Yvette Fortier Bline v. Matthew D. Rogers, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 7, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02318
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YVETTE FORTIER BLINE, No. 2:25-cv-02318-JAM-JDP 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 14 MATTHEW D. ROGERS, et al., MOTION TO DISMISS 15 Defendants. 16 17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of 18 Tehama, Matt Rogers, Dave Kain, Jeff Garrett, and Eric Clay’s 19 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Yvette Bline’s Complaint. ECF No. 9- 20 1, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mot.”). 21 Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 13 22 “Opp’n”)), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 15 (“Reply”)). 23 For the reasons detailed below, Defendants’ Motion to 24 Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.1 Defendants’ 25 unopposed Request for Judicial Notice is also granted. See ECF 26 Nos. 9-2, 14. 27 1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 28 oral argument. See ECF No. 18; E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). 1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff’s claims stem from her employment with the Tehama 3 County Sheriff’s Office, and a workers’ compensation claim she 4 made while serving as a Correctional Officer at the Tehama County 5 Jail. See Mot.; Opp’n; ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 3, 16, 44. 6 Plaintiff alleges that because the costs associated with her 7 workers’ compensation claim “were escalating,” and had exceeded 8 “a half a million dollars,” the named “Defendants[] decided to 9 form a scheme to falsely accuse Plaintiff of Insurance Fraud to 10 retaliate against her for exercising her statutory right to . . . 11 Workers’ Compensation benefits [].” Compl. ¶ 44. This included 12 the elected district attorney, Matt Rogers, a district attorney 13 investigator, Eric Clay, the elected sheriff, Dave Kain, and his 14 undersheriff, Jeff Garrett, conspiring to fabricate evidence and 15 conduct an unlawful investigation that culminated in Plaintiff’s 16 arrest, criminal charges being filed, and false statements being 17 made to the press about Plaintiff’s criminal case, despite 18 knowing “that [Plaintiff] was innocent.” E.g., id. ¶¶ 4-8, 51. 19 The felony charged against Plaintiff, however, was dismissed by a 20 judge following a preliminary hearing. See Compl. ¶¶ 104-107, 21 115. At that same hearing, the judge made a factual innocence 22 finding. Id. 23 Plaintiff’s complaint includes eight causes of action. The 24 caption of Plaintiff’s complaint lists six claims, but in the 25 body of the complaint, Plaintiff brings eight causes of action, 26 with two, separate third causes of action; those are: 27 (1) “Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights” (42 U.S.C. § 1983), 28 against all defendants; (2) Deprivation of due process, liberty 1 and property interests “by Subjecting Plaintiff to Criminal 2 Charges Based on Deliberately False Fabricated Evidence” (42 3 U.S.C. § 1983), against all defendants; (3) Unreasonable seizure 4 (42 U.S.C. § 1983), against all defendants; (3) Malicious 5 prosecution (42 U.S.C. § 1983, captioned as another, separate 6 “Third Claim for Relief” in the Complaint), against all defendant 7 except defendant Rogers; (4) “False Statements to the Media” (42 8 U.S.C. § 1983), against defendants Kain, Rogers, and Tehama 9 County; (5) “Section 1983 Claim Against Local Governing Body 10 Defendants Based on Acts of Final Policymakers,” against 11 defendant Tehama County; (6) “Section 1983 Claim Against Local 12 Governing Body Defendants Based on Ratification,” against 13 defendants Rogers and Kain; and (7) a section 1983 claim for 14 Plaintiff’s “right to be Free from Governmental Action Taken to 15 Retaliate Against Plaintiff for Her Exercise of Her First 16 Amendment Right to Workers Compensation Benefits . . . ,” against 17 all defendants. Defendants’ motion targets the first, second, 18 fourth, seventh, and both of the third causes of action. 19 II. OPINION 20 A. Legal Standard 21 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a 22 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 23 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted 24 only if “the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or 25 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 26 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th 27 Cir. 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true 28 and “construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the 1 nonmoving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 2 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Everest & Jennings, Inc. 3 v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994)). 4 That said, if the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give 5 rise to an entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted. 6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 7 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement 8 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations.” 10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations 11 omitted). However, this rule demands more than unadorned 12 accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at 13 least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, 14 conclusory or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements” do not 15 alone suffice. Id. (internal quotations and citations removed). 16 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 17 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 18 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 19 alleged.” Id. 20 In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide 21 whether to grant leave to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Leave 22 to amend should be given freely where there is no “undue delay, 23 bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . 24 undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of 25 the amendment, [or] futility of amendment . . . .” Foman v. 26 Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, 27 Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Dismissal without 28 leave to amend is proper only if “‘the complaint could not be 1 saved by any amendment.’” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest 2 Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re 3 Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005)). 4 B. Analysis 5 Starting with Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, 6 Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition to Defendants’ 7 request for the Court to consider the criminal complaint filed 8 in Tehama County against Plaintiff. ECF No. 9-2, 14. Since 9 “court filings and other matters of public record” may be 10 judicially noticed, the Defendants’ request is granted. See 11 Fed. R. Evid. 201; Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 12 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burbank–Glendale– 13 Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th 14 Cir.1998)). 15 Turning to Defendants’ motion, the Court addresses each of 16 the Defendants’ arguments in the order presented in their 17 briefs, below, before addressing Plaintiff’s failure to comply 18 with the Court’s Order regarding page limits. 19 1. First Cause of Action: Conspiracy 20 Relying almost exclusively on Eleventh Circuit precedent, 21 Defendants allege Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is barred by the 22 intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, since “[d]efendants were all 23 agents of [Tehama] County” and are therefore “legally incapable 24 of colluding among themselves.” Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff opposes 25 Defendants’ motion, arguing Defendants’ authority is inapposite 26 since it generally analyzes 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims and is not 27 from the Ninth Circuit. Opp’n at 6-9. 28 Defendants’ arguments are based on an oversimplification of 1 the intra- or intercorporate conspiracy doctrine, and the 2 precedent cited by Defendants does not support its application 3 at the motion to dismiss stage, especially within the Ninth 4 Circuit. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240 (11th 5 Cir. 2010) is the primary case on which Defendants rely. In 6 Grider, the court applies the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine 7 as part of its analysis regarding the application of qualified 8 immunity at the summary judgment stage. 618 F.3d at 1259-63 9 (reviewing the district court’s denial of qualified immunity 10 based on the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim). The 11 Grider court cites and analyzes other precedent, none of which 12 apply the doctrine at a motion to dismiss stage outside of the 13 qualified immunity context. Id. at 1261 (citing, e.g., 14 Dickerson v. Alachua Cnty. Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 2000) 15 (appeal following a jury verdict, where the intracorporate 16 doctrine was raised at summary judgment and post-verdict stages 17 of the case); Chambliss v. Foote, 562 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1977) 18 (slip opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment)). 19 Although Defendants cite Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th 20 1058 (9th Cir. 2022), which appears to briefly discuss and apply 21 the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, it relies on Nevada 22 state law, appears to be an outlier case, is infrequently cited, 23 and other, more recent Ninth Circuit cases do not follow or 24 apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine at the 12(b)(6) 25 stage as a bright-line rule broadly prohibiting any conspiracy 26 claims involving county employees, as Defendants suggest. See 27 Lobato v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, No. 22- 28 16440, 2023 WL 6620306 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 2023) (acknowledging 1 the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine at the 2 summary judgment stage within a qualified immunity analysis); 3 Long v. Weeks, 2024 WL 1672258 (“Appellants are entitled to 4 qualified immunity on the conspiracy claim because it is not 5 clearly established that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine 6 is inapplicable to Section 1983 claims.”). The United States 7 Supreme Court also acknowledged the split of authority across 8 the county regarding the application on the intracorporate 9 conspiracy doctrine as to § 1985 claims. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 10 582 U.S. 120, 154-54 (2017) (including in its string cite “Bowie 11 v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1130–1131 (C.A.D.C.2011) (detailing a 12 longstanding split about whether the intracorporate-conspiracy 13 doctrine applies to civil rights conspiracies)”). Since 14 Defendants have failed to demonstrate “the complaint lacks a 15 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a 16 cognizable legal theory,” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. 17 Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008), their motion to 18 dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action is denied. 19 2. Second and Both Third Causes of Action 20 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and third 21 causes of action, arguing they are barred by absolute 22 prosecutorial immunity and because “independent prosecutorial 23 judgment breaks the chain of causation . . . .” Mot. at 6-11. 24 Though Plaintiff concedes a small portion of Defendants’ acts 25 fall within the absolute immunity doctrine, Plaintiff argues the 26 vast majority of her claims do not and Defendants’ arguments are 27 unavailing as to causation. Opp’n at 9-15. The Court first 28 addresses Defendants’ absolute immunity arguments before turning 1 to causation. 2 The seminal Buckley case guides the Court’s analysis as to 3 the first portion of Defendants’ motion. Buckley v. 4 Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993). In Buckley, the Supreme Court 5 reiterated the parameters of absolute and qualified immunity for 6 prosecutors. “[A] state prosecutor ha[s] absolute immunity for 7 the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, including 8 the presentation of the state’s case at trial,” appearances at 9 probable cause hearings, and acts “‘intimately associated with 10 the judicial phase of the criminal process,’” which also 11 encompass “‘actions preliminary to the initiation of a 12 prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.’” 509 U.S. at 13 269-274 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). As 14 to Plaintiff’s claims related to: (1)the preparation and filing 15 of the criminal complaint; (2)the resulting prosecution and 16 detention of Plaintiff; (3)eliciting or presenting false 17 testimony or evidence at the preliminary hearing; and (4)a 18 failure to disclose exculpatory evidence post-charging, 19 Defendants are shielded by absolute immunity. Id.; see also 20 Friedman v. Younger, 282 F.Supp. 710, 714-16 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 21 1968) (discussing the extension to conspiracies). Since the 22 application of absolute immunity in this context is clear, 23 Defendants’ motion is granted with prejudice as to these four 24 specific acts. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 25 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007); Opp’n at pg. 10-11 26 (“Unfortunately, Rogers enjoys absolute immunity for [] charging 27 Plaintiff . . . .”). 28 Prosecutors and other public officials, however, are only 1 entitled to qualified immunity for a number of other acts. 2 These include “[a] prosecutor's administrative duties and those 3 investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s 4 preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial 5 proceedings,” giving legal advice to police, and statements to 6 the media. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269-279 (“A prosecutor may not 7 shield his investigative work with the aegis of absolute 8 immunity merely because, after a suspect is eventually arrested, 9 indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively described 10 as “preparation” for a possible trial; every prosecutor might 11 then shield himself from liability for any constitutional wrong 12 against innocent citizens by ensuring that they go to trial. 13 When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same, 14 as they were here, the immunity that protects them is also the 15 same.”) (citing, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) and 16 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, n.33). Although Defendants attempt 17 to couch Rogers’ legal advice during the investigation and 18 statements to the media as either within his advocacy function, 19 or as generally insufficient to state a claim, it is clear these 20 types of acts are not protected by absolute immunity and can 21 substantiate the causes of action presented by Plaintiff. Id.; 22 see also Caldwell v. City and County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 23 1105, 1112-18 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, as to any claims or 24 acts outside of those covered by absolute immunity, Defendants’ 25 motion is denied. 26 Turning to Defendants’ arguments regarding causation, in 27 the Ninth Circuit, “[t]o establish causation, [a plaintiff] must 28 [show] the fabricated evidence was the cause in fact and 1 proximate cause of his injury. [] Like in any proximate cause 2 analysis, an intervening event may break the chain of causation 3 between the allegedly wrongful act and the plaintiff's injury.” 4 Caldwell v. City and County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105, 5 1115 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 6 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal and other citations omitted). 7 Although Defendants rely on Caldwell, their arguments are 8 unavailing since Caldwell supports the denial of their motion. 9 As the Ninth Circuit clarified: “As to what constitutes an 10 injury, a § 1983 plaintiff need not be convicted on the basis of 11 the fabricated evidence to have suffered a deprivation of 12 liberty—being criminally charged is enough.” Caldwell, 889 F.3d 13 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018). And, “[d]eliberately fabricated 14 evidence in a prosecutor's file can rebut any presumption of 15 prosecutorial independence.” Id. at 1116. Since Plaintiff has 16 made allegations in this case that include deliberately 17 fabricated evidence led to her arrest, prosecution, and 18 overnight stay in jail, among other things, Defendants have 19 failed to demonstrate her claims are foreclosed based on a 20 theory of lack of causation; simply because Plaintiff was 21 charged, it does not prohibit the possibility of the 22 deprivations Plaintiff suffered from being linked to the alleged 23 acts occurring before criminal charges were filed. Cf. id. at 24 1112-18. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied 25 on this basis. 26 3. Fourth Cause of Action: False Statements to Media 27 Starting with Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourteenth 28 Amendment, Defendants argue since Plaintiff has failed to 1 demonstrate “not only ‘the utterance of a statement 2 “sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that 3 is capable of being proved false’” but also that the statement 4 caused ‘a deprivation of a legal right or status,’ beyond 5 reputational harm,” this cause of action must be dismissed. 6 Mot. at 12 (quoting Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38 7 (2d Cir. 2001) (other citations omitted)). Plaintiff counters 8 that Defendants’ statements were “slander per se,” and 9 therefore, her allegations withstand Defendants’ motion. See 10 Opp’n at 16-17. 11 “The procedural due process rights of the Fourteenth 12 Amendment apply only when there is a deprivation of a 13 constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.” WMX 14 Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 373 (citing Board of 15 Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). Defamation alone is 16 typically not actionable under section 1983 vis-a-vis the 17 Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (“The Supreme Court made clear in 18 Paul v. Davis, 414 U.S. 693 [] (1976) that reputation alone is 19 not an interest protected by the constitution.”); accord 20 Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004) 21 (“Defamation, however, is an issue of state law, not federal 22 constitutional law, and therefore provides an insufficient basis 23 to maintain a § 1983 action.” (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 24 693, 699-701 (1976)). As Defendants correctly note, when making 25 allegations, like Plaintiff’s here, one must demonstrate a 26 “state right or status was removed or significantly altered.” 27 WMX, 197 F.3d at 373-74; accord Sadallah, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d 28 Cir. 2004) (“The state-imposed burden or alteration of status 1 must be ‘in addition to the stigmatizing statement.’ [] Thus, 2 even where a plaintiff's allegations would be sufficient to 3 demonstrate a government-imposed stigma, such defamation is not, 4 absent more, a deprivation of a liberty or property interest 5 protected by due process.”) (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of Public 6 Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2001) (overruled on 7 other grounds) and citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 8 (1991)); Mot. at 11-13; Reply at 4-5. 9 Plaintiff has failed to make a connection between the 10 alleged “slander per se,” and a constitutionally recognized 11 deprivation actionable under section 1983. Plaintiff’s reliance 12 on Buckley is misplaced, since, as argued by Defendants, the 13 Court focused on the issue of absolute versus qualified 14 immunity, and did not make the findings Plaintiff suggests; 15 Buckley does not support a denial of Defendants’ motion. See 16 Mot. at 11-13; Opp’n at 16-17; Reply at 5 (citing Buckley, 509 17 U.S. 259 (1993) (“Buckley was a prosecutorial immunity case, and 18 did not address whether media statements alone can state a valid 19 basis for Constitutional liability.”)). Plaintiff’s claims are 20 insufficiently pled to support her cause of action under section 21 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment for alleged “False Statements 22 to the Media,” since Plaintiff has not pled facts substantiating 23 “a deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or property’ recognized by state 24 or federal law . . . without due process.” Paul v. Davis, 424 25 U.S. 693, 710-711 (1976); see also WMX, 197 F.3d at 373 26 Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth Amendment fail for the 27 same reason. Plaintiff has not “demonstrate[d] that the 28 [D]efendant[s’] conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed 1 injury.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1150 (9th Cir. 2 2020) (noting actual and proximate causation are required 3 showings in a § 1983 action); Mot. at 11. Plaintiff’s argument, 4 that Defendants are liable based on other theories, does not 5 create a stand-alone cause of action. See Opp’n at 15-16. 6 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is dismissed in 7 its entirety, without prejudice. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 8 182 (1962) (leave to amend should be given freely where there is 9 no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 10 movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of 11 allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment 12 . . . .”). 13 4. Seventh Cause of Action: First Amendment 14 Retaliation 15 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action must 16 be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege facts 17 substantiating an essential element of a First Amendment 18 retaliation claim; specifically, Plaintiff has not demonstrated 19 she was petitioning on a matter of public concern. Mot. at 14- 20 15; Reply at 5-6. Plaintiff avers the standard cited by 21 Defendants is incorrect, arguing instead that she “alleged 22 sufficient facts showing Defendants retaliated against her for 23 exercising her right to seek redress through the California 24 Workers’ Compensation system.” Opp’n at 19-20. 25 In order to state “a claim of retaliation for the exercise 26 of constitutionally-protected rights, [a court] must consider: 27 (1) whether the plaintiff was engaged in an activity that is 28 entitled to constitutional protection; (2) whether her exercise 1 of the constitutionally-protected right was a ‘substantial’ or 2 ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant's action; and (3) whether 3 the defendant has established that it would have taken the same 4 action in the absence of the protected conduct.” Rendish v. 5 City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 6 Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1197 (1994)) (other 7 citations omitted). In the Rendish case, cited by Defendants, 8 the Ninth Circuit clarified that “a public employee’s speech 9 must involve a matter of public concern,” in order “to be 10 protected by the First Amendment.” 123 F.3d at 1219 (citing 11 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)). Though “a public 12 employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights . . . by 13 virtue of government employment, [a]t the same time, the State’s 14 interest in regulating the speech of its employees differs 15 significantly from its interest in regulating the speech of its 16 citizenry.” Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 140) (internal 17 quotations and citations omitted). 18 Plaintiff’s reliance on precedent regarding a prisoner’s 19 right to file grievances is misplaced, especially since it 20 involves a discreet and separate application of certain section 21 1983 principles that only apply to inmates. See Opp’n at 19-20; 22 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) 23 (discussing certain rights that are “[o]f fundamental import to 24 prisoners,” and couching its analysis “within the prison context 25 . . . .”). The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are that 26 she was “engaged in her constitutionally protect[ed] right to 27 obtain Workers[’] Compensation benefits,” and Defendants’ 28 actions were aimed to prevent or chill Plaintiff from exercising 1 this claimed right, as well as other county employees. See 2 Compl. ¶ 138. The Court agrees that, as presently alleged, 3 “Plaintiff’s workers compensation claims and benefits pertained 4 solely to her own medical needs and advanced only her private 5 interests, rather than matters of general public concern.” Mot. 6 at 15. Although Plaintiff’s complaint includes language 7 regarding Defendants’ actions having a chilling effect on other 8 County of Tehama employees, it is conclusory and there are no 9 other facts or allegations presented by Plaintiff supporting 10 this assertion; nor has Plaintiff presented any precedent 11 demonstrating her claim involves a matter of public concern. 12 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh 13 claim is granted. However, given the allegation regarding the 14 chilling of other employees, the Court grants Defendants’ motion 15 without prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 16 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 17 5. Page Limit Order 18 The Court’s Order regarding filing requirements delineates 19 a 15-page limit for all memoranda in support of and in 20 opposition to motions, other than motions for summary judgment. 21 ECF No. 7-2. Plaintiff’s Opposition is 20 pages. Accordingly, 22 Plaintiff’s attorneys are ordered to pay monetary sanctions of 23 $250 ($50 per page over the 15 page limit) to the clerk of court 24 no later than April 27, 2026. 25 III. ORDER 26 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART 27 and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss: 28 1. Defendants’ motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s first IEEE NE OS EIR IE EO mR IIE RO IRE III OI ED

1 cause of action; 2 2. Defendants’ motion is granted, with prejudice, as to 3 claims in the second and third causes of action barred by 4 absolute prosecutorial immunity, as detailed above; 5 3. Defendants’ motion as to the second and both third 6 | causes of action is otherwise denied; 7 4. Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s fourth 8 cause of action, without prejudice; and 9 5. Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s seventh 10 cause of action, without prejudice. 11 Counsel for Plaintiffs are ordered to pay $250 to clerk of 12 court no later than April 27, 2026. 13 Lastly, if Plaintiff elects to attempt to amend Counts Two, 14 Four, Seven, and both Counts currently captioned as Count Three, 15 she shall file her amended complaint within twenty days of the 16 date of this Order. Defendants shall file their response to the 17 amended complaint within twenty days thereafter. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: April 7, 2026 20 HN A. MENDEZ. 21 Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 16