IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1369 Filed July 24, 2024
ZACHARY LIDDICK, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, Michael Hooper,
Judge.
Zachary Liddick appeals the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Zachary Liddick appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief
(PCR), which claimed he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel and
counsel in his first PCR action. Because we find that Liddick failed to establish
either of his counsel were ineffective, we affirm the denial of his PCR application.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
“Liddick was seventeen years old when he exchanged words with a
sixteen-year-old stranger and then approached the stranger and shot him in the
abdomen.” State v. Liddick, No. 21-0680, 2021 WL 5458506, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Nov. 23, 2021). He pled guilty to attempted murder, and the district court accepted
the plea and sentenced him. Liddick appealed his sentence, arguing the court
erred in applying the appropriate juvenile sentencing factors. See State v. Lyle,
854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014) (requiring the court to consider certain
factors before imposing mandatory minimum sentencing scheme on juvenile
offenders). We affirmed Liddick’s sentence in part on direct appeal, vacating only
the portion imposing a fine. Liddick, 2021 WL 5458506, at *4.
In 2022, Liddick applied for PCR, but his application was dismissed. He
applied for PCR again in 2023, and after trial, the PCR court denied his application.
On appeal, Liddick asserts that he received ineffective assistance from both his
sentencing counsel and first PCR counsel.
II. Review.
We generally review PCR proceedings for correction of errors at law. See
Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019). But because 3
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims implicate constitutional issues, our review
is de novo.1 See Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523–24 (Iowa 2018).
III. Discussion.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Liddick must
show (1) his counsel breached an essential duty and (2) such failure prejudiced
him. Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251. For the first prong, “[w]e begin with the
presumption that the attorney performed competently.” State v. Ledezma,
626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). To overcome this presumption, Liddick must
prove “counsel’s representation falls below the objective standard of
reasonableness.” Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251 (cleaned up) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). For the second prong, he “must prove ‘a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694). If Liddick cannot establish either element, his claim must fail. Id.
A. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.
Liddick contends his trial counsel was ineffective for both failing to file a
motion for reconsideration of sentence and not advising him of his right to file such
motion. See Iowa Code § 902.4 (2019) (allowing the court to reconsider a felon’s
sentence). But Liddick was convicted of attempt to commit murder, a class “B”
felony, which is expressly excluded from the statute. See id. §§ 707.11(2)
(designating attempt to commit murder as a class “B” felony), 902.4 (restricting
1 Liddick raises ineffective-assistance claims against both his trial counsel and first
PCR counsel. While there is a statutory, not a constitutional, right to effective counsel for postconviction proceedings, we still apply a de novo review. See Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011). 4
reconsideration to those “convicted of a felony, other than a class ‘A’ or class ‘B’
felony”). There is no basis under which Liddick’s trial counsel could move for
reconsideration or advise Liddick to file a futile motion. We do not require trial
counsel to “raise an issue that lacks merit.” State v. Doolin, 942 N.W.2d 500, 507
(Iowa 2020) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 184 (Iowa 2017)). And even
if Liddick was afforded reconsideration, he cannot establish a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have changed. See Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251.
Liddick loosely claims that he “would have prevailed on such a motion because of
his youthful age, intellectual disability, and his resultant inability to understand
situations.” But we already determined on direct appeal that the sentencing court
properly considered such factors when imposing Liddick’s mandatory minimum
sentence. Liddick, 2021 WL 5458506, at *3. Liddick provides no additional facts
or considerations not presented at the time of this decision. We therefore find his
trial counsel was not ineffective.2
B. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel.
Liddick also contends that his first PCR counsel was ineffective for several
reasons: (1) failing to resist the State’s motion to dismiss; (2) failing to obtain trial
counsel’s file and communicate with her regarding Liddick’s case; (3) failing to
require Liddick’s presence at the dismissal hearing; (4) failing to require reporting
of the dismissal hearing; and (5) failing to file a notice of appeal. While Liddick
2 Liddick likewise claims his PCR counsel was ineffective for not raising his trial
counsel’s failure to move for reconsideration. Because we have already determined that Liddick’s trial counsel was not ineffective on this matter, we similarly find that his PCR counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless issue. See Doolin, 942 N.W.2d at 507. 5
generally claims that these alleged failures constitute “structural error,” see State
v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008) (presuming prejudice prong of
ineffective-assistance claims when there is a structural defect), we disagree.
Liddick was neither outright denied counsel nor did his counsel concede to the
State’s case. See id. Instead, he argues his counsel’s alleged errors fit a third
category: when the “surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of
ineffectiveness.” See id. When this error occurs, it “renders the entire
postconviction relief proceeding ‘presumptively unreliable.’” Lado, 804 N.W.2d
at 253 (citation omitted).
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-1369 Filed July 24, 2024
ZACHARY LIDDICK, Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, Michael Hooper,
Judge.
Zachary Liddick appeals the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Richard Hollis, Des Moines, for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ. 2
CHICCHELLY, Judge.
Zachary Liddick appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief
(PCR), which claimed he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel and
counsel in his first PCR action. Because we find that Liddick failed to establish
either of his counsel were ineffective, we affirm the denial of his PCR application.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
“Liddick was seventeen years old when he exchanged words with a
sixteen-year-old stranger and then approached the stranger and shot him in the
abdomen.” State v. Liddick, No. 21-0680, 2021 WL 5458506, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Nov. 23, 2021). He pled guilty to attempted murder, and the district court accepted
the plea and sentenced him. Liddick appealed his sentence, arguing the court
erred in applying the appropriate juvenile sentencing factors. See State v. Lyle,
854 N.W.2d 378, 404 n.10 (Iowa 2014) (requiring the court to consider certain
factors before imposing mandatory minimum sentencing scheme on juvenile
offenders). We affirmed Liddick’s sentence in part on direct appeal, vacating only
the portion imposing a fine. Liddick, 2021 WL 5458506, at *4.
In 2022, Liddick applied for PCR, but his application was dismissed. He
applied for PCR again in 2023, and after trial, the PCR court denied his application.
On appeal, Liddick asserts that he received ineffective assistance from both his
sentencing counsel and first PCR counsel.
II. Review.
We generally review PCR proceedings for correction of errors at law. See
Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 729 (Iowa 2019). But because 3
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims implicate constitutional issues, our review
is de novo.1 See Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 523–24 (Iowa 2018).
III. Discussion.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Liddick must
show (1) his counsel breached an essential duty and (2) such failure prejudiced
him. Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251. For the first prong, “[w]e begin with the
presumption that the attorney performed competently.” State v. Ledezma,
626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). To overcome this presumption, Liddick must
prove “counsel’s representation falls below the objective standard of
reasonableness.” Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251 (cleaned up) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). For the second prong, he “must prove ‘a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 694). If Liddick cannot establish either element, his claim must fail. Id.
A. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.
Liddick contends his trial counsel was ineffective for both failing to file a
motion for reconsideration of sentence and not advising him of his right to file such
motion. See Iowa Code § 902.4 (2019) (allowing the court to reconsider a felon’s
sentence). But Liddick was convicted of attempt to commit murder, a class “B”
felony, which is expressly excluded from the statute. See id. §§ 707.11(2)
(designating attempt to commit murder as a class “B” felony), 902.4 (restricting
1 Liddick raises ineffective-assistance claims against both his trial counsel and first
PCR counsel. While there is a statutory, not a constitutional, right to effective counsel for postconviction proceedings, we still apply a de novo review. See Lado v. State, 804 N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011). 4
reconsideration to those “convicted of a felony, other than a class ‘A’ or class ‘B’
felony”). There is no basis under which Liddick’s trial counsel could move for
reconsideration or advise Liddick to file a futile motion. We do not require trial
counsel to “raise an issue that lacks merit.” State v. Doolin, 942 N.W.2d 500, 507
(Iowa 2020) (quoting State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174, 184 (Iowa 2017)). And even
if Liddick was afforded reconsideration, he cannot establish a reasonable
probability that the outcome would have changed. See Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251.
Liddick loosely claims that he “would have prevailed on such a motion because of
his youthful age, intellectual disability, and his resultant inability to understand
situations.” But we already determined on direct appeal that the sentencing court
properly considered such factors when imposing Liddick’s mandatory minimum
sentence. Liddick, 2021 WL 5458506, at *3. Liddick provides no additional facts
or considerations not presented at the time of this decision. We therefore find his
trial counsel was not ineffective.2
B. Alleged Ineffective Assistance of PCR Counsel.
Liddick also contends that his first PCR counsel was ineffective for several
reasons: (1) failing to resist the State’s motion to dismiss; (2) failing to obtain trial
counsel’s file and communicate with her regarding Liddick’s case; (3) failing to
require Liddick’s presence at the dismissal hearing; (4) failing to require reporting
of the dismissal hearing; and (5) failing to file a notice of appeal. While Liddick
2 Liddick likewise claims his PCR counsel was ineffective for not raising his trial
counsel’s failure to move for reconsideration. Because we have already determined that Liddick’s trial counsel was not ineffective on this matter, we similarly find that his PCR counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless issue. See Doolin, 942 N.W.2d at 507. 5
generally claims that these alleged failures constitute “structural error,” see State
v. Feregrino, 756 N.W.2d 700, 707 (Iowa 2008) (presuming prejudice prong of
ineffective-assistance claims when there is a structural defect), we disagree.
Liddick was neither outright denied counsel nor did his counsel concede to the
State’s case. See id. Instead, he argues his counsel’s alleged errors fit a third
category: when the “surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of
ineffectiveness.” See id. When this error occurs, it “renders the entire
postconviction relief proceeding ‘presumptively unreliable.’” Lado, 804 N.W.2d
at 253 (citation omitted). We have recognized two circumstances in which such
presumption was warranted: “actually-conflicted representation of co-defendants
and an appointment to represent a capital defendant in an unfamiliar jurisdiction
with no preparation.” Wright v. State, No. 23-0101, 2024 WL 3050514, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. June 19, 2024). Neither situation is applicable to Liddick’s circumstances.
Accordingly, we cannot presume Liddick was prejudiced by any alleged error.
We also do not find that Liddick successfully established prejudice. See
Lado, 804 N.W.2d at 251 (placing the burden on the applicant). While Liddick
challenges his counsel’s ineffectiveness on five grounds, each of these
contentions rely on the reasonable probability of his PCR dismissal being
overturned. He cites the PCR court’s reliance on the denial of his further review
application, which he argues was not properly in the record, as the basis for which
his first PCR “would have been reversed on appeal had there been one.” But
whether there was further review of his direct appeal is not material to any issue
on PCR. Liddick’s first PCR counsel testified that he knew the PCR application
would be unsuccessful from the beginning, advising Liddick “he would lose, [the 6
application] would be dismissed.” But nothing deterred Liddick from continuing
with his preferred strategy. Liddick’s PCR counsel also could not have disputed
the record before it, which included both Liddick’s failed direct appeal and the
procedendo. See Iowa Code § 822.6A (“automatically” including the underlying
trial record as part of the PCR application). In dismissing the PCR action, the court
noted that Liddick “cannot relitigate in this matter issues decided adversely to him
on direct appeal.” We agree and therefore need not consider whether his counsel
breached any duty on this issue. See Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142 (“If the claim
lacks prejudice, it can be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether
the attorney performed deficiently.”).
IV. Disposition.
Because Liddick failed to establish the ineffective assistance of either his
trial or PCR counsel, we affirm the denial of his PCR application.
AFFIRMED.