Zambrano-Acevedo v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-6202
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MANUEL RICARDO ZAMBRANO- No. 24-6202 ACEVEDO, Agency No. A241-025-803 Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM*

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted July 18, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, MENDOZA, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

Manuel Ricardo Zambrano-Acevedo (“Zambrano”), a native and citizen of

El Salvador, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal from the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of asylum based on a determination of firm resettlement in Mexico.1 See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2020). We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a). We deny the petition for review.

Zambrano’s sole contention before us is that the BIA abused its discretion

by failing to address his request for remand so that the IJ could determine whether

he was removable to Mexico under Mexican law.2 Zambrano argued to the BIA

that he was not removable to Mexico because he lost his Mexican permanent

resident status by operation of Mexican law: first, when he definitively departed

from Mexico, and second, when he received status in the United States in the form

of withholding of removal from El Salvador. He asked the BIA to “remand this

matter so that the Immigration Judge may hold further proceedings to consider the

legality of [his] removal . . . to Mexico based on Mexican Immigration Law.”

Dismissing his appeal, the BIA reasoned that a later revocation of permanent

resident status “does not rebut the finding that he had an offer of firm resettlement”

1 The IJ granted Zambrano withholding of removal from El Salvador and declined to reach his application for protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) from El Salvador. The IJ denied Zambrano’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection as to Mexico. Zambrano does not challenge any of these determinations. 2 Zambrano does not challenge the IJ’s determinations that he received an offer of firm resettlement and that the conditions of his residency in Mexico were not “so substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of [Mexico] that he . . . was not in fact resettled,” 8 C.F.R § 1208.15(b) (2020).

2 24-6202 in Mexico. The BIA did not explicitly address Zambrano’s request for a remand

on the issue of removability.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to remand for abuse of discretion.

Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 2005). “[T]he BIA

abuses its discretion when it fails to provide a reasoned explanation for its actions.”

Id. at 1098. See Narayan v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he

BIA must address and rule upon remand motions, giving specific, cogent reasons

for a grant or denial.”). However, even if we construe Zambrano’s request as a

motion to remand and assume that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to

address it, we decline to remand because it would be an “idle and useless

formality.” Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted).

Here, Zambrano failed to meet the applicable standard for a motion to

remand because he did not present material and previously unavailable evidence

showing a “reasonable likelihood” that he would succeed, on remand, in proving

that he is no longer removable to Mexico. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (stating

motion to reopen standard); Fonseca-Fonseca v. Garland, 76 F.4th 1176, 1183

(9th Cir. 2023) (clarifying application of “reasonable likelihood” standard to

motions to reopen); see also Alcarez-Rodriguez v. Garland, 89 F.4th 754, 759 (9th

Cir. 2023) (“[T]he formal requirements of the motion to reopen and those of the

motion to remand are for all practical purposes the same.” (citation omitted)). The

3 24-6202 IJ designated Mexico as the country of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §

1231(b)(2)(B), which permits a noncitizen to designate an adjacent foreign

territory for removal if the noncitizen “has resided in” that territory. Zambrano’s

contention that he no longer possesses Mexican residency is not material to the

determination of whether he “has resided in” Mexico, and Zambrano provides no

support for his argument that his removability depends on the current validity of

his Mexican residency. Moreover, the cited provisions of Mexican law, last

amended in 2014, were not unavailable at the time of Zambrano’s immigration

hearings, particularly given his argument that he lost his Mexican residency “upon

. . . filing for asylum [from Mexico].” Accordingly, “[w]e believe that no

additional information would be available that previously was not, and a remand

[to the BIA] therefore would be futile.” Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653,

658 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008).

PETITION DENIED.3

3 Zambrano’s Motion for Stay of Removal (Dkt. No. 5) is denied as moot. The temporary stay of removal shall remain in effect until issuance of the mandate.

4 24-6202