Yvonne Rough v. Department of Veterans Affairs

CourtMerit Systems Protection Board
DecidedDecember 23, 2024
DocketDE-1221-21-0078-W-1
StatusUnpublished

This text of Yvonne Rough v. Department of Veterans Affairs (Yvonne Rough v. Department of Veterans Affairs) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Merit Systems Protection Board primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Yvonne Rough v. Department of Veterans Affairs, (Miss. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

YVONNE ROUGH, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DE-1221-21-0078-W-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS DATE: December 23, 2024 AFFAIRS, Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Georgia A. Lawrence , Esquire, and Shaun Southworth , Esquire, Atlanta, Georgia, for the appellant.

Jason Halper , Tucson, Arizona, for the appellant.

Karl Lynch , Esquire, Garland, Texas, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner recused himself and did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

FINAL ORDER

The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision in this individual right of action (IRA) appeal, which denied her request for corrective action because the appellant failed to establish that she actually made the disclosure that she alleged. On petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that she failed to prove that she made her purported disclosure. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to VACATE the administrative judge’s finding that the agency established that it would have terminated the appellant during her probationary period despite her purported protected disclosure, we AFFIRM the initial decision. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to show by preponderant evidence that she made a protected disclosure. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 26, Initial Decision (ID) at 8-16. The administrative judge also found that the appellant failed to show that her purported disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to terminate her during her probationary period. 2

2 To the extent that the administrative judge considered the appellant’s motivation in making a purported disclosure and discounted her testimony because of its self-serving 3

ID at 16-19. We agree with the administrative judge, and the appellant’s arguments on review provide no reason to disturb the initial decision. However, despite the appellant’s failure to establish a prima face case of retaliation, the administrative judge proceeded to make findings on whether the agency had proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated the appellant in the absence of her alleged protected activity. ID at 19-28. An administrative judge only reaches the agency’s burden to prove that it would have taken the same action absent the appellant’s protected activity after the appellant has met her burden to establish a prima facie case. See Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 28 (2016). Given her correct finding that the appellant failed to prove her prima facie case, it was inappropriate for the administrative judge to determine whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same action absent the appellant’s alleged whistleblowing. See Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014) (stating that the Board may not proceed to the clear and convincing evidence test unless it has first determined that the appellant established his prima facie case), aff’d, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015), disagreed with on other grounds by Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 880 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, we vacate the administrative judge’s findings that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would still have terminated the appellant absent her alleged whistleblowing.

nature, doing so was error. ID at 11. An employee’s motivation for making a disclosure does not render that disclosure unprotected. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(1)(C). Moreover, the Board has observed that most testimony by an appellant can be described as self-serving, but that is not a basis to discredit the testimony. Thompson v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 372, ¶ 25 (2015). We have carefully considered the record evidence and find that it supports the administrative judge’s conclusion even in the absence of the finding regarding the appellant’s motivation and the self-serving nature of her testimony. 4

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 3 The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum. Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you should contact that forum for more information.

(1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

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Related

Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Bd.
582 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Adam Delgado v. Merit Systems Protection Board
880 F.3d 913 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)

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Yvonne Rough v. Department of Veterans Affairs, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yvonne-rough-v-department-of-veterans-affairs-mspb-2024.