Yucob Rylander v. Archer Systems LLC, Brent Coon and Associates
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Opinion
Opinion issued May 22, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00185-CV ——————————— YUCOB RYLANDER, Appellant V. ARCHER SYSTEMS LLC AND BRENT COON & ASSOCIATES, Appellees
On Appeal from the 270th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2025-06681
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Yucob Rylander, filed a notice of appeal attempting to appeal the
trial court’s February 25, 2025 order denying his motion for sanctions. We dismiss
the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because appellant alternatively requests that we consider this appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, we do so in the interest of
judicial efficiency and deny mandamus relief.
Appellate Jurisdiction
Generally, appellate courts have jurisdiction only over appeals from final
judgments unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal. CMH Homes v. Perez,
340 S.W.3d 444, 447–48 (Tex. 2011); see N.Y. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez,
799 S.W.2d 677, 678–79 (Tex. 1990) (“In the absence of a special statute making an
interlocutory order appealable, a judgment must dispose of all issues and parties in
the case . . . to be final and appealable.”).
The February 25, 2025 order denying appellant’s motion for sanctions is
neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order. See Wade v. Bacon
Corp., No. 01-18-00654-CV, 2018 WL 5259809, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] Oct. 23, 2018, no pet.) (dismissing appeal of order denying motion for
sanctions because order was neither final judgment nor appealable interlocutory
order); Gafford v. Bliss-Gafford, No. 04-24-00378-CV, 2024 WL 3954243, at *1
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 28, 2024, no pet.) (same). We thus lack jurisdiction
over this attempted appeal. See Wade, 2018 WL 5259809, at *1; see also In re M.G.,
No. 01–05–00426–CV, 2006 WL 1549754, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
June 8, 2006, no pet.) (“When a party attempts to appeal a non-appealable
2 interlocutory order, appellate courts have no jurisdiction except to declare the
interlocutory nature of the order and to dismiss the appeal.”) (citations omitted).
On April 22, 2025, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that his appeal
was subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction unless he filed a written response
demonstrating that this Court has jurisdiction over his appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.
42.3(a). Appellant filed a response asserting that we have jurisdiction to consider his
appeal because “[s]anctions orders can be appealable before final judgment in
certain circumstances.” None of the cases cited by appellant support this proposition.
Rather, the cases cited by appellant hold that (a) sanctions orders are not appealable
before final judgment, but (b) under certain circumstances where appeal would be
an inadequate remedy, orders imposing sanctions are subject to review before final
judgment by writ of mandamus.1 Appellant fails to cite any authority permitting our
Court to review an interlocutory order denying sanctions on direct appeal, and we
have found none. See Wade, 2018 WL 5259809, at *1; Gafford, 2024 WL 3954243,
at *1.
1 See, e.g., Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929-31 (Tex. 1991) (mandamus relief available to challenge order imposing monetary sanctions payable before final judgment where payment threatens continuation of litigation); TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 919-20 (Tex. 1991) (mandamus relief available to challenge order imposing “death penalty” sanctions having effect of adjudicating dispute but which do not result in rendition of appealable judgment). 3 Alternative Mandamus Petition
In his response, appellant requests that if we conclude that the February 25,
2025 order is not appealable, we alternatively treat his appeal as a petition for writ
of mandamus. “We may . . . exercise our mandamus jurisdiction when a party
specifically requests mandamus treatment of [his] appeal, as in this case.” Silwany
v. JJLJ Operating, LLC, No. 14-24-00403-CV, 2024 WL 3579456, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing CMH Homes,
340 S.W.3d at 454). In the interest of judicial efficiency, we consider the documents
filed in the appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus and deny the petition because
appellant has not established a clear abuse of discretion or no adequate remedy by
appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down
an opinion but is not required to do so.”).
Conclusion
Because the order denying appellant’s motion for sanctions is neither a final
judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, we dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Considering the appeal as a petition
for writ of mandamus, we deny the petition. Any pending motions are denied as
moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Caughey and Johnson.
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