Z M Golam Dastagir and Tamanna Zaman v. DF1 Investors Borrower LLC

Opinion

In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

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No. 02-26-00481-CV

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Z.M. GOLAM DASTAGIR AND TAMANNA ZAMAN, Appellants V.

DF#1 INVESTORS BORROWER LLC, Appellee

On Appeal from the 442nd District Court Denton County, Texas

Trial Court No. 24-6941-442

Before Womack, Wallach, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants Z.M. Golam Dastagir1 and Tamanna Zaman, appearing pro se, filed a notice of appeal purporting to appeal from a “Final Judgment” signed by the trial court on April 30, 2026.2 In a letter dated August 7, 2026, we notified Dastagir and Zaman of our concern that the appeal is moot because the trial court has granted their motion for new trial and vacated the prior orders dismissing Dastagir’s and Zaman’s underlying suit. See Gomez v. Elizondo, No. 04-02-00661-CV, 2002 WL 31890891, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 31, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.) (dismissing appeal without prejudice as moot after trial court granted motion for new trial). We stated

1 In the Notice of Appeal in the court’s file, the plaintiffs are listed as: “Z.M.

Golam Dastagir, Tamanna Zaman, and Dastagir Children’s Irrevocable Trust” (the Trust). In the trial court, Dastagir proceeded as a plaintiff “individually and as trustee” of the Trust. “Trusts are not legal entities, so the trustees of a trust are the legal representatives of the trust.” Est. of Moncrief, 699 S.W.3d 315, 343 (Tex. App.— Fort Worth 2024, pet. denied) (first citing Ray Malooly Tr. v. Juhl, 186 S.W.3d 568, 570 (Tex. 2006) (holding that suit against a trust must be brought against the trustee in a representative capacity because a trust is not a legal entity); and then citing In re Guetersloh, 326 S.W.3d 737, 739 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, orig. proceeding) (holding that a trust was not a separate legal entity and that non-attorney trustee was not entitled to represent trust pro se because he would be appearing in representative capacity, which would constitute the unauthorized practice of law)). Here, it is unclear if Dastagir, in his capacity as Trustee, is attempting to represent the Trust pro se on appeal. Ultimately, we do not have jurisdiction over the appeal, and therefore we need not further explore the representation of the Trust. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. However, we address the parties separately: the appeal as to Dastagir and Zaman, pro se, and then any potential appeal as to the Trust.

2 We note that no copy of a final judgment signed on April 30, 2026, is included in the record on appeal. However, in light of the subsequently issued “Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Verified Motion for New Trial” on July 29, 2026, the missing final judgment is immaterial to our disposition of the case.

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that this appeal would be dismissed as moot unless we received a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal.

Dastagir and Zaman filed a response,3 but it does not resolve our concern;

thus, we will dismiss this appeal as moot as to the individual claims of Dastagir and Zaman. See Kirkland v. Kirkland, No. 02-22-00469-CV, 2023 WL 3643642, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that if a trial court modifies its order, that modification might moot issues that have been raised on appeal) (citing Ahtna Support & Training Servs., LLC v. Asset Prot. & Sec. Servs., LP, No. 13-19-00196-CV, 2020 WL 1856470, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

The trial court issued an “Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Verified Motion for New Trial” (New Trial Order) on July 29, 2026. It ordered that “all Orders entered in 24- 6941-442 that dismissed . . . Dastagir . . . [and] Zaman, are vacated.” The New Trial Order further reinstated on its docket for further proceedings “all claims asserted by Plaintiffs, including the claims asserted by . . . Dastagir, individually[,] and . . . Zaman.” Because the final judgment that Dastagir and Zaman sought to appeal has been vacated and the new trial is pending, their appeal is moot and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Gomez, 2002 WL 31890891, at *1; see also Morris v. Morris, No. 02-22-00053-CV, 2022 WL 2071965, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Appellants filed an opposed motion for an extension of time to respond and 3

to obtain volunteer appellate counsel to answer this court’s August 7, 2026 letter.

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June 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Appellate courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide moot controversies.”).

Regarding the Trust, also named in the Notice of Appeal, the trial court’s New Trial Order did not reinstate any of the claims asserted by Dastagir as trustee of the Trust, nor did it vacate its previous orders dismissing the Trust. There is no documentation in the record to show that the Trust or Dastagir, in his capacity as trustee of the Trust, were severed from the pending lawsuit.

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments or interlocutory orders authorized by statute. See In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); El-Saleh v. Aldirawi, 606 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020, pet. denied). In determining whether an order is a final judgment, we first examine the language of the order itself. Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827–28 (citing Lehmann v. Har- Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 205–06 (Tex. 2001)); In re M & O Homebuilders, Inc., 516 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding). If the order does not clearly and unequivocally indicate finality, we then look at the record to determine finality. Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827–28; M & O, 516 S.W.3d at 106.

Although no “magic language” renders a judgment final, “a trial court may express its intent to render a final judgment by describing its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and (3) appealable.” Bella Palma, LLC v. Young, 601 S.W.3d 799, 801 (Tex. 2020). Examples of clear and unequivocal finality language include: “This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable,”

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Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206, and “This judgment is final, disposes of all claims and all parties, and is appealable,” Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 825.

Here, we do not have a copy of the Final Judgment to review. However, because there is no evidence that Dastagir in his capacity as trustee for the Trust was severed from the underlying lawsuit, we conclude that there is no final judgment or order in this case that may be appealed as to the Trust. See Wright v. Payne, No. 02-19- 00147-CV, 2019 WL 6003243, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that when separate trials were ordered, the divorce case remained pending, and the parties were not severed, the trial court’s order was not final); see also, e.g., Martinez v. Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 311, 312 (Tex. 1994) (“When the problem is that an otherwise final judgment fails to dispose of all parties, the [trial] court may make the judgment final for purposes of appeal by severing the causes and parties disposed of by the judgment into a different cause.”). Thus, we have no jurisdiction over any possible claims on appeal as to the Trust.

As a result, we dismiss this appeal without prejudice to refiling an appeal in the underlying cause when a final judgment is entered. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f); Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 826; Gomez, 2002 WL 31890891, at *1. We likewise dismiss any pending motions for relief.4

This includes “Appellants’ Emergency Motion for Extension of Time to 4

Respond to Court’s August 7, 2026 Jurisdictional Inquiry and to Obtain Volunteer Appellate Counsel” filed on August 13, 2026.

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/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack

Justice

Delivered: September 3, 2026