Zagaroli v. Neill

2017 NCBC 101

• Court: North Carolina Business Court
• Decided: November 7, 2017
• Docket: 15-CVS-2635
• Status: Published

Opinion

Zagaroli v. Neill, 2017 NCBC 101.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION CATAWBA COUNTY 15 CVS 2635

PETE ZAGAROLI,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant,

v.

JAMES CLAYTON NEILL; RICK BERRY; NEILL GRADING AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, ORDER AND OPINION ON INC.; and RECLAMATION, LLC, DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Defendants and AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO Counterclaim/Third-Party AMEND Plaintiffs,

BENCHMADE, LLC and DEAN PRITCHETT,

Third-Party Defendants.

1. THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Judgment

on the Pleadings and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend First Amended Complaint

(collectively, the “Motions”). Having considered the Motions, the briefs, and the

arguments of counsel at a hearing on the Motions, the Court GRANTS in part and

DENIES in part Defendants’ motion and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

Law Offices of Matthew K. Rogers, by Matthew K. Rogers, for Plaintiff Pete Zagaroli and Third-Party Defendant Benchmade, LLC.

Young, Morphis, Bach & Taylor, LLP, by Paul E. Culpepper and Timothy D. Swanson, for Defendants James Clayton Neill, Rick Berry, Neill Grading and Construction Company, Inc., and Reclamation, LLC. Robinson, Judge.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. The Court does not making findings of fact on Defendants’ Motion for

Judgment on the Pleadings, but only recites those factual allegations of the First

Amended Complaint that are relevant and necessary to the Court’s determination of

the motion.

3. Plaintiff Pete Zagaroli (“Plaintiff”) is a resident of Catawba County, North

Carolina. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 2; Answer, Countercl. & Third-Party

Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 12 [“Answer”].) Plaintiff was, at one time, a construction general

contractor who built new construction, renovations, and additions. (First Am. Compl.

¶ 9; Answer ¶ 9.)

4. Defendants James Clayton Neill (“Clay”) and Rick Berry (“Rick”) are also

residents of Catawba County. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2−3; Answer ¶¶ 2−3.)

5. Defendant Neill Grading and Construction Company, Inc. (“Neill Grading”)

is a North Carolina corporation with its principal place of business in Hickory, North

Carolina. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 4; Answer ¶ 4.) Neill Grading is owned and operated

by Clay and his family. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 5.)

6. Defendant Reclamation, LLC (“Reclamation”) is a North Carolina limited

liability company with its principal place of business in Catawba County. (First Am.

Compl. ¶ 7.)

7. From 2007 through 2010, Plaintiff researched and evaluated various ways

to make money from renovating historic factories and mills. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 10; Answer ¶ 10.) Plaintiff sought out professionals with experience in renovating mills

to obtain tax credits and began working with James Maynard, an architect having

significant experience with historic mills. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 11.)

8. On three separate occasions between 2007 and July 31, 2009, Plaintiff

contracted to purchase an abandoned hosiery mill property called the Hollar Hosiery

Mill (the “Hollar Mill”). (First Am. Compl. ¶ 12.) On one of these occasions, Plaintiff

approached Clay to partner in renovating the Hollar Mill. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff informed Clay that Plaintiff had contracted to purchase the Hollar Mill, but

that Plaintiff was financially unable to renovate it on his own. (First Am. Compl.

¶ 16.)

9. As a result of discussions between Plaintiff and Clay, Clay caused a limited

liability company to contract for the purchase of the Hollar Mill in order to renovate

and develop it consistent with Plaintiff’s development plans. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff understood that he was partnering with Clay to develop the Hollar Mill and

that Plaintiff would perform and profit from design, construction administration, and

project oversight. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that he and Clay agreed

that if Plaintiff did not perform design, construction administration, and project

oversight, Plaintiff would be paid twenty-five percent of the profits from the business.

(First Am. Compl. ¶ 19.)

10. In 2009, Plaintiff prepared a general business plan for the renovation of

historic factories and mills throughout Catawba County, including the Hollar Mill,

Moretz Mills, and Lyerly Mills (the “Wingfoot Business Plan”). (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21−22.) Clay and Rick expressed a desire to partner with Plaintiff in the Wingfoot

Business Plan. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 23.)

11. Plaintiff prepared development concept drawings and pro forma profit

statements and performed cost analyses for renovation of the Hollar Mill. (First Am.

Compl. ¶ 31.) Clay and Plaintiff used Plaintiff’s designs and cost analyses to solicit

numerous potential tenants for the Hollar Mill, including Lenoir-Rhyne and Dale

Jarrett. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 33; Answer ¶ 33.)

12. In September 2009, Clay formed Hollar Hosiery Investments, LLC (“HHI”).

(First Am. Compl. ¶ 20; Answer ¶ 20.) At this same time, Plaintiff alleges that he

commenced construction on the Hollar Mill in reliance on his partnership with Clay

and Rick. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff alleges that in or around 2010, a

gentleman’s partnership agreement existed between Plaintiff and Clay to evaluate

and make money in all possible ways from historic mill renovation and reclamation

of materials from mills. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 38.)

13. In November 2010, members of HHI contracted directly with Plaintiff’s

construction company, Zagaroli Construction Company, Inc. (“Zagaroli

Construction”), for construction work at the Hollar Mill. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 42.) In

or around the end of 2010, however, Plaintiff expressed to Clay that Zagaroli

Construction needed money and that Plaintiff could not continue to spend time and

money on the Hollar Mill renovation without being timely compensated. (First Am.

Compl. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff further told Clay that Plaintiff’s dedication to the Wingfoot

Business Plan and the Hollar Mill had caused Plaintiff’s financial condition to deteriorate and, unless Plaintiff was timely paid for his work, he may not be able to

renew his general contractor’s license. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 44.) Plaintiff alleges that,

in response, Clay told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was vital to, and must remain a part of,

the Wingfoot Business Plan and the Hollar Mill renovation, and that if Plaintiff could

not be the general contractor for the renovations, then Plaintiff would be paid to

solicit and supervise other general contractors to perform the renovation work for the

Hollar Mill. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45−46.)

14. At some time thereafter, Plaintiff approached furniture companies with

which he had a personal relationship for the purpose of selling furniture he had made.

(First Am. Compl. ¶ 54.) One such company, Mitchell Gold, expressed interest in

purchasing furniture made from reclaimed materials. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 54.)

Because Plaintiff did not have sufficient funds, Plaintiff asked Clay if Clay was

interested in funding furniture manufacturing from reclaimed materials. (First Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 55−56; Answer ¶¶ 55−56.) Clay stated that he was interested and

suggested that they solicit investment from Rick. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 57.) Rick

committed to contributing $26,000 in start-up capital. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 57;

Answer ¶ 57.)

15. Plaintiff alleges that he told Clay and Rick that Plaintiff could not provide

furniture manufacturing services unless he was paid for his work. (First Am. Compl.

¶ 58.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that Clay and Rick promised to pay Plaintiff at

least $1,000 per week for his furniture reclamation work. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 59.)

Clay and Rick told Plaintiff that they were partners and that Plaintiff was a thirty percent owner, but that because of Zagaroli Construction’s financial condition, they

all agreed that Plaintiff would be an unnamed partner. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59−61,

63; Answer ¶¶ 59, 61, 63.) Clay and Rick were also thirty percent owners, and Ryan

Lovern, a commercial real estate broker, was a ten percent owner. (First Am. Compl.

¶¶ 62−63; Answer ¶¶ 62−63.)

16. On February 18, 2011, Clay formed Reclamation. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 64;

Answer ¶ 64.) Clay told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was a thirty percent owner of

Reclamation. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 65; Answer ¶ 65.)

17. Plaintiff alleges that he was first paid his $1,000 per week salary in May

2011. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 75.) In July 2011, Plaintiff notified Clay and Rick that

Reclamation did not have funds to pay Plaintiff’s $1,000 per week salary. (First Am.

Compl. ¶ 78.) Plaintiff alleges that he was paid $22,000 in salary in 2011. (First Am.

Compl. ¶ 84.)

18. In May 2012, Plaintiff requested that Clay pay Plaintiff for his construction

administration and design services regarding the Hollar Mill, alleging that Clay

promised to pay him at least $35,000 for his work at the Hollar Mill. (First Am.

Compl. ¶ 87.)

19. In 2012, Plaintiff was performing all aspects of Reclamation’s business.

(First Am. Compl. ¶ 94; Answer ¶ 94.) In the summer of 2012, Plaintiff notified Clay

and Rick that Reclamation needed additional funds to ensure that Plaintiff was paid

his $1,000 per week salary. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 98.) Plaintiff contends that

Reclamation continued to have insufficient cash flow to pay him the minimum weekly compensation promised by Clay and Rick, and that Reclamation paid the weekly

salary only when Reclamation had sufficient funds. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 101.)

Plaintiff avers that in 2012, he was paid $29,500 in salary. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 115.)

20. At the end of 2012, Plaintiff alleges that Clay and Rick agreed that

Reclamation owed Plaintiff $22,500 in back wages for 2012, which they agreed should

be characterized as debt owed by Reclamation to Plaintiff. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 116.)

21. Plaintiff avers that, on or about October 25, 2013, relying on the Wingfoot

Business Plan and connections established from experience with historic renovation

projects obtained by and through Plaintiff, Clay and Neill Grading obtained

substantial financing for the Moretz Mills project. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 128.) Plaintiff

alleges that Clay did not provide the Moretz Mills opportunity to the partnership or

Reclamation. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 129.)

22. Plaintiff alleges that in 2013, he was not paid any salary from Reclamation

and was owed $52,000 in unpaid salary at the end of the year. (First Am. Compl.

¶ 136.)

23. Plaintiff avers that Clay continued to promise Plaintiff payments relating

to Plaintiff’s design and development work at historic factories and mills, including

the Hollar Mill. (First Am. Compl. ¶ 138.)

24. By February 2015, Reclamation’s operations had completely ceased. (First

Am. Compl. ¶ 146.) II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

25. The Court sets forth here only those portions of the procedural history

relevant to its determination of the Motions.

26. Plaintiff filed his Complaint on October 26, 2015, (ECF No. 1), and his First

Amended Complaint on March 21, 2016, (ECF No. 2). The First Amended Complaint

asserts the following claims for relief: (1) breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud,

and fraud (“First Claim”); (2) self-dealing and misappropriation of corporate

opportunities (“Second Claim”); (3) quasi-contract and unjust enrichment (“Third

Claim”); (4) breach of contract (“Fourth Claim”); (5) violation of the North Carolina

Wage and Hour Act (the “Wage and Hour Act”) (“Fifth Claim”); and (6) defamation

(“Sixth Claim”). (First Am. Compl. 14, 16−19.)

27. This action was designated as a mandatory complex business case by order

of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina dated April 14, 2016,

(ECF No. 4), and assigned to Chief Business Court Judge James L. Gale that same

day, (ECF No. 5). This case was later reassigned to the undersigned by order dated

July 5, 2016. (ECF No. 19.)

28. On May 18, 2016, Defendants filed their Answer, Counterclaim and Third-

Party Complaint against Benchmade, LLC (“Benchmade”) and Dean Pritchett

(“Pritchett”). (ECF No. 12.)

29. On July 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed his reply to Defendants’ counterclaims.

(ECF No. 21.) 30. On August 1, 2016, Benchmade filed its answer to Defendants’ third-party

complaint. (ECF No. 22.)

31. On October 14, 2016, Plaintiff inexplicably filed a “revised” reply to

Defendants’ counterclaims, which Defendants did not contest. (ECF No. 32.)

32. On October 31, 2016, the Court entered default in favor of third-party

plaintiffs against Pritchett. (ECF No. 37.)

33. On May 26, 2017, Defendants filed the Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure

(“Rules(s)”) (the “Rule 12(c) Motion”). (ECF No. 52.) Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion

seeks judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiff’s Second (self-dealing and

misappropriation of corporate opportunities), Third (quasi contract and unjust

enrichment), and Fifth (Wage and Hour Act) Claims. (Defs.’ Mot. J. Pleadings ¶ 6,

ECF No. 52.)

34. On June 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Amend First Amended

Complaint (the “Motion to Amend”). (ECF No. 61.)

35. The Motions have been fully briefed, and the Court held a hearing on the

Motions on August 9, 2017. The Motions are now ripe for resolution.

III. RULE 12(c) MOTION

36. The Rule 12(c) Motion seeks judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs’ Third

and Fifth Claims on the ground that the factual allegations of the First Amended

Complaint reveal that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

these claims. (Br. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. J. Pleadings 7−10, ECF No. 54.) The Rule 12(c) Motion seeks judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs’ Second Claim on the grounds

that the claim is derivative and, as such, Plaintiff does not have standing to assert

the claim individually. (Br. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. 6−7.) Accordingly, the Court first

considers the Rule 12(c) Motion as to Plaintiffs’ Third and Fifth Claims, and then

considers the motion as to Plaintiffs’ Second Claim.

A. Legal Standard

37. “A motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted unless the

movant clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and

that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Carpenter v. Carpenter, 189 N.C.

App. 755, 761, 659 S.E.2d 762, 767 (2008). On a Rule 12(c) motion, “[t]he movant is

held to a strict standard and must show that no material issue of facts exists and that

he is clearly entitled to judgment.” Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 137, 209

S.E.2d 494, 499 (1974). “[T]he court cannot select some of the alleged facts as a basis

for granting the motion on the pleadings if other allegations, together with the

selected facts, establish material issues of fact.” J. F. Wilkerson Contracting Co. v.

Rowland, 29 N.C. App. 722, 725, 225 S.E.2d 840, 842 (1976). The Court must read

the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and

[a]ll well pleaded factual allegations in the nonmoving party’s pleadings are taken as true and all contravening assertions in the movant’s pleadings are taken as false. All allegations in the nonmovant’s pleadings, except conclusions of law, legally impossible facts, and matters not admissible in evidence at the trial, are deemed admitted by the movant for purposes of the motion.

Ragsdale, 286 N.C. at 137, 209 S.E.2d at 499 (citations omitted). 38. “Judgment on the pleadings is not favored by the law . . . .” Huss v. Huss,

31 N.C. App. 463, 466, 230 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1976). The function of Rule 12(c) “is to

dispose of baseless claims or defenses when the formal pleadings reveal their lack of

merit.” Ragsdale, 286 N.C. at 137, 209 S.E.2d at 499. “[J]udgment on the pleadings

is not appropriate merely because the claimant’s case is weak and he is unlikely to

prevail on the merits.” Huss, 31 N.C. App. at 469, 230 S.E.2d at 163. “A motion for

judgment on the pleadings is allowable only where the pleading of the opposite party

is so fatally deficient in substance as to present no material issue of fact . . . .” George

Shinn Sports, Inc. v. Bahakel Sports, Inc., 99 N.C. App. 481, 486, 393 S.E.2d 580, 583

(1990).

B. Quasi Contract and Unjust Enrichment (Third Claim)

39. Plaintiff’s Third Claim for quasi contract and unjust enrichment seeks to

recover for, among other things, renovation and construction work Plaintiff alleges

that he performed for Defendants. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 189−92.) Defendants argue

that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this claim because Plaintiff

alleges that the parties entered into express agreements regarding Plaintiff’s

renovation work, and an express contract precludes recovery under an implied

contract theory. (Br. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. 7−8.)

40. An unjust enrichment claim is a claim in quasi contract or a contract

implied in law. M Series Rebuild, LLC v. Town of Mount Pleasant, 222 N.C. App. 59,

67, 730 S.E.2d 254, 260 (2012). “A quasi contract or a contract implied in law is not

a contract. The claim is not based on a promise but is imposed by law to prevent an unjust enrichment. If there is a contract between the parties the contract governs

the claim and the law will not imply a contract.” Booe v. Shadrick, 322 N.C. 567, 570,

369 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1988). “Only in the absence of an express agreement of the

parties will courts impose a quasi contract or a contract implied in law in order to

prevent an unjust enrichment.” Paul L. Whitfield, P.A. v. Gilchrist, 348 N.C. 39, 42,

497 S.E.2d 412, 415 (1998).

41. Notwithstanding that an express contract precludes an implied contract

concerning the same matter, it is also well established under North Carolina law that

a party may plead claims in the alternative. James River Equip., Inc. v. Mecklenburg

Utils., Inc., 179 N.C. App. 414, 419, 634 S.E.2d 557, 560 (2006) (concluding that

plaintiff may plead her express contract and quantum meruit claims in the

alternative even though plaintiff may not ultimately be able to prevail on both).

Indeed, our Court of Appeals has held that “a party who seeks recovery in quantum

meruit while also seeking to recover on an express contract should ideally plead these

claims in the alternative in her complaint[.]” Law Offices of Peter H. Priest, PLLC v.

Coch, 780 S.E.2d 163, 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). Notwithstanding that Plaintiff

ideally should have pleaded these claims expressly in the alternative, “under certain

facts a plaintiff is not required to identify alternatively pleaded claims expressly as

such, because [Rule] 8(e)(2) does not mandate a particular form for phrasing

alternative claims.” Kingsdown, Inc. v. Hinshaw, 2016 NCBC LEXIS 15, at *29 n.9

(N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2016); see also Bandy v. Gibson, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 66, at

*11−12 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 26, 2017) (“[Defendants] cite no authority in support of [their] argument that failure to specifically plead unjust enrichment ‘in the

alternative’ requires dismissal of her claim.”).

42. Therefore, although Plaintiff may not ultimately be able to prevail on both

his breach of contract and quasi contract claims, at this stage, the Court cannot

conclude as a matter of law that Plaintiff is precluded from recovery on his quasi

contract claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion as to Plaintiff’s Third

Claim is denied.

C. Violation of the Wage and Hour Act (Fifth Claim)

43. Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim alleges that “Reclamation, [Clay] and/or [Rick]”

violated the Wage and Hour Act by failing to pay Plaintiff his $1,000 per week salary.

(First Am. Compl. ¶ 205.) Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on this claim because the First Amended Complaint lacks sufficient

allegations to state that Plaintiff is an “employee” as that term is defined in the Wage

and Hour Act. (Br. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. 9−10.)

44. Although the First Amended Complaint does not specify which provision of

the Wage and Hour Act it contends Defendants violated, the Court reads the

allegations as asserting a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6, which provides, in

relevant part, that “[e]very employer shall pay every employee all wages and tips

accruing to the employee on the regular payday.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.6. The

Wage and Hour Act defines “employee” as “any individual employed by an employer.”

Id. § 95-25.2(4). Our Court of Appeals has concluded that the Wage and Hour Act is

modeled after the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and, “[a]s such, ‘[i]n interpreting the [Wage and Hour Act], North Carolina courts look to the FLSA for

guidance.’” Powell v. P2Enterprises, LLC, 786 S.E.2d 798, 800 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016)

(second alteration in original).

45. The FLSA’s definition of “employee” is likewise defined as “any individual

employed by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). Federal decisions have determined

that the term “employee” is to be broadly construed. Salinas v. Commercial Interiors,

Inc., 848 F.3d 125, 133 (4th Cir. 2017); Steelman v. Hirsch, 473 F.3d 124, 128 (4th

Cir. 2007). “[I]n determining whether a worker is an employee covered by the FLSA,

a court considers the ‘economic realities’ of the relationship between the worker and

the putative employer . . . .” Salinas, 848 F.3d at 150 (emphasis omitted). Courts

consider a number of factors and examine the totality of the circumstances in

analyzing employee status. Id.; Steelman, 473 F.3d at 128−29. “The focal point is

whether the worker is economically dependent on the business to which he renders

service or is, as a matter of economic [reality], in business for himself.” Salinas, 848

F.3d at 150 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted).

46. Defendants argue that Plaintiff is not an “employee” as a matter of law

because Plaintiff alleges that he was a partner, and general partners are not

“employees” within the meaning of the Wage and Hour Act, relying on Steelman. (Br.

Supp. Defs.’ Mot. 9.) In Steelman, plaintiff and defendant were both romantic and

business partners who lived together and worked side-by-side in operating their

business. Steelman, 473 F.3d at 125. Plaintiff and defendant’s bills, as well as each

of their personal expenses, were paid from the business proceeds, and they took the company’s successes and failures into account when making spending decisions. Id.

at 126. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on

plaintiff’s FLSA claim, concluding that plaintiff was a partner, rather than an

“employee.” Id. at 127.

47. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that “general

partners in a business are not covered by the FLSA[,]” and that “attributes of

partnership such as exposure to risk, managerial control, and the ability to share in

profits ‘introduce complexities and economic realities which are not consonant with

employee status.’” Id. at 129 (citations omitted) (quoting Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825

F.2d 257, 275 (10th Cir. 1987)). The Court of Appeals reasoned as follows:

The intended lifetime partnership [plaintiff] described was not the bargained-for exchange of labor for mutual economic gain that occurs in a true employer-employee relationship. According to the plaintiff, the couple saw their work together as a way to improve an economic future that they intended to share in perpetuity, rather than as a transfer of one individual’s assets to another in exchange for labor. The plaintiff did not obtain a bargained-for portion of her supposed employer’s assets -- she took from those assets for her own purposes with a discretion that is fundamentally alien to employer-employee relationships.

....

Such extensive access to company funds is not the kind of privilege that employees enjoy with respect to their employers’ revenue. Indeed, the plaintiff’s ability to draw compensation from the company exceeded the financial control typical in the partnerships that the plaintiff does not dispute fall outside the FLSA. When the plaintiff lived comfortably and exclusively off the proceeds of the business and exerted authority in disposing of its funds, we find it hard to see the bargain exchanging labor for compensation that marks employment arrangements.

Id. at 130 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 48. As Steelman and other cases make clear, however, “[t]he determination of

employee status is very fact intensive,” Herman v. Express Sixty-Minutes Delivery

Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 299, 305 (5th Cir. 1998), and “a person’s title alone should not

be dispositive in the analysis[,]” Harris v. Universal Contracting, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-

00253 DS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81105, at *5 (D. Utah June 12, 2014). In Harris,

the district court squarely addressed the issue of whether a member of a limited

liability company can also be an “employee” of that company. In so doing, the court

noted that “no controlling court has addressed the direct question of whether LLC

members can also be employees under this vague definition [of employee] in the

FLSA,” and the court applied a six-factor test to address the issue. Harris, 2014 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 81105, at *5, *7−9. After a fact-intensive inquiry, the court granted

summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on his FLSA claim, concluding that the

members were subject to the company’s control and, thus, were “employees” as

defined by the FLSA. Id. at *13.

49. Likewise, in Kehler v. Albert Anderson, Inc., No. 16-5318 (JBS/KMW), 2017

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58826 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2017), defendants moved to dismiss

plaintiff’s FLSA claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

arguing that plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed because plaintiff alleged that he was

an owner, not an “employee.” The court concluded that plaintiff sufficiently pleaded

that he was an “employee” under the FLSA. Id. at *14. In so concluding, the court

recognized that “[c]ourts have struggled with characterizing putative owners and

partners that also perform work for their companies, like [p]laintiff here, as the economic realities test is generally used to distinguish between employees and

independent contractors, not employees and owners.” Id. at *14−15. The court

distinguished Steelman on the ground that Steelman concerned a partnership while

Kehler concerned a close corporation, and the court emphasized the acute

vulnerability of minority shareholders in closely held corporations. Id. at *15−16.

50. In light of the highly fact-dependent nature of employee status, the Court

cannot conclude as a matter of law, based solely on the pleadings, that Plaintiff was

not an employee of Reclamation, Clay, or Rick within the meaning of the Wage and

Hour Act. Although Plaintiff alleges that he was a partner and an interest owner in

Reclamation, a party may claim ownership and employee status in the alternative,

Steelman, 473 F.3d at 128, and Plaintiff alleges that he agreed to work for

Reclamation based on Clay and Rick agreeing to ensure that Reclamation had

sufficient capital and operating funds to pay Plaintiff a salary of $1,000 per week,

(First Am. Compl. ¶ 196). Plaintiff additionally alleges that Clay knew that Plaintiff

was financially dependent on Clay and Rick, (First Am. Compl. ¶ 175), and “the FLSA

applies to workers regardless of their protestations that they are not employees

because ‘the purposes of the [FLSA] require that it be applied even to those who would

decline its protections[,]’” Steelman, 473 F.3d at 131 (quoting Tony & Susan Alamo

Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985)). While a fact-intensive inquiry

may reveal that Plaintiff is not an employee within the meaning of the Wage and

Hour Act, the Court is unable to conduct that analysis based solely on the pleadings.

Therefore, Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion as to Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim is denied. D. Self-Dealing and Misappropriation of Corporate Opportunities (Second Claim)

51. Plaintiff’s Second Claim alleges the following:

183. Upon information and belief, [Clay] used his partnership with [Plaintiff] to obtain business information intending not to provide such to or for the benefit of the partnership or Reclamation, but rather, for Neill Grading to benefit from business opportunities that should’ve been partnership or Reclamation opportunities.

184. [Clay] did not disclose to the partnership nor [sic] provide the partnership opportunities to the partnership nor [sic] Reclamation opportunities that [Clay] was required to offer to the partnership and/or Reclamation, but in violation of duties to partnership [sic] used partnership information for the benefit of businesses associated with [Clay] including without limitation Neill Grading.

(First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 183−84.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to

assert this claim because it is a derivative claim that must be brought on behalf of

Reclamation, and Plaintiff has not made a proper demand on Reclamation. (Br. Supp.

Defs.’ Mot. 6−7.)

52. “Standing is a necessary prerequisite to a court’s proper exercise of subject

matter jurisdiction[,]” Neuse River Found., Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 155 N.C.

App. 110, 113, 574 S.E.2d 48, 51 (2002), and a court may consider matters outside the

pleadings in determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, Keith v.

Wallerich, 201 N.C. App. 550, 554, 687 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2009). However, “if the trial

court confines its evaluation [of standing] to the pleadings, the court must accept as

true the plaintiff’s allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Munger v. State, 202 N.C. App. 404, 410, 689 S.E.2d 230, 235 (2010); see

also Neuse River Found., Inc., 155 N.C. App. at 113, 574 S.E.2d at 51 (“[E]ach element [of standing] must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the

plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence

required at the successive stages of the litigation.”). Although Plaintiff attached

numerous exhibits to his response in opposition to Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion,

(ECF Nos. 69−71, 73−82), the exhibits cited in his response do not affect the Court’s

analysis of Plaintiff’s standing. Accordingly, the Court confines its analysis of

Plaintiff’s standing to the pleadings and views the allegations of the First Amended

Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

1. Corporate Opportunities

53. It is a well-settled principle of North Carolina law that shareholders of a

corporation cannot pursue individual causes of action for wrongs or injuries to the

corporation. Barger v. McCoy Hillard & Parks, 346 N.C. 650, 658, 488 S.E.2d 215,

219 (1997); Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 796 S.E.2d 324, 338 (N.C. Ct. App.

2016). This same standard applies for purposes of determining whether a member of

a limited liability company can assert an individual, as opposed to a derivative, claim.

Levin v. Jacobson, 2015 NCBC LEXIS 111, at *14−15 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2015);

see Russell M. Robinson, II, Robinson on North Carolina Corporation Law § 34.04[5]

(7th ed. 2016) (“A derivative action on behalf of an LLC will be governed by essentially

the same rules that apply to a derivative action on behalf of a corporation.”).

54. There are two exceptions to the general requirement of derivative claims:

(1) when there is a special duty between the wrongdoer and the member; and (2) when

the member suffered an injury separate and distinct from the injury suffered by the limited liability company and the other members. Barger, 346 N.C. at 658, 488 S.E.2d

at 219; Corwin, 796 S.E.2d at 338; Levin, 2015 NCBC LEXIS 111, at *14−15; see

Robinson § 34.04[5] (“[W]hether the member must bring the suit individually or on

behalf of the LLC turns on whether the alleged injuries were caused directly to the

member or are a consequence of breaches of fiduciary duty that harmed the LLC.”).

a. Special Duty

55. For the special duty exception to apply, “the duty must be one that the

alleged wrongdoer owed directly to the shareholder as an individual”—a duty that

was personal to the shareholder and separate and distinct from the duty owed to the

corporation. Barger, 346 N.C. at 659, 488 S.E.2d at 220. In Barger, our Supreme

Court set forth an illustrative, non-exclusive list of situations in which a special duty

may be found. This non-exhaustive list includes when the wrongdoer induced

plaintiff to become a shareholder, the wrongdoer violated his fiduciary duty to the

shareholder, the wrongdoer performed individualized services directly for the

shareholder, and the wrongdoer undertook to advise shareholders independently of

the corporation. Id.

56. Plaintiff argues that “[s]pecial duties owing to [Plaintiff] included promises

owing to [Plaintiff] which induced him to be a part thereof, including [Reclamation]

helping [Plaintiff] carry (if not carrying) the cost of the Yount Mill and Zag Building

(and buying each from [Plaintiff]) as an obligation owing to [Plaintiff].” (Pl.’s Resp.

Defs.’ Mot. J. Pleadings 12, ECF No. 68.) The First Amended Complaint does not

allege, however, that Defendants induced Plaintiff to become a member of Reclamation or that Plaintiff contributed any capital to Reclamation. Although

Plaintiff alleges that he loaned funds to Reclamation, Plaintiff could withdraw the

loaned funds at any time and in his sole discretion. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 117, 119,

124−25.) Moreover, there is no allegation that Defendants induced Plaintiff to make

any such loan. See Green v. Freeman, 367 N.C. 136, 143, 749 S.E.2d 262, 269 (2013)

(stating that courts apply the same rules for establishing a special duty when plaintiff

is a creditor as courts apply when plaintiff is a shareholder).

57. Additionally, Plaintiff argues that he “was owed special duties as an

‘unnamed’ partner” in Reclamation. (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. 13.) It is well established,

however, that members of a limited liability company do not owe fiduciary duties to

each other or to the company, except a controlling member owes fiduciary duties to

minority members. Kaplan v. O.K. Techs., L.L.C., 196 N.C. App. 469, 473, 675 S.E.2d

133, 137 (2009). Although “a minority shareholder exercising actual control over a

corporation may be deemed a ‘controlling shareholder’ with a concomitant fiduciary

duty to the other shareholders[,]” Corwin, 796 S.E.2d at 330, “we begin with the

general presumption that a minority shareholder is not in control of a corporation’s

conduct[,]” id. at 332. In order to rebut this presumption, Plaintiff “must allege

specific facts demonstrating or allowing for the reasonable inference of actual control

by that shareholder.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has neither alleged any such facts nor

argued that Defendants exercised domination and control over Reclamation’s

operations—indeed, Plaintiff alleges that neither Clay nor Rick participated in Reclamation’s operations, and that Plaintiff was primarily responsible for

Reclamation’s business. (First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68, 94.)

b. Special Injury

58. For the special injury exception to apply, the injury must be peculiar or

personal to the shareholder. Barger, 346 N.C. at 659, 488 S.E.2d at 220. “[A] plaintiff

must show that its particular injury was ‘separate and distinct from the injury

sustained by the other shareholders or the corporation itself.’” Raymond James

Capital Partners, L.P. v. Hayes, 789 S.E.2d 695, 702 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting

Barger, 346 N.C. at 659, 488 S.E.2d at 219).

59. “Misappropriation of corporate opportunities is logically a derivative claim,

but not an individual claim, because the injury is to the corporation, not to an

individual shareholder.” Plasman v. Decca Furniture (USA), Inc., 2016 NCBC LEXIS

80, at *38 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2016) (citing Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C.

279, 307, 307 S.E.2d 551, 567 (1983)). Plaintiff’s bare assertion in his brief that he

“incurred specific damages separate from damages incurred by Reclamation[,]” and

that “[e]vidence shows that Reclamation failed because Clay and [Rick] did not

perform numerous promises to [Plaintiff,]” (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. 13 (emphasis

added)), is insufficient to state that Plaintiff suffered an injury separate from any

injury sustained by Reclamation.

60. Plaintiff also appears to argue that, because no membership interests were

distributed and no operating agreement was ever signed, there is a question as to

whether Reclamation ever achieved corporate existence such that it could pursue claims in its own name. (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. 15−17.) Even assuming arguendo

that no membership interests were distributed and no operating agreement was

signed, this has no effect on Reclamation’s existence as “[a]n LLC is formed at the

time the articles of organization filed by the Secretary of State become effective.” N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 57D-2-20(b). Thus, whether or not, after Reclamation was formed, as

Plaintiff alleges, membership interests were distributed or an operating agreement

was signed are not determinative of Reclamation’s corporate existence.

61. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff’s Second Claim is based on

Defendants’ alleged misappropriation of opportunities belonging to Reclamation, a

limited liability company, the Court concludes that Plaintiff must bring this claim as

a derivative claim and, thus, Plaintiff does not have standing to assert an individual

claim for self-dealing and misappropriation of corporate opportunities.

62. In order to have standing to bring a derivative claim, Plaintiff must have

made a proper demand. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 57D-8-01(a); Anderson v. Seascape at

Holden Plantation, LLC, 241 N.C. App. 191, 203, 773 S.E.2d 78, 87 (2015). In order

for a member to bring a derivative claim on behalf of a limited liability company, the

North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act requires that

[t]he member made written demand on the LLC to take suitable action, and either (i) the LLC notified the member that the member’s demand was rejected, (ii) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was made, or (iii) irreparable injury to the LLC would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 57D-8-01(a)(2). 63. Plaintiff argues that the “pleadings and evidence establish that [Plaintiff]

made numerous demands in writing and in meetings over more than three years to

cause [Defendants] to take specific actions, and [Plaintiff]’s demands were rejected

and ignored.” (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. 17.) In support of this proposition, Plaintiff

cites to multiple paragraphs of his Proposed Second Amended Complaint.

Notwithstanding the fact that, as discussed below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion

to Amend, the Proposed Second Amended Complaint is devoid of any allegation that

Plaintiff made a proper demand on Reclamation to take suitable action. The

allegations of the proposed complaint to which Plaintiff cites are entirely irrelevant

to the demand requirement. At best, the proposed complaint alleges that Plaintiff

made a written demand that Reclamation pay amounts owed to Plaintiff. Even still,

this is not a demand that Reclamation take suitable action regarding Defendants’

alleged failure to disclose business opportunities belonging to Reclamation—the basis

for Plaintiff’s Second Claim for self-dealing and misappropriation of corporate

opportunities. See Miller v. Burlington Chem. Co., LLC, 2017 NCBC LEXIS 6, at

*29−30 (N.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 27, 2017) (discussing the purpose of the demand

requirement and stating that, in determining whether a proper demand to take

suitable action was made, the court must compare the derivative claims against the

specific demands plaintiff made).

64. As Plaintiff has failed to allege that he made a proper demand on

Reclamation to take suitable action, Plaintiff’s Second Claim for self-dealing and

misappropriation of corporate opportunities, to the extent that this claim is based on opportunities belonging to Reclamation, must be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. The Court next turns to whether Plaintiff may assert this claim to the

extent that it is based on opportunities allegedly belonging to a partnership.

2. Partnership Opportunities

65. Plaintiff argues that he has standing to assert his Second Claim for

misappropriation of partnership opportunities because self-dealing is a breach of a

partner’s fiduciary duties to the other partners. (Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ Mot. 9.) The Court

agrees with Plaintiff in part, as “[i]t is elementary that the relationship of partners

is fiduciary and imposes on them the obligation of the utmost good faith in their

dealings with one another in respect to partnership affairs[,]” and our Court of

Appeals has concluded that self-dealing by one partner constitutes a breach of that

partner’s fiduciary duties to the other partners. Compton v. Kirby, 157 N.C. App. 1,

15, 577 S.E.2d 905, 914 (2003). Defendants do not argue otherwise; rather,

Defendants argue that “any claim based on Defendants’ purported self-dealing and

misappropriation of business opportunities is either properly plead[ed] as breach of

fiduciary duty claims (if it arose in a partnership context and prior to the formation

of [Reclamation]) or is derivative and must be asserted on behalf of [Reclamation].”

(Reply Br. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. J. Pleadings 2, ECF No. 84.) Plaintiff’s First Claim for

breach of fiduciary duty alleges the following:

164. As business partners relating to Hollar Mill, [the Wingfoot Business Plan] and Reclamation, each [Rick] and [Clay] owed fiduciary duties to [Plaintiff], including without limitation to act for the benefit of the partnership without conflicts of interests [sic] and to disclose all business opportunities for the benefit of the partnership in order that the partners, including without limitation for [Plaintiff] benefit [sic] from and to the extent available, profit from partnership opportunities.

170. [Clay] and [Rick] breached fiduciary duties to [Plaintiff] by directing business opportunities intended for the partnership to businesses owned by or benefitting [Rick] and/or [Clay], and not to the partnership.

173. [Clay] and/or [Rick] breached fiduciary duties to [Plaintiff] and committed constructive fraud by using [the Wingfoot Business Plan] to obtain the business solicited by [Plaintiff], and using partnership resources for Neill Grading to obtain the business without providing the partnership or Reclamation with the opportunities . . . .

177. By 2015, due in part to self-dealing of [Clay] and breaches of duties to [Plaintiff], Reclamation was unable to continue operations.

(First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 164, 170, 173, 177.) It is clear that Plaintiff’s Second Claim for

self-dealing and misappropriation of corporate opportunities, to the extent this claim

seeks individual relief, is identical to, and unnecessarily duplicative of, Plaintiff’s

First Claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

66. To the extent that Plaintiff’s Second Claim asserts a partnership claim, this

claim must fail. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that, unlike a shareholder

or member who seeks to bring a claim belonging to the corporation or limited liability

company, a partner who seeks to bring a claim belonging to the general partnership

is not required to make a pre-suit demand on the partnership. See N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 59-31 et seq.; Gillespie v. Majestic Transp., Inc., 2016 NCBC LEXIS 69, at *19−20

(N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2016). Nonetheless, it is not clear whether, in the absence of express authority set forth in a partnership agreement or consent by the other

partners, a partner may bring a claim belonging to the partnership. Gillespie, 2016

NCBC LEXIS 69, at *21−22. However, “[i]t is clear under North Carolina law that

‘one partner may not sue in his own name, and for his benefit, upon a cause of action

in favor of a partnership.’” Id. at *21 (quoting Godwin v. Vinson, 251 N.C. 326, 327,

111 S.E.2d 180, 181 (1959)). Plaintiff’s self-dealing and misappropriation claim

alleges that Plaintiff—not the partnership—“is entitled to revenues and profits

relating thereto received by [Clay], [Rick] or Neill Grading” and that Plaintiff “is owed

and was damaged . . . due to [Clay]’s self-dealing and misappropriation[.]” (First Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 185, 187.) Thus, even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff may assert a claim

belonging to the partnership, Plaintiff’s Second Claim fails to assert such a claim as

it seeks only individual relief.

67. In short, to the extent that Plaintiff’s Second Claim brings an individual

claim for self-dealing and misappropriation of corporate opportunities, this claim is

properly pleaded as a breach of fiduciary duty claim, and Plaintiff’s additional claim

for self-dealing and misappropriation is duplicative. See Plasman, 2016 NCBC

LEXIS 80, at *38 (“Misappropriation of corporate opportunity ‘is a species of the duty

of a fiduciary to act with undivided loyalty . . . .’” (quoting Meiselman, 309 N.C. at

307, 307 S.E.2d at 568)). To the extent that Plaintiff’s Second Claim brings a

partnership claim, this claim must fail as it seeks to recover damages sustained by

Plaintiff, rather than by the partnership generally. Therefore, Defendants’ Rule 12(c)

Motion as to Plaintiff’s Second Claim is granted. IV. MOTION TO AMEND

68. Plaintiff requests leave to amend his First Amended Complaint pursuant

to Rules 15, 19, and 20 to add Edward C. Neill (“Edward”) and Hollar Hosiery

Development, LLC (“Hollar Hosiery Development”) as defendants, assert additional

factual allegations, and add claims for libel, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and

piercing the corporate veil and joint and several liability. (Mot. Amend First Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 5, 12−14, ECF No. 61; Mot. Amend Ex. 1, at 39, 41, 43, ECF No. 66.)

Plaintiff argues that the proposed amendments relate to events that have occurred

since Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint and facts learned over the course

of discovery. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Amend First Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 64.) To the

extent that the Motion to Amend is based on events that occurred after Plaintiff filed

the First Amended Complaint, the Court properly considers the Motion under Rule

15(d). See Foy v. Foy, 57 N.C. App. 128, 132, 290 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1982). Otherwise,

the Court considers the Motion to Amend under Rule 15(a).

A. Rule 15(a)

69. Rule 15(a) provides that, after a responsive pleading has been served, a

party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the

adverse party, and “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a). “The party objecting to the amendment has the burden of

establishing it will be materially prejudiced by the amendment.” N. River Ins. Co. v.

Young, 117 N.C. App. 663, 671, 453 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1995). A motion for leave to

amend is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. E.g., Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd. of Educ., 166 N.C. App. 464, 467, 602 S.E.2d 721, 724 (2004).

Reasons justifying denial of a motion to amend under Rule 15(a) are undue delay, bad

faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure defects by previous amendments,

undue prejudice, and futility of amendment. E.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.

Browning, 230 N.C. App. 537, 541, 750 S.E.2d 555, 559 (2013). “In deciding if there

was undue delay, the trial court may consider the relative timing of the proposed

amendment in relation to the progress of the lawsuit.” Draughon, 166 N.C. App. at

467, 602 S.E.2d at 724. “[A] trial court may appropriately deny a motion for leave to

amend on the basis of undue delay where a party seeks to amend its pleading after a

significant period of time has passed since filing the pleading and where the record

or party offers no explanation for the delay.” Rabon v. Hopkins, 208 N.C. App. 351,

354, 703 S.E.2d 181, 184 (2010).

70. “Where the essence of a Rule 15(a) motion to amend a pleading is to add a

party to the lawsuit, consideration of [Rules] 20 and 21 is required.” Coffey v. Coffey,

94 N.C. App. 717, 721, 381 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1989). Under Rule 20(a), defendants may

be joined in one action “if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact

common to all parties will arise in the action.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 20(a);

Coffey, 94 N.C. App. at 721, 381 S.E.2d at 470. Under Rule 21, “parties may be

dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative

at any stage of the action.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 21. 71. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is the product of

undue delay. Plaintiff filed the Motion to Amend one year and eight months after he

filed his original Complaint, and one year and three months after he filed his First

Amended Complaint. In addition, Plaintiff contends that the Motion to Amend is

based on facts learned through discovery; however, Plaintiff fails to offer any support

for this contention. In his brief in support of the motion, Plaintiff states that “[i]n

discovery, [Plaintiff] learned that Clay formed an entity called [Hollar Hosiery

Development], but did not disclose such entity to [Plaintiff],” (Mem. Supp. Mot.

Amend 8), but, there is no citation for this statement. Further, Plaintiff asserts that

“[t]he deposition of [Clay] occurring on April 13, 2017 revealed that Neill Grading is

operated as an alter ego of the Neill family including Clay and [Edward,]” and that

“Clay’s testimony supports that ordinary corporate formalities were not followed,

including co-mingling of funds without documenting such.” (Mem. Supp. Mot. Amend

13.) Neither of these assertions contains a citation to the record, but the excerpts of

Clay’s deposition that were submitted with the Motion to Amend do not appear to

support either assertion. In sum, Plaintiff’s briefs in support of the Motion to Amend

are replete with statements that numerous material facts were learned through

discovery, but for which there is either no citation to the record or an unsupportive

citation. See Strickland v. Lawrence, 176 N.C. App. 656, 667, 627 S.E.2d 301, 308

(2006) (“Plaintiffs sought to add the claim for civil conspiracy ‘based upon information

that has been obtained in discovery,’ however, at the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion to

amend, plaintiffs presented no deposition transcripts or other documentary evidence, other than the pleadings, to support their motion. Based on these circumstances

alone, plaintiffs cannot show that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the

motion based on undue delay.”).

72. The Court further concludes that the timing and nature of Plaintiff’s Motion

to Amend suggest a dilatory motive. On September 14, 2016, the Court entered a

Case Management Order. (ECF No. 27.) Pursuant to the Case Management Order,

the parties were to complete fact discovery by April 14, 2017 and expert discovery by

June 14, 2017. (Case Management Order 12.) On April 14, 2017—the last day of fact

discovery—Plaintiff filed a Motion to Extend Case Management Deadlines,

requesting a ninety-day extension of the deadlines set forth in the Case Management

Order. (ECF No. 44.) On April 18, 2017, the Court entered an order granting the

motion in part and extending the discovery deadlines an additional six weeks. (ECF

No. 46.) The order found that “the parties, and especially Plaintiff, ha[d] not been

diligent in conducting discovery in this case.” (Order Mot. Extend Case Mgmt.

Deadlines ¶ 10.) The Court explained that “Plaintiff waited four months after the

entry of the Case Management Order to serve his first set of interrogatories and

request for production and waited until the day before the end of fact discovery to

take his first deposition, the deposition of the named defendant.” (Order ¶ 10.)

Nevertheless, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline to and including May

26, 2017, but the order expressly stated that “[t]he discovery period shall not be

further extended absent extraordinary cause.” (Order 4.) 73. On June 14, 2017—after the fact discovery deadline—the parties filed a

Consent Motion to Amend Case Management Order. (ECF No. 57.) The motion

sought a second amendment to the Case Management Order to allow Plaintiff to take

Neill Grading’s deposition on July 12, 2017, and to extend the expert discovery

deadline to and including October 11, 2017. The Court denied these requests by order

dated June 15, 2017. (ECF No. 58.) Later that day, the parties filed a Joint Consent

Motion to Reconsider and Amended Motion to Amend Case Management Order.

(ECF No. 59.) The Court denied the parties’ June 15 motion by order dated June 16,

2017. (ECF No. 60.) Soon thereafter, on that same day, Plaintiff filed the Motion to

Amend. Although Plaintiff states that the amendment would not require additional

discovery, Plaintiff should know full well that the Court could not permit Plaintiff to

add new parties as defendants in this action without permitting those new party-

defendants to obtain discovery. See Greater Baltimore Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns,

Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 721 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Chief

among its errors was the district court’s award of summary judgment to [plaintiff]

without allowing [defendant] any discovery. As a general proposition, summary

judgment is appropriate only after adequate time for discovery. . . . A district court

therefore must refuse summary judgment where the nonmoving party has not had

the opportunity to discover information that is essential to [its] opposition.” (third

alteration in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

74. Therefore, the Court concludes, in its discretion, that the Motion to Amend,

to the extent that it is brought under Rule 15(a), should be denied based on Plaintiff’s undue delay and dilatory motive. Media Network, Inc. v. Long Haymes Carr, Inc.,

197 N.C. App. 433, 447−48, 678 S.E.2d 671, 681 (2009) (affirming trial court’s denial

of defendant’s motion to amend when the motion was filed almost four months after

defendant filed its original answer and defendant did not offer any credible

explanation for the delay); Walker v. Sloan, 137 N.C. App. 387, 402, 529 S.E.2d 236,

247 (2000) (affirming trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend based on

undue delay when the motion was made five months after plaintiffs filed their

original complaint and there was nothing in the record to explain why plaintiffs were

delayed in moving to amend); Johnson v. Beverly-Hanks & Assocs., Inc., 97 N.C. App.

335, 341, 388 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1990) (affirming trial court’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion

to amend based on undue delay when the motion was made seven months after

plaintiffs filed their original complaint and there was nothing in the record to indicate

why plaintiffs were delayed in moving to amend).

B. Rule 15(d)

75. The Motion to Amend also seeks to add allegations regarding statements

made during a June 19, 2016 meeting between Plaintiff’s parents, Nancy and David

Zagaroli, on the one hand, and Clay, Edward, and Rick, on the other hand (the “June

19 Meeting”). (Mot. Amend Ex. 1, at 39−41.) As the proposed allegations concern

events that occurred after the filing of the First Amended Complaint, the Motion to

Amend based on these allegations must be considered under Rule 15(d).

76. Rule 15(d) provides that “[u]pon motion of a party the court may, upon

reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which may

have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be supplemented[.]” N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(d). A motion to serve a supplemental pleading is left to

the discretion of the trial court. Brackett v. SGL Carbon Corp., 158 N.C. App. 252,

258, 580 S.E.2d 757, 761 (2003). Indeed, the language of Rule 15(d) “permits but does

not require a trial court to allow a supplemental pleading.” Deutsch v. Fisher, 32 N.C.

App. 688, 692, 233 S.E.2d 646, 649 (1977). Our courts have stated that “motions to

allow supplemental pleadings should be freely granted unless their allowance would

impose a substantial injustice upon the opposing party.” Miller v. Ruth’s of N.C., Inc.,

69 N.C. App. 153, 156, 316 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1984); see Draughon v. Harnett Cty. Bd.

of Educ., 166 N.C. App. 449, 454, 602 S.E.2d 717, 720 (2004) (“Motions to allow

supplemental pleadings should ordinarily be granted because by definition they

encompass matters that arose after the date of the original pleading, unless a

substantial injustice would result to the opposing party.”). This rule is “based upon

the policy that a party should be protected from the harm which may occur if he is

prevented from litigating certain issues merely by virtue of the court’s denial of such

a motion.” vanDooren v. vanDooren, 37 N.C. App. 333, 337, 246 S.E.2d 20, 23–24

(1978). In considering a motion to allow supplemental pleadings, courts “should focus

on any resulting unfairness which might occur to the party opposing the motion.” Id.

at 337, 246 S.E.2d at 24.

77. Unlike motions to amend under Rule 15(a), North Carolina courts have not

specifically articulated the grounds that justify denying a motion to supplement a pleading under Rule 15(d). Our courts have held that, as with a motion to amend

under Rule 15(a), futility is a proper justification for denying a motion to file a

supplemental pleading, Brackett, 158 N.C. App. at 258, 580 S.E.2d at 761, but that

“mere delay, standing alone, is not a sufficient reason to deny [a] motion” under Rule

15(d), vanDooren, 37 N.C. App. at 338, 246 S.E.2d at 24. Additionally, federal

decisions interpreting Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is

substantially similar to Rule 15(d) of the North Carolina Rules, have concluded that

motions to supplement a pleading under Federal Rule 15(d) are governed by the same

standard as motions to amend under Federal Rule 15(a). Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d

184, 198 n.15 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he standards used by a district court in ruling on a

motion to amend or on a motion to supplement are nearly identical.”).

78. For the same reasons discussed above with respect to the Motion to Amend

under Rule 15(a), and as further explained below with respect to the motion under

Rule 15(d) based on the June 19 Meeting, the Court concludes that the timing and

nature of Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend under Rule 15(d) suggest a dilatory motive.

Plaintiff did not move to supplement his First Amended Complaint until one full year,

less three days, after the June 19 Meeting. Plaintiff states in his affidavit that he

“was aware either Clay or Rick requested [Plaintiff] not be” at the June 19 Meeting,

but that he “did not discuss the detailed statements” made by Clay, Edward, and Rick

to Plaintiff’s parents during that meeting and that he “was not aware of most things

said in the meeting.” (Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Br. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Leave to Amend Ex.

E, ¶¶ 2, 5, ECF No. 88.) Plaintiff states that during Clay’s deposition on April 13, 2017, Plaintiff heard Clay’s testimony regarding the June 19 Meeting, and that in

early June 2017, Plaintiff’s father “authorized [Plaintiff] to listen to a recording of the

[June 19 Meeting.]” (Pl.’s Reply Ex. E, ¶ 5.) At the hearing on the Motions, the Court

inquired of counsel for Plaintiff, Mr. Rogers, about the recording. Mr. Rogers

responded that he knew of the recording’s existence pursuant to his attorney-client

relationship with Plaintiff’s father. As a result, Mr. Rogers stated that he did not

think it was appropriate, at least until sometime in early June 2017, to discuss the

recording with Plaintiff. It is unclear what occurred between the June 19 Meeting

and early June 2017 that led Plaintiff’s father to allow Plaintiff to listen to the

recording. Nevertheless, for all the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that

Plaintiff obtaining permission in June 2017—almost a full year after the June 19

Meeting—to listen to the recording of that meeting is a product of Plaintiff’s dilatory

motive. Indeed, during Plaintiff’s deposition of Clay on April 13, 2017—two months

before Plaintiff both listened to the recording and filed the Motion to Amend—

Plaintiff’s counsel inquired in detail about the June 19 Meeting, and his inquiries

parallel the proposed amendments, strongly suggesting that he was aware of what

was allegedly said during the June 19 Meeting. (Pl.’s Reply Ex. D, at 321–27, ECF

No. 88.) For example, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Clay the following questions:

Q. Now, you told the Zagarolis that the reason why Hollar didn’t happen was because [Plaintiff] was taking money under the table and that was the reason why it went to hell; is that right?

A. That’s correct.

.... Q. Okay. Now, did you guys tell the Zagarolis that your father was willing to lend you up to $20 million to fight [Plaintiff] in this lawsuit?

A. He may have made a comment to that extent.

(Pl.’s Reply Ex. D, at 323:10−14, 325:20−23.) Based on the foregoing, the Court

concludes, in its discretion, that the Motion to Amend under Rule 15(d) is a product

of Plaintiff’s dilatory motive.

79. The Court further concludes that allowing Plaintiff’s supplemental

pleading would unfairly prejudice Defendants. The discovery deadline has passed,

and Plaintiff’s contention that no further discovery is necessary is without merit.

(Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Br. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Leave to Amend 12, ECF No. 85.) Defendants

deposed Nancy Zagaroli on or about September 19, 2016, (Defs.’ Br. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot.

Leave to Amend 16, ECF No. 83; Pl.’s Reply 12), but Defendants did not question

Nancy Zagaroli regarding the June 19 Meeting as the First Amended Complaint does

not assert claims pertaining to that meeting, (Defs.’ Br. Opp’n 16). Defendants did

not depose David Zagaroli. (Defs.’ Br. Opp’n 16; Pl.’s Reply 12.) Defendants would

need to conduct additional discovery relating to the June 19 Meeting, which would

inevitably lead to additional costs. Further, as explained above, Edward cannot be

added as a defendant without allowing him the opportunity to conduct discovery.

80. As an alternative ground for denying the Motion to Amend under Rule

15(d), the Court concludes that the amendment would be futile. Plaintiff’s Proposed

Second Amended Complaint seeks to assert claims for slander per se and slander per

quod based on statements allegedly made during the June 19 Meeting. “In order to

recover for defamation, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant caused injury to the plaintiff by making false, defamatory statements of or concerning the plaintiff, which

were published to a third person.” Eli Global, LLC v. Heavner, 794 S.E.2d 820, 824

(N.C. Ct. App. 2016). Oral defamation may be categorized as either slander per se or

slander per quod. Izydore v. Tokuta, 242 N.C. App. 434, 445, 775 S.E.2d 341, 349

(2015). Slander per se is “an oral communication to a third party which amounts to

(1) an accusation that the plaintiff committed a crime involving moral turpitude; (2)

an allegation that impeaches the plaintiff in his trade, business, or profession; or (3)

an imputation that the plaintiff has a loathsome disease.” Id. “Slander per quod

involves a spoken statement of which the harmful character does not appear on its

face as a matter of general acceptance, but rather becomes clear ‘only in consequence

of extrinsic, explanatory facts showing its injurious effect . . . .’” Donovan v. Fiumara,

114 N.C. App. 524, 527, 442 S.E.2d 572, 574−75 (1994) (omission in original) (quoting

Badame v. Lampke, 242 N.C. 755, 757, 89 S.E.2d 466, 467−68 (1955)). When

statements are slanderous per se, both malice and damages are presumed as a matter

of law. Izydore, 242 N.C. App. at 445, 775 S.E.2d at 349. Conversely, to state a

slander per quod claim, plaintiff must plead both the injurious character of the words

and special damages. Id.

81. The Proposed Second Amended Complaint contains a number of conclusory

allegations. (E.g., Mot. Amend Ex. 1, ¶ 337 (“[Edward], Clay and [Rick] . . . told David

and Nancy many statements over the course of approximately an hour which

statements are objective [sic] false and were intended to impeach [Plaintiff] in his

trade and profession.”).) These generalized allegations are insufficient to state a slander claim as a matter of law. See Izydore, 242 N.C. App. at 446, 775 S.E.2d at

349 (“[A]llegedly slanderous remarks need not be repeated verbatim, but they must

be alleged substantially in haec verba, or with sufficient particularity to enable the

court to determine whether the statement was defamatory.” (quotation marks

omitted)). Thus, in determining whether the amendment would be futile, the Court

considers only those non-conclusory allegations of the Proposed Second Amended

Complaint.

82. With respect to the June 19 Meeting, the proposed complaint alleges the

following:

 “Clay, [Edward], and [Rick] intentionally mischaracterized

payments made to [Plaintiff] as ‘taking money under the table’ and

[Plaintiff] being ‘caught’ by Meg Locke.” (Mot. Amend Ex. 1, ¶ 339.)

 “[Edward] stated that ‘we could’ve sued [Plaintiff]’ for taking money

from James Maynard ‘under the table.’” (Mot. Amend Ex. 1, ¶ 341.)

 “[Edward] accused [Plaintiff] of forging checks . . . .” (Mot. Amend

Ex. 1, ¶ 342.)

 “Clay stated that [Plaintiff] lost his General Contractors license

because [Plaintiff] owed everybody . . . .” (Mot. Amend Ex. 1, ¶ 343.)

 “Clay stated that [Plaintiff] forged Clay’s signature and that Clay

never authorized [Plaintiff] to sign his signature . . . .” (Mot. Amend

Ex. 1, ¶ 347.)  “[Edward] told the [sic] David and Nancy that Neill Grading was

forced to become the general contractor for Hollar Mill and to exclude

[Plaintiff] . . . .” (Mot. Amend Ex. 1, ¶ 349.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants made the above statements “intending to impeach

[Plaintiff] in his profession and with regard to Reclamation.” (Mot. Amend Ex. 1,

¶ 336.)

83. Whether a statement is slanderous per se is a question of law for the Court.

Eli Global, LLC, 794 S.E.2d at 825. “[T]he policy of the law has much restricted the

range of defamatory utterances which are actionable per se.” Donovan, 114 N.C. App.

at 528, 442 S.E.2d at 575. Words are defamatory per se when they are “susceptible

of but one meaning and of such nature that the court can presume as a matter of law

that they tend to disgrace and degrade the party or hold him up to public hatred,

contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned and avoided.” Boyce & Isley, PLLC

v. Cooper, 153 N.C. App. 25, 30−31, 568 S.E.2d 893, 898−99 (2002) (quoting Flake v.

News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 786, 195 S.E. 55, 60 (1938)). The Court must consider the

statement in its full context. Id. at 31, 568 S.E.2d at 899. In order for false words to

be actionable per se on the basis that it impeaches plaintiff in his business,

the false words (1) must touch the plaintiff in his special trade or occupation, and (2) must contain an imputation necessarily hurtful in its effect on his business. That is to say, it is not enough that the words used tend to injure a person in his business. To be actionable per se, they must be uttered of him in his business relation. Defamation of this class ordinarily includes charges made by one trader or merchant tending to degrade a rival by charging him with dishonorable conduct in business. Eli Global, LLC, 794 S.E.2d at 825 (quoting Badame, 242 N.C. at 757, 89 S.E.2d at

468).

84. The Court concludes that, even taking the allegations of the Proposed

Second Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the statements

allegedly made by Defendants to Plaintiff’s parents are not slanderous per se. The

statement to Plaintiff’s parents that Plaintiff forged checks and took money under

the table does not touch Plaintiff in his special trade or occupation, and it does not

contain an imputation necessarily hurtful to Plaintiff’s business. This is akin to a

charge that Plaintiff is dishonest, and “[o]ur Courts have held that ‘alleged false

statements . . . calling plaintiff dishonest or charging that plaintiff was untruthful

and an unreliable employee, are not actionable per se.’” Izydore, 242 N.C. App. at

445, 775 S.E.2d at 349 (omission in original). Thus, as Defendants’ alleged

statements are only actionable per quod, Plaintiff must allege special damages. Id.

85. “In the context of an action for defamation, special damage means

pecuniary loss; emotional distress and mental suffering are not alone sufficient . . . .”

Donovan, 114 N.C. App. at 527, 442 S.E.2d at 575 (omission in original) (citations and

quotation marks omitted). The Proposed Second Amended Complaint contains the

following allegations regarding special damages:

456. [Clay] and/or [Rick] accusing [Plaintiff] of crimes relating to his profession and business establish a presumption of malice and legal injury and damage for which [Plaintiff] is entitled to punitive, compensatory and special damages in excess of $30,000.00.

.... 459. Plaintiff’s reputation has been smeared, and his ability to earn a living have [sic] been harmed by Clay and [Edward]’s defamation of Plaintiff.

460. [Plaintiff] has incurred special damages, including without limitation Defendants intentionally causing severe personal stress, as well as stress to [Plaintiff]’s personal and familial relationships.

461. [Plaintiff] is entitled to damages including without limitation special and punitive damages exceeding $30,000.00 relating to Defamation.

(Mot. Amend Ex. 1, ¶¶ 456, 459−61.)

86. Plaintiff has failed to allege any special damages to sustain his slander per

quod claim. Allegations of personal stress and harm to reputation are insufficient as

a matter of law to establish a basis for relief. See Johnson v. Bollinger, 86 N.C. App.

1, 11, 356 S.E.2d 378, 384−85 (1987) (“In order to prove special damages from

defamation, plaintiff’s allegations must evidence a pecuniary loss rather than simple

humiliation. Emotional distress and mental suffering are not sufficient allegations

to establish a basis for relief in cases which are only actionable per quod.” (citation

omitted)). Further, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that “his ability to earn a living

have [sic] been harmed[,]” without more, is insufficient to inform Defendants of the

scope of Plaintiff’s demand. See Skinner v. Reynolds, 237 N.C. App. 150, 157, 764

S.E.2d 652, 658 (2014) (“The conclusory allegation that [plaintiff] suffered unspecified

‘lost wages’ and ‘expenses’ associated with ‘mitigating the defamation’ is insufficient

to inform defendants of the scope of [plaintiff’s] claim.”); Griffin v. Holden, 180 N.C.

App. 129, 138, 636 S.E.2d 298, 305 (2006) (“[S]pecial damages . . . must be pleaded, and the facts giving rise to the special damages must be alleged so as to fairly inform

the defendant of the scope of plaintiff’s demand.”).

87. Therefore, the Court concludes that the Motion to Amend under Rule 15(d)

would be futile and, as such, is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

88. For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:

A. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion as to Plaintiff’s

Third and Fifth Claims.

B. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Rule 12(c) Motion as to Plaintiff’s

Second Claim, and this claim is dismissed with prejudice.

C. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.

SO ORDERED, this the 7th day of November, 2017.

/s/ Michael L. Robinson Michael L. Robinson Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business Cases