Zabriskie v. City of New York

160 F. 235, 1908 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 31, 1908
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 160 F. 235 (Zabriskie v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Zabriskie v. City of New York, 160 F. 235, 1908 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).

Opinion

ADAMS, District Judge.

The libellants, Nelson Zabriskie and Michael PI. Plyland, owners of the scow Oneida, brought this action against the City of New York to recover the damages incident to the sinking of the scow while at Riker’s Island, in July, 1906, with a load of city sweepings. The scow was under charter to the city at $5. per day. When taken to the Island she was at first placed alongside of a dock some distance away from a digger, located on the dock, which was to discharge her, but shortly afterwards she was moved nearer to the digger and while awaiting her turn to get under it, she sank.

The libellants’ allegations are that the respondent took possession of the scow under an agreement to return her to the owners in as good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear excepted, but failed to keep its agreement and took so little care of the scow that she was returned to the libellants in a damaged condition, not caused by ordinary wear and tear. The respondent admits that it hired the scow but alleges that under the agreement the libellants were to furnish and did furnish the captain and equipment of the scow; that the libellants’ own captain was in charge of the scow and was supposed to guard the boat [236]*236at all times; that if any injuries were suffered by the boat, they were caused by the neglect of the captain in failing to look after the boat and that she did not suffer any damages through the use by the respondent other than ordinary wear and tear.

It appears that the boat was in good condition when the accident happened and that her injuries resulted from the sinking. The cause of the sinking has been the subject of a warm controversy, the libellants claiming that it was due to an uneven bottom at the place where she was taken for discharge, of which the libellants were not required to take notice by sounding, while the respondent claims it was solely the result of the negligence of the master of the boat in leaving her for the night without having taken proper precautions with respect to her forward mooring line and she consequently hung herself so that water came over her side and filled her.

The relations of the master to the boat and the parties do not appear in the testimony, the latter doubtless proceeding upon the assumption, that the court would take notice that this was a usual form of oral letting for boats of this character, where the hire covers the master’s wages. I believe it is understood in such cases that the master, although under the orders of the charterer as to the vessel’s employment, being appointed, paid, and subject to dismissal by the owner, remains his agent in matters relating to the care of the boat. Many decisions have been made by this court upon such an assumption. It would seemingly be anomalous, if in such cases the master should be deemed the charterer’s agent the same as if selected and employed by him to care for a bare boat, under the principle of chartering known as locatio navis. The kind of chartering in this case more properly falls under the 2d class of chartering, which constitutes a demise of the vessel fit for mercantile adventure, including in a case of this kind, a master. The 3d class is a contract for the carriage of the merchant’s goods in the owner’s ship and by his servants. It is said in Abbott on Shipping (14th Ed.) pp. 60, 61, 63, 64, 75:

“Contracts between shipowners and merchants for the hire of ships, have been divided into three classes, namely: (I) Locatio navis, a demise of the ship itself, with its furniture and apparel; (XI.) Locatio navis et operarum magistri et nauticorum, a demise of the ship in a state fit for mercantile adventure, including a master and crew; and (III.) Locatio operis vehendarum mercium, a contract for the carriage of the merchant’s goods in the owner’s ship and by his servants.
Respecting the first of these classes of contracts and the liability thereunder, no difficulty is likely to arise, as the shipowner surrenders to the charterer the possession of the ship with the right to appoint master and crew, and fully control them when appointed, and the charterer alone can be made liable. In the third class of such contracts it is equally plain that the shipowner retains full control over his ship, and that the master and crew are his servants, and he is therefore liable for anything done by them in the performance of the contract of carriage. But it is in the construction of the second class that difficulties have arisen. A ship may be demised with her master and crew so that the charterer has the sole control or ordering of the whole; or she may be demised so that whilst the charterer has the right to order the lading and carrying of cargo and other matters, the general control of the ship, her master and crew, remain in the shipowner; or it may be that the contract, although purporting to demise the ship with her master and crew, appears by its other provisions to be intended only as a contract for the carriage of the charterer’s goods as in Class III.
[237]*237There have been many varying decisions dealing with the construction of such, charter-parties and the liability of owners under the same. In the earlier cases there was a tendency to hold that if there were technical words of demise, this was enough to transfer the possession and control, and consequently the liability to tho charterer; but the later eases have established that the question whether the possession and control is transferred to the charterer must be determined by the intention of the parties as expressed by the wording of the contract as a whole. From the cases it appears to result that if the charterer by the terms of the contract gets the absolute possession and control of the ship, so that in the performance thereof the master and crew are acting as his servants, and not as the servants of the shipowner, the latter is not liable for their acts; but that if the control of the ship or of the master and crew remain, even partly, in the shipowner, the latter will be liable, at any rate, for anything done by them as his servants, or where they act, so that the person injured has the right to assume that they are so acting.”
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“The foregoing cases illustrate what does and what does not amount to locatio navis, or demise of the ship with its furniture and apparel. Between this class of contract and locatio navis et operarum magistri et nauticorum, or demise of the ship in a state fit for mercantile adventure, comes a class which is not wholly within either one or the other, but something between the two; it is the letting of more than a ship, but of something less than a ship in a state fit for mercantile adventure. Such is a charter where the owner provides the ship and crew but allows the charterer to appoint his own master. To find out whether the master is the servant of the owner or of the charterer, or whether he is to a certain extent the servant of both, depends on the variety of circumstances, for which it is necessary to look to the particular charter.”
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“When it is desired to find out whether the owner is the employer of the master and crew, or any of them, the primary questions seem to be, Who pays them? Who appointed them? Who can dismiss them? The last being, perhaps, the most important of the three. A master and crew appointed by the owner, but paid by the charterer, were held to be the owner’s servants, and the owner to be liable fpr their negligence.

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Bluebook (online)
160 F. 235, 1908 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/zabriskie-v-city-of-new-york-nysd-1908.