Y.Z. v. E.F.
This text of Y.Z. v. E.F. (Y.Z. v. E.F.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1274
Y.Z.
vs.
E.F.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
After obtaining an ex parte harassment prevention order
against her mother-in-law E.F., the plaintiff, Y.Z., sought to
have the order extended for one year. Following a two-party
hearing, however, a District Court judge declined to extend the
order any further.
The daughter-in-law appeals, arguing that the judge
(1) relied too heavily on the mother-in-law's video evidence,
(2) failed to consider the mother-in-law's violation of the
wiretap statute, (3) disregarded the difference between the
daughter-in-law's open evidence collection versus the mother-in-
law's secretive evidence collection, (4) failed to consider the
broader circumstances of the situation, (5) neglected to properly consider the mother-in-law's behavior and intent,
(6) failed to evaluate each of the daughter-in-law's allegations
of harassment directed at her, (7) neglected to properly
consider inconsistencies and contradictions in the mother-in-
law's account of events, (8) failed to consider the mother-in-
law's violation of the ex parte order, and (9) neglected to
consider the welfare of the children. We affirm.
Discussion. To obtain a civil harassment prevention order
under G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (a), a plaintiff must demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed
three or more acts of harassment within the meaning of G. L.
c. 258E, § 1. See Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 36-37
(2016). An act constitutes harassment under G. L. c. 258E, § 1,
when it is "aimed at a specific person"; consists of "willful
and malicious conduct" that is "committed with the intent to
cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property," and
"does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to
property." See F.K. v. S.C., 481 Mass. 325, 332 (2019). We
review a judge's ruling on a request to extend a harassment
prevention order for abuse of discretion or other error of law.
See Wilhelmina W. v. Uri U., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 637 (2023).
Here, the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law both
testified at the hearing. From the evidence presented, the
judge could have found that the parties had been living together
2 in the same household for several years, with the mother-in-law
helping to take care of the daughter-in-law's children. At the
time that the daughter-in-law sought the harassment prevention
order, she was in the middle of a divorce with her husband (the
mother-in-law's son), and they all continued to live together
under one roof. An issue in the divorce was the schooling of
the children; the mother-in-law taught at a school the younger
child was attending, and the daughter-in-law wanted the child to
attend a Chinese charter school.
According to the daughter-in-law, the mother-in-law put her
in fear for her safety and that of her children in the preceding
few months by (1) entering her bedroom unannounced and taking
her sleeping child out of her arms, (2) blocking her from
accessing a closet in the home, preventing her from getting her
child's school bag, and pushing her away, and (3) blocking her
in the driveway, preventing her from taking her daughters away
on a vacation, and threatening to take the children.1 She also
testified that the mother-in-law violated the ex parte order by
speaking with the daughter-in-law's child through the child's
father's phone.
1 In her affidavit, but not in testimony, the daughter-in- law referenced another incident where the mother-in-law destroyed her Chinese New Year themed decoration.
3 According to the mother-in-law, she never entered the
daughter-in-law's bedroom or snatched the child away; rather,
the child's father brought the child to the mother-in-law every
morning so that she could get the child ready for school. The
mother-in-law agreed that there was an incident involving the
child's backpack, which was in a closet of the mother-in-law's
bedroom, but denied that she threatened or assaulted the
daughter-in-law in any way. As to the driveway incident, the
mother-in-law testified that her son had positioned his car at
the end of the driveway because he wanted to speak with the
daughter-in-law before she left, unexpectedly taking one of
their children away. She denied being aggressive with the
daughter-in-law in any way. She also denied violating the ex
parte order, saying that she only spoke with her son on the
phone and not with her grandchildren. Moreover, the mother-in-
law testified to a number of additional incidents of alleged
aggression by the daughter-in-law directed at her.
In short, the judge was presented with conflicting
evidence. He took note of the daughter-in-law's four claimed
incidents of harassment and acknowledged the mother-in-law's
denials. Determining that both parties gave "equally credible
recitations of fact," he found that the daughter-in-law failed
to establish that her version of events was more likely to be
true and that therefore she failed in her burden of proving her
4 allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See F.K., 481
Mass. at 332 n.11 (plaintiff must establish entitlement to
relief by preponderance of evidence).
The judge's resolution of conflicting evidence is not open
to challenge, so long as his findings are supported in the
evidence. See Bayer Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 436 Mass.
302, 306-307 (2002) (resolution of conflicts in evidence and
credibility of witnesses within province of board as fact
finder); Crown v. Kobrick Offshore Fund Ltd., 85 Mass. App. Ct.
214, 226 (2014) (where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous); Commonwealth v. Tanner, 66 Mass. App. Ct.
432, 437 (2006) ("task of assessing the cogency of evidence and
resolving conflicting testimony is the exclusive province of the
fact finder"). See also F.A.P. v. J.E.S., 87 Mass. App. Ct.
595, 601 (2015) (whether or not harassment occurred will be for
judge "who has heard the evidence and can best determine its
credibility" [citation omitted]). Apart from the wiretap
argument,2 the daughter-in-law's claims on appeal all challenge
the weight, rather than the admissibility of the evidence.
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