Yuri Doering v. Samuel Vasquez

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: February 9, 2024
• Docket: 2:23-cv-09351
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 O 2

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 Case No.: 2:23-cv-09351-MEMF-AS YURI DOERING,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DECLINING TO EXERCISE 13 SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER v. PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS [ECF 14 NO. 10]

15 SAMUEL LOPEZ VASQUEZ D/B/A 16 SAMANTA’S MEAT MARKET; PVK HOLDINGS, LLC; and DOES 1 to 10, 17 Defendants. 18 19

20 Before the Court is the Plaintiff’s Response to Order to Show Cause Re: Supplemental 21 Jurisdiction filed by Plaintiff Yuri Doering. ECF No. 10. For the reasons stated herein, the Court 22 DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Doering’s state law claims and DISMISSES 23 the claims. 24 I. Background 25 A. Factual Background1 26

27 1 The factual allegations included in this section are taken from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. ECF 28 No. 15 (“FAC”). The Court makes no finding on the truth of these allegations and includes them only as 1 Plaintiff Yuri Doering (“Doering”) suffers from a physical disability, and requires a 2 wheelchair while traveling in public. FAC ¶ 1. Defendants are the owners or operators of a hardware 3 store (the “Business”) located at or about 3124 E. Gage Ave., Huntington Park, California. Id. ¶ 2. 4 In or about August 2023, Doering went to the Business. Id. ¶ 10. While attempting to enter 5 the Business, Doering encountered barriers. Id. ¶ 12. The Business does not have a parking space 6 designated for persons with disabilities, nor does it have signage indicating such a space with the 7 International Symbol of Accessibility, signage warning others not to park in the designated space, 8 proper paint on the ground for such a space, or proper van accessibility for such a space. Id. ¶ 13. 9 These issues deny Doering the full and equal access to the Business and deter him from visiting the 10 Business. Id. ¶ 14. 11 B. Procedural History 12 On November 6, 2023, Doering filed a complaint against Defendants and Does 1-10, 13 asserting: (1) a claim for injunctive relief arising out of an alleged violation of the Americans with 14 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.; (2) a claim for damages pursuant to 15 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51–52, et seq.; (3) a claim for 16 damages pursuant to the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54, et seq.; (4) a claim 17 for damages and injunctive relief based on California Health and Safety Code § 19955, et seq.; and 18 (5) a claim for damages for negligence. See generally Compl. 19 On November 20, 2023, the Court ordered Doering to show cause as to why the Court should 20 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. ECF No. 9 (“OSC”). Doering filed a 21 response on December 4, 2023. Response, ECF No. 10 (“Response” or “Resp.”). 22 On January 2, 2024, Doering dismissed defendant PVK Holdings, LLC from the case, and 23 filed an amended complaint reflecting this dismissal. ECF Nos. 14, 15. 24 II. Applicable Law 25 A. Supplemental Jurisdiction 26 42 U.S.C. § 1367 “reflects the understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise 27 supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every 28 stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” City of 1 Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting Carnegie- 2 Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). A district court has supplemental jurisdiction 3 over “all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 4 they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 5 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, district courts have the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental 6 jurisdiction if: 7 (1) The claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law; (2) The claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the district 8 court has original jurisdiction; (3) The district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 9 jurisdiction; or (4) In exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 10 declining jurisdiction. 11 Id. § 1367(c). A district court declining supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the section 12 1367(c)(4)’s “exceptional circumstances” provision must satisfy a two-part inquiry: (1) the “district 13 court must articulate why the circumstances of the case are exceptional within the meaning of § 14 1367(c)(4)”; and (2) “in determining whether there are compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction 15 . . . the court should consider what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and 16 comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 17 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 18 2021) (describing the inquiry)). 19 B. The ADA and Unruh Act 20 The ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment 21 of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 22 accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public 23 accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Only injunctive relief is available under the ADA. See 24 Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002). 25 The Unruh Act entitles all people within California, regardless of their disability “to the full 26 and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business 27 establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). Under the Unruh Act, a violation 28 1 of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the Unruh Act. See id. § 51(f). And although the Unruh 2 Act also permits injunctive relief, unlike the ADA, it also allows for recovery of monetary damages. 3 It entitles plaintiffs to actual damages for each offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount 4 of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars.” Id. § 52(a). “The litigant need not 5 prove she suffered actual damages to recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000.” Molski 6 v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 731 (9th Cir. 2007). 7 Under the Unruh Act, all persons in California, “no matter what their . . . disability . . . are 8 entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 9 business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). The Unruh Act and the 10 ADA go hand-in-hand—a violation of the ADA is automatically a violation of the Unruh Act. Vo, 49 11 F.4th at 1169 (citing Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1204). However, unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows for 12 recovery of monetary damages for every offense “up to a maximum of three times the amount of 13 actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars ($4,000).” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). 14 Further, California law sets forth a heightened pleading standard for lawsuits brought under 15 the Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.55(a)(2) & (3). The stricter pleading standard 16 requires certain plaintiffs bringing construction-access claims like the one in the instant case to file a 17 verified complaint alleging specific facts concerning the plaintiff’s claim, including the specific 18 barriers encountered or how the plaintiff was deterred and each date on which the plaintiff 19 encountered each barrier or was deterred. See id. § 425.50(a). A “high-frequency litigant fee” of 20 $1,000 is also imposed on certain plaintiffs and law firms bringing these claims. See Cal. Gov’t 21 Code § 70616.5. A “high-frequency litigant” is “a plaintiff who has filed 10 or more complaints 22 alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period immediately 23 preceding the filing of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation” 24 and “an attorney who has represented as attorney of record 10 or more high-frequency litigant 25 plaintiffs in actions that were resolved within the 12-month period immediately preceding the filing 26 of the current complaint alleging a construction-related accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 27 §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). High frequency litigants are also required to state: (1) whether the complaint 28 is filed by, or on behalf of, a high-frequency litigant; (2) in the case of a high-frequency litigant who 1 is a plaintiff, the number of complaints alleging construction-related accessibility claim filed by the 2 high-frequency litigant during the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint; (3) the reason the 3 individual was in the geographic area of the defendant’s business; and (4) the reason why the 4 individual desired to access the defendant’s business.” See id. § 425.50(a)(4)(A). 5 III. Discussion 6 In the Order to Show Cause, the Court ordered Doering to show cause in writing why the 7 Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim, California Disabled 8 Persons Act claim, California Health and Safety Code claim, and negligence claim. OSC at 3; see 28 9 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Further, the Court ordered Doering to identify the amount of statutory damages he 10 seeks to recover and provide all facts necessary for the Court to determine if Doering and Doering’s 11 counsel satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency litigants” as provided by California Code of Civil 12 Procedure §§ 425.55(b)(1) & (2). OSC at 3. The Court finds Doering’s state law claims unsuitable 13 for supplemental jurisdiction within the meaning of section 1367(c)(4). 14 A. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 15 claims. 16 In the OSC, the Court ordered Doering to “identify the amount of statutory damages” sought 17 under the Unruh Act and include declarations “providing all facts necessary” for the Court to 18 determine whether Doering and Doering’s counsel satisfy the definition of a “high-frequency 19 litigant” as provided by California Code of Civil Procedure sections 425.55(b)(1) & (2). OSC at 2. 20 i. Doering qualifies as a high frequency litigant. 21 In the response to the Court’s OSC, Doering admits that he has filed more than ten 22 complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility violation within the 12-month period 23 immediately preceding the instant complaint. Declaration of Plaintiff in Support of Plaintiff’s OSC 24 Response re: Supplemental Jurisdiction, ECF No. 10-2 (“Pl. Decl.”), ¶ 2. Correspondingly, 25 Doering’s counsel conceded that their law firm “likely” qualifies as a high-frequency litigant but 26 failed to provide any facts from which the Court could determine whether Doering’s counsel 27 satisfies the definition of a high-frequency litigant under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code section 425.55(b)(2). 28 1 Declaration of Jason J. Kim in Support of Plaintiff’s OSC Response re: Supplemental Jurisdiction, 2 ECF No. 10-1 (“Kim Decl.”), ¶ 2. 3 Therefore, in state court, Doering would not only be obligated to pay the $1,000 high- 4 frequency litigant fee but would also be required to meet the heightened pleading standard and allege 5 specific facts relating to his claim. Although Doering alleges that he “is deterred from visiting the 6 Business,” he has not set forth the allegations required by the heightened pleading standard— 7 namely, he fails to disclose in his Complaint that the Complaint was filed by or on behalf of a high- 8 frequency litigant, state the number of construction-related accessibility complaints he filed within 9 the 12 months prior to filing the instant complaint, or explain why he was in the geographic area of 10 the Business. See Compl. 11 The California legislature has determined that requiring Doering and other high frequency 12 litigants to meet this heightened pleading standard would serve California’s interest in preventing 13 continued abuse of the Unruh Act by high-frequency litigants. Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206–07. It is 14 therefore appropriate in view of the Gibbs values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness to 15 litigants, and comity to decline supplemental jurisdiction so that Doering may comply with the 16 requirements and California’s interest in curtailing abuse can be vindicated. See United Mine 17 Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966). 18 ii. Doering’s state law claims predominate over the federal ADA claim. 19 Doering asserts five claims: one federal law claim and four state law claims. See generally 20 Compl. Of these four claims, Doering seeks damages and injunctive relief in connection with his 21 state law claims and, as prescribed by statute, only seeks an injunction in connection with his ADA 22 claim. See id. 23 A district court may dismiss state law claims without prejudice if a state law claim 24 “substantially predominates” over a federal claim “in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised 25 or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27. Indeed, the Unruh 26 Act entitles plaintiffs to a minimum award of $4,000 for each violation of the Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 27 52(a). 28 1 The Court finds that Doering’s state law claims predominate over the federal law ADA 2 claim. Doering seeks “all appropriate damages, including but not limited to statutory damages, 3 general damages and treble damages in amounts, according to proof,” and as such, any potential 4 monetary damages awarded predominate over the injunctive relief sought on the ADA claim. 5 Compl. at Prayer. 6 iii. Given the comity concerns expressed by the Ninth Circuit, exceptional 7 circumstances exist to justify declining exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 8 In the Ninth Circuit, to qualify as “exceptional circumstances” under section 1367(c)(4), the 9 circumstances at hand “should be ‘quite unusual’ and should not rest ‘solely’ on routinely occurring 10 conditions such as ‘docket congestion.’” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211 (quoting Ex. Software N. Am., Inc. 11 v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 24 F.3d 1545, 1558, 1560 n.15 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Ninth 12 Circuit has held that in the context of joint ADA-Unruh Act claims, the specific legislative apparatus 13 surrounding the Unruh Act and the ADA meets the “exceptional circumstances” threshold. Vo, 49 14 F.4th at 1170 (citing Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1213). Specifically, the California Legislature created the 15 Unruh Act to give plaintiffs seeking an injunction under the ADA the additional option of pursuing 16 monetary damages. Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1211–12. The Unruh Act “relies dispositively on the ADA’s 17 substantive rules [and] expands the remedies available in a private action” to include monetary 18 damages. Id. at 1211. The California legislature became concerned that “high-frequency litigants 19 may be using the statute to obtain monetary relief for themselves without accompanying adjustments 20 to locations to assure accessibility to others.” Id. But rather than adjust the language of the statute, 21 the California Legislature opted to impose filing restrictions on potential litigants, making it “very 22 unattractive” for litigants seeking monetary relief to file joint ADA-Unruh Act claims in state court.” 23 Id. at 1211–12. However, as these restrictions do not apply in federal court, they have been rendered 24 “largely toothless,” causing a “wholesale shifting of Unruh Act/ADA cases into the U.S. District 25 Court for the Central District of California.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit concluded, because this evasion 26 of the Legislature’s limitations would both be unfair to defendants and constitute “an affront to the 27 comity between federal and state courts,” it rises to the level of “exceptional circumstances” under 28 1 section 1367(c)(4). Vo, 49 F.4th at 1171. Doering asserts that “there is nothing unique in the state 2 court procedures that are not replicated in some fashion in the federal system,” Response at 10, but 3 the Ninth Circuit considered both systems and determined otherwise. See Vo, 49 F.4th at 1170-1171. 4 Here, the circumstances in this case meet the “exceptional” threshold. As previously 5 discussed, Doering and/or his counsel qualify as high-frequency litigants. Further, given the “unique 6 configuration of laws in this area” that have given rise to concerns regarding fairness and the comity 7 between federal and state courts, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Doering’s Unruh Act 8 claim results in the evasion of the California state legislature’s filing restrictions. Id. 9 Moreover, as discussed above, Doering’s four state law claims predominate over the single 10 federal law claim. Thus, extending supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act would run afoul of 11 principles of federal-state comity. 12 iv. As this case is in its nascent stages, there are compelling reasons for declining 13 supplemental jurisdiction. 14 Given that the first prong is satisfied, this Court must proceed to the second prong and 15 consider “what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which 16 underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.” Id. at 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 17 Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1210). 18 This case is still in its early stages—the initial complaint was filed on November 6. 2023, and 19 the Defendants have not yet appeared. See Compl. Accordingly, Vo does not dictate that the Court 20 retain jurisdiction. Compare Vo, 49 F4th at 1172 (concluding that because “[t]he district court here 21 declined supplemental jurisdiction over Vo’s Unruh Act claim well before it ruled on the merits of 22 the ADA claim,” there is “no reason to hold that the district court abused its discretion in 23 determining there were compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim”), with 24 Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1215–16 (“If the district court had declined supplemental jurisdiction over 25 Arroyo’s Unruh Act claim at the outset of the litigation, it might then still have been possible to 26 further California’s interest in cabining Unruh Act damages claims through the imposition of 27 heightened pleading requirements and a substantial up-front filing fee.”). 28 1 Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Doering’s 2 || state law claims. The Court therefore DISMISSES the Unruh Act claim, California Disabled Persons 3 | Act claim, the California Health and Safety Code, and the negligence claim WITHOUT 4 | PREJUDICE. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. , f= Dated: February 8, 2024 eee 9 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 10 United States District Judge 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28