she had “any support for a contention
that [Attorney] Sherman was president or is president of Premier [] LLC
other than the printout which [she] referenced from the Pennsylvania
Department of State Corporation Bureau website[.]” N.T., 1/25/13, at 187.
Zamsky responded, “No.” Id.
Attorney Sherman presented a letter sent by the Pennsylvania
Corporation Bureau that explained the Department of State’s process for
obtaining information and transmitting information regarding corporate
entities into its records. The letter explained,
As indicated in your letter, the Department of State and the Department of Revenue provide information to each other as required by statute. Title 15 Pa.C.S. § 134(b) requires the Department of State to transmit the information contained in the Docketing Statement to the Department of Revenue. The information contained in the docketing statement consists of the entity name, the tax responsible party, the entity purpose and the effective date, if any. This information is transmitted electronically to the Department of Revenue on a daily basis.
Section 403 of the Tax Reform Code provides that a corporate tax report shall include such other information as the Department of Revenue may require. Upon receipt of the report, the Department of Revenue shall promptly forward to the Department of State, the names of the president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer of the
- 12 - J-A09020-15
corporation and the complete street address of the principal office of the corporation for inclusion in the records of the Department of State relating to corporation. 72 P.S. § 7403(a)(3).
Section 1110 of the Associations Code provides that the names of the officers and the address of “corporations for profit” as annually forwarded to the Department of State by the Department of Revenue are public information. The phrase “corporations for profit” as used in the Associations Code does not include limited liability companies, partnerships and other associations that are classified as corporations for Federal income tax purposes. Furthermore, limited liability companies do not have the statutory officers of president, secretary and treasurer and may only have members, managing members and partners.
In February 2010 a review of the above procedures discovered that when the Department of State provided the tax responsible party information contained in the docketing statement, the Department of Revenue inadvertently transmitted officer information on the limited liability companies, when in fact this was incorrect. Upon this realization, the Corporation Bureau had all officer information for limited liability companies deleted from the database on March 14, 2010. The Department of Revenue also made provisions so that this incorrect information was no longer forwarded to the Department of State. You indicated in your letter of August 8, 2011 that you were initially identified as the tax responsible party. However a search of the Corporation Bureau’s website prior to March 14, 2010 incorrectly identified you as the president of Premier Platform Tennis, LLC. Our records now have been updated and you are no longer identified as the president.
Department of State Corporation Bureau Letter, 8/15/11, at 1-2 (emphasis
in original).
- 13 - J-A09020-15
Appellants argue that the trial court misread the letter sent by the
Corporation Bureau:
The Court omits that the technical error in the view of the Corporation Bureau was a listing of any officer, and that the Corporation Bureau’s [sic] ceased listing any and all officers. The Corporation Bureau did not state that Defendant Sherman was not the President of Premier LLC. Only that it would not list him or any other officer of any LLC.
Appellants’ Brief at 17.
Although Appellants contend that the letter does not establish that
Attorney Sherman was not the president, Appellants disregard their burden
of providing some basis that Attorney Sherman was the president or had
any other role in the company. Appellants failed to present any evidence
that Attorney Sherman acted other than as a lawyer aside from the negative
inference they drew from the letter issued by the Corporation Bureau.
Moreover, Zamsky admitted at her deposition that she was unaware of
any documents submitted to the Department of State that reflected Attorney
Sherman’s involvement with Premier LLC. N.T., 1/25/13, at 195. The
interest certificate of Premier LLC reflects that Anthony retained a 100%
interest in Premier LLC. See Attorney Sherman’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, 8/30/13, Exhibit L (Interest Certificate). Moreover, in Premier
LLC’s Articles of Dissolution, Anthony is solely listed as a director and officer.
Id. at Exhibit Q (Articles of Dissolution). Thus, based upon our review of the
record, we conclude that Appellants have not presented any evidence to
- 14 - J-A09020-15
establish a genuine issue of material fact that Attorney Sherman acted other
than as a lawyer.
In their next nine issues on appeal, Appellants assert that “[t]here are
numerous allegations set forth in the Complaint that do not relate to
whether [Attorney Sherman] was president or not.” Appellants’ Brief at 12.
Specifically, Appellants claim that Attorney Sherman acted in concert with
Anthony and Dodge to commit several business torts including, conversion,
unfair competition, tortious interference with business relations, unjust
enrichment, accounting, and violating the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. The
trial court addressed the Appellants’ assertions, stating:
These claims may best be described as torts which are contingent upon (1) the involvement of [Attorney] Sherman in the business operations of Premier LLC and/or (2) a personal stake or interest by [Attorney] Sherman in Premier LLC. The record before this court revealed no such personal interest in Premier LLC and was devoid of any evidence [Attorney] Sherman was involved in the actual business of Premier LLC. Rather, it is apparent that [Attorney] Sherman simply provided legal services to Anthony and Dodge, specifically regarding the formation and registration of Premier LLC.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/5/14, at 11.
We agree with the trial court’s assessment. As we previously
discussed, there is no evidence establishing that Attorney Sherman acted as
anything other than a lawyer. The evidence presented establishes that
Attorney Sherman provided legal services to Anthony and Dodge to form and
- 15 - J-A09020-15
register Premier LLC. There is no evidence, however, that Attorney
Sherman played any other role in the business activities of Premier LLC
related to Appellants or otherwise after he assisted Anthony and Dodge with
forming and registering the company. Thus, Appellants are unable to
establish that Attorney Sherman participated in any activity or conspired
with Anthony and Dodge to participate in any activity that would be
detrimental to Appellants. Accordingly, Appellants failed to establish the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact and are not entitled to relief on
these nine issues.
Finally, in their last two issues on appeal, Appellants claim that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because discovery had not
yet been completed. Our review of the record reveals, however, that
discovery had been completed. The record reflects that the discovery
deadline was set for July 2, 2013. See Attorney Sherman’s Memorandum of
Law in Support of Motion for Sanctions and for Dismissal of Claims Against
Sherman, 8/30/13, Exhibit H, at 1 (Letter to Delaware County Court of
Common Pleas). On July 2, 2013, counsel for Attorney Sherman requested
that the trial court approve a stipulation between Attorney Sherman and
Appellants to permit specific discovery to occur and to extend the deadline
for filing dispositive motions from August 1, 2013 to August 30, 2013. Id.
The parties requested the trial court allow document review to occur on
August 8, 2013 at Zamsky’s home, a deposition of Richard K. House, the
- 16 - J-A09020-15
individual who wrote the letter regarding the Pennsylvania Department of
State records, and to permit the deposition of Zamsky, if needed following
the document review. Id. at 2-3. On July 10, 2013, the trial court entered
an order approving the stipulation. Order, 7/10/13. Attorney Sherman filed
his motion for summary judgment on August 30, 2013, in accordance with
the stipulation. There is nothing in the record to support Appellants’
assertion that discovery had yet to be completed.
Moreover, Appellants fail to assert what more they could have gained
from additional discovery that would be essential to its case. Appellants
baldly assert that additional discovery would have permitted them to
determine why Attorney Sherman received two payments from Dodge and
Anthony, one for $1,500 and one in excess of $8,000. Appellants’ Brief at
18, 20. Appellants do not identify any other evidence they sought to
discover that would be essential to their case. Appellants argue, however,
that the doctrine of spoilation applies to this case because Attorney Sherman
claims that he “lost” all electronic files. See Appellants’ Brief at 12, 20.
Appellants specifically argue that “The grant of summary judgment permits
[Attorney] Sherman to contend that all documents and records were ‘lost’
without consequence. A result that should not be permitted to stand under
the Doctrine of Spoilation.” Id. at 12. Appellants fail, however, to provide
any discussion or citation to legal authority. It is well settled that
“arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived.” Lackner v.
- 17 - J-A09020-15
Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing Jones v. Jones, 878
A.2d 86, 90-91 (Pa. Super. 2005)). “Arguments not appropriately developed
include those where the party has failed to city any authority in support of a
contention.” Lackner, 892 A.2d at 29-30 (citing Korn v. Epstein, 727 A.2d
1130, 1135 (Pa. Super. 1999)). Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants
waived any argument regarding the doctrine of spoliation.
As Appellants failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact, we
conclude that the trial court did not commit an error of law or abuse its
discretion when it granted Attorney Sherman’s motion for summary
judgment.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 6/23/2015
- 18 -