Yuhua Yang v. Polly Kaiser, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-02205
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 YUHUA YANG, No. 2:25-cv-02205-DAD-AC (HC) 12 Petitioner, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR 14 POLLY KAISER, et al., PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 15 Respondents. 16 17 This matter is before the court on petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction.1 (Doc. 18 No. 4.) On October 8, 2025, respondents filed their opposition brief and on October 15, 2025, 19 petitioner filed his reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 21, 22.) On October 18, 2025, the pending motion 20 was taken under submission pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). (Doc. No. 23.) For the reasons 21 explained below, the court will grant petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction in part. 22 “The proper legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief requires a party to demonstrate 23 ‘that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 24 absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction 25

1 On September 3, 2025, the parties filed a stipulation in which they represented that “Petitioner 26 has already fully briefed these issues in his motion for temporary restraining order and 27 preliminary injunction.” (Doc. No. 17 at 3.) Accordingly, the court refers to petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 4) as his motion for preliminary injunction throughout 28 this order. 1 is in the public interest.’” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 2 Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)); see also Ctr. for Food Safety v. 3 Vilsack, 636 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (“After Winter, ‘plaintiffs must establish that 4 irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.’”) 5 (quoting All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011)). The Ninth 6 Circuit has also held that an “injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates . . . that 7 serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the 8 plaintiff’s favor.” All. for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134–35 (quoting Lands Council v. 9 McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Winter, 555 10 U.S. 7).2 The party seeking the injunction bears the burden of proof as to each of these elements. 11 Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2009); Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. 12 v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A plaintiff must do more than merely allege 13 imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened 14 injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.”). Finally, an injunction is “an 15 extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 16 to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. 17 On August 20, 2025, the court granted petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order 18 in part, enjoining and restraining respondents from “re-detaining petitioner for any purpose, 19 absent exigent circumstances, without providing petitioner notice and a pre-detention hearing 20 before an immigration judge.” (Doc. No. 16 at 19.) “‘The standard for issuing a temporary 21 restraining order is identical to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.’” Rowe v. 22 Naiman, No. 2:14-cv-02498-ODW-SH, 2014 WL 1686521, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2014) 23 (quoting Lockheed Missile & Space Co. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (N.D. 24 Cal. 1995)). “Because the same legal standard applies to temporary restraining orders and

25 2 The Ninth Circuit has found that this “serious question” version of the circuit’s sliding scale approach survives “when applied as part of the four-element Winter test.” All. for the Wild 26 Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134. “That is, ‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of 27 hardships that tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the 28 injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 1135. 1 preliminary injunctions, in issuing the TRO, the court determined that plaintiff” has satisfied the 2 requirements for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Right to Life of Cent. Cal. v. Bonta, 3 614 F. Supp. 3d 729, 734 (E.D. Cal. 2022). 4 In their opposition to petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction, respondents largely 5 reiterate the arguments they advanced in opposing petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining 6 order which have already been considered and rejected by the court. (Doc. No. 21.) Respondents 7 additionally argue that petitioner’s request for release is now moot because he has been released 8 from detention. (Id. at 4.) In his reply, petitioner concedes that his request for release is now 9 moot, but maintains that due process requires a pre-deprivation hearing prior to any re-detention 10 that he may be subject to. (Doc. No. 22 at 2.) Petitioner also continues to request that the court 11 order that he be “provided with constitutionally-compliant procedures prior to any third country 12 removal.” (Id.) However, petitioner has provided no new arguments or evidence addressing the 13 court’s previous finding that the issue of third country removal was not currently before the court 14 in this case. (Doc. No. 16 at 3.) In short, the parties do not advance any materially different 15 arguments regarding either petitioner’s request for an order enjoining re-detention without a pre- 16 deprivation hearing or for an order enjoining his removal to a third country without notice and an 17 opportunity to be heard. 18 Accordingly, the court incorporates the analysis made in its prior order granting 19 petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 16) in its entirety herein and will 20 grant petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction in part. 21 For the reasons above, 22 1. Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 4) is GRANTED in part 23 as follows: 24 a. Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining 25 petitioner for any purpose, absent exigent circumstances, without providing 26 petitioner notice and a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge; 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 b. Petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction enjoining respondents 2 from removing him to a third country without notice and an opportunity to 3 be heard is DENIED without prejudice to a renewed motion for temporary 4 restraining order if the issue of his threatened removal becomes ripe for the 5 court’s consideration; 6 C. Petitioner’s request for release from respondents’ custody has been 7 rendered moot by respondents’ release of petitioner in compliance with this 8 court’s temporary restraining order; 9 2. No bond shall be required to be posted by petitioner pursuant to Rule 65(c) of the 10 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 11 3. This preliminary injunction is effective immediately and shall remain in full force 12 and effect through the date on which judgment, if any, is entered in this case. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. * | Dated: _ October 29, 2025 Da A. 2, ye 15 DALE A. DROZD 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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