Yuli Velarde-Flores v. Matthew Whitaker
This text of Yuli Velarde-Flores v. Matthew Whitaker (Yuli Velarde-Flores v. Matthew Whitaker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2019 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YULI MARISELA VELARDE-FLORES; et No. 18-15278 al., D.C. No. Petitioners-Appellants, 2:18-cv-00031-DJH-BSB
v. MEMORANDUM* MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting Attorney General; et al.,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 5, 2019** Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, M. SMITH, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
This appeal arises out of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition that seeks
to enjoin the removal of petitioners Yuli Velarde-Flores, Ibeth Corral, and Liliana
Reyes Diaz to Mexico. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). matter jurisdiction, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). We have jurisdiction over this appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
1. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear
any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal orders . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
The statute’s jurisdiction-stripping mandate expressly extends to § 2241 habeas
corpus petitions. Id.
2. Because this petition arises from the government’s decision to execute
valid orders of removal, it facially falls within the statutory jurisdictional bar. The
decision whether to remove aliens subject to valid removal orders who have applied
for U-visas is entirely within the Attorney General’s discretion. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 214.14(c)(1)(ii) (“The filing of a petition for U–1 nonimmigrant status has no
effect on ICE’s authority to execute a final order, although the alien may file a
request for a stay of removal . . . .”); see also Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 485 n.9 (1999) (“Section 1252(g) was directed against a
particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial
discretion.”). The petitioners do not identify any cognizable liberty interest in
remaining in the country while their applications are pending. Cf. Jimenez v.
Nielsen, 334 F. Supp. 3d 370, 384–85 (D. Mass. 2018) (declining to apply § 1252(g)
2 in case involving alien spouses of United States citizens seeking waivers of
inadmissibility under 8 C.F.R. § 212.7).
3. Although placement on a waitlist for a U-visa can entitle an applicant
to deferred action, 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2), Reyes was not on the waitlist when the
district court dismissed this action. We express no opinion as to whether her
subsequent placement on the waitlist provides a basis for an application to the Board
of Immigration Appeals to reopen her removal order.
AFFIRMED.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
Yuli Velarde-Flores v. Matthew Whitaker, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/yuli-velarde-flores-v-matthew-whitaker-ca9-2019.