Yu Hin Chan v. Karen May Bacdayan, Kevin C. McClanahan, Carmen A. Pacheco, Dawn Hill-Kearse, Wavny Toussaint, and Remax

• Court: District Court, D. Guam
• Decided: October 20, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-00037
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

7 THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM

8 YU HIN CHAN, CIVIL CASE NO. 25-00037 9 Plaintiff, 10 vs. ORDER 11 KAREN MAY BACDAYAN, KEVIN C. 12 MCCLANAHAN, CARMEN A. PACHECO, DAWN HILL-KEARSE, WAVNY 13 TOUSSAINT, and REMAX,

14 Defendants.

16 This matter is before the court on Plaintiff Yu Hin Chan’s Application to Proceed 17 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (the “Application to Waive Fees”). See ECF No. 2. The 18 Application to Waive Fees is GRANTED but the case is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 19 I. Application to Waive Fees 20 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se, without an attorney, and has requested to 21 proceed without paying the required filing fee. Section 1915(a)(1) permits a court to authorize a 22 person to commence a civil action without prepaying the required filing fee if said person 23 “submits an affidavit [stating] that the person is unable to pay such fees[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 24 1915(a)(1). Under this statute, federal courts can authorize the filing of a lawsuit without 1 prepayment of fees or security by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement 2 setting forth all the person’s assets and demonstrates an inability to pay such costs or give such 3 security. 4 The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Application to Waive Fees, where he reports he has 5 $1,000.00 monthly income but with $1,050.00 monthly expenses and $20.00 in the bank. ECF 6 No. 2 at ¶¶ 2, 4, 6. Plaintiff further claims to owe $114,650.00 in court judgment. Id. at ¶ 8. 7 While it appears that Plaintiff has demonstrated that he does not have the resources to pay the 8 filing fees, this does not end the court’s inquiry. The court must still subject the Complaint to

9 mandatory screening before allowing the case to move forward and issue summons, requiring an 10 answer or responsive pleading. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 11 banc). 12 II. Screening Complaint 13 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court is required to review the complaint and 14 dismiss the case if the court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a 15 claim upon which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 16 immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27 (stating that 17 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss an in forma

18 pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). “A complaint is frivolous within the meaning of § 19 1915(d) if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 20 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992)). 21 When screening a complaint, the court is mindful that allegations of a pro se complaint 22 are held to less stringent standards than the pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 23 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se 24 complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 1 pleadings drafted by lawyers.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Hebbe v. Pliler, 2 627 F.3d 338, 342 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal construction of pro se pleadings is 3 required after Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2007)). However, pro se litigants “should not be 4 treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of record,” Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 5 1364 (9th Cir. 1986); rather, they must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other 6 litigants. Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). 7 The Complaint requires Plaintiff to provide a “short and plain statement of the claim[.]” 8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

9 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 10 The court must engage in a two-step procedure to determine the plausibility of a claim. Id. at 11 678-79. First, the court must weed out the legal conclusions—that is “threadbare recitals of the 12 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements”—in the pleading that 13 are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Id. at 678. Second, the court should presume the 14 remaining factual allegations are true and determine whether the claim is plausible. Id. at 679. A 15 claim is facially plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 16 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing 17 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

18 In the Complaint, Plaintiff wrote a total of four sentences: “(1) “The current owner of the 19 apartment where Plaintiff resides is Re/Max, as the former owner claimed in his sworn 20 affidavit,” (2) “All defendants conspired together and deprived Plaintiff of due process,” (3) 21 “This Court has jurisdiction under the RICO Act[,]” and (4) “Plaintiff demands $1 Billion 22 against all Defendants.” ECF No. 1. From this scant information, the court is unable to determine 23 the cause(s) of action against each defendant. The claim that “[a]ll defendants conspired together 24 and deprived Plaintiff of due process,” without anything more, is conclusory. Plaintiff needs to 1 || state his claim with sufficient facts on as to how each defendant “conspired together” to “deprive 2 || Plaintiff of due process” and under which section of the RICO Act did each defendant violate 3 || (this is based on Plaintiff's statement that the court has jurisdiction under the RICO Act). 4 III. Leave to Amend 5 When dismissing a complaint, a court should normally grant leave to amend “unless it 6 || determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegations of other facts.” Lopez 7 || v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 8 || 719, 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A district court acts within its discretion to deny leave to amend 9 || when amendment would be futile [.]” 10 Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court will allow Plaintiff to file an amended 11 || complaint no later than thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. If Plaintiff fails to file an 12 || amended complaint in compliance with this Order, this action may be dismissed with prejudice 13 |] and without further notice. 14 IV. Conclusion 15 For the reasons stated above, the Application to Waive Fees is GRANTED but the case 16 DISMISSED with leave to amend. 17 SO ORDERED. 18 i Fea WE eer 19 aa. Chief Judge ie ’ & Dated: Oct 20, 2025

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