Youngblood v. State

35 Ark. 35
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedNovember 15, 1879
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 35 Ark. 35 (Youngblood v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Youngblood v. State, 35 Ark. 35 (Ark. 1879).

Opinion

English, C. J.

In November, 1879, Cal Emory and James Youngblood were jointly indicted in the circuit court of Franklin county for murder.

They were charged with murdering Mary E. Taylor, on the seventh of July, 1878, in said county.

The indictment contained seven counts, alleging variously the means of death.

The first count charged that they murdered her by stabbing her with a knife.

The second, by striking, beating, wounding and bruising her with clubs.

The third, by striking, beating, wounding and bruising her with their fists.

The fourth, by striking and beating her with stones.

The fifth, by throwing her into water and drowning her.

The sixth, by stabbing her with knives; and by beating her with their fists; and by beating and wounding her with clubs; and by beating, wounding and bruising her with stones; and by throwing her into water and drowning her.

The seventh, killing and murdering her by some means, instruments and weapons to the grand jurors unknown!

Each count alleged the time and place of the offense, and employed the technical words requisite and usual in an indictment for murder in the first degree.

Both defendants entered a general demurrer to the whole-.indictment, which the court overruled. They elected to-sever. Youngblood was tried on the plea of not guilty. The jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree, and fixed his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for twenty-one years. He filed motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial, which were overruled, and he took a hill of exceptions. He was sentenced upon the verdict, and prayed an appeal, which was allowed by one of the judges of this court.

Appeal: infus?udg°iro u i t

I. At the time appellant was sentenced (the eleventh of December, 1879), fie moved the court to suspend the execution of the iudgment, and allow him sufficient time to obtain a transcript of the record, and submit the same to one of the judges of the supreme court for the allowance of an appeal, etc., which motion the court overruled. At what time the execution issued, does not appear. The clerk’s certificate of authentication to the transcript bears date the seventh of January, 1880, and the appeal was allowed on the twenty-seventh of the same month, before which time, it seems, appellant had been lodged in the penitentiary, and the allowance of the appeal did not operate as a supersedeas.

On the thirtieth of January appellant’s counsel moved this court for an order to remand him to the jail of Franklin county, that he might there remain until his appeal could be heard and determined, as he would have done had the court below suspended the execution until he obtained the allowance of the appeal, and had a certificate thereof sent to the clerk below, etc.

This motion was overruled because there is no law providing for such an order, and no precedent for it.

By statute, if appellant is confined in the penitentiary before the certificate of the allowance of the appeal is delivered to the sheriff, he must remain there during thependency of the appeal. Gantt’s Dig., sec. 2134.

Sec. 2120 Gantt’s Dig. provides that: “Hpon an appeal being prayed, the circuit court shall grant to the defendant a reasonable time for obtaining a transcript of the record, for submitting the transcript to a judge of the supreme court for his allowance of the appeal, for filing the same in the clerk’s office of the supreme court, and obtaining the certificate of appeal.”

2. Verdict: General, on several eount s, good.

"Why the court below did not suspend the execution of the judgment for a sufficient time to e.nable appellant to apply for an appeal and supersedeas, as provided by the statute, does, not appear.

But such an error occurring after the judgment is no ground for its reversal.

II. The demurrer was general to the whole indictment, and, in short, upon the record by consent.

The motion in arrest of judgment was upon two grounds: First — That the indictment does not charge any public offense known to the law; and, second — because the jury, in their verdict, did not state upon which count of the indictment they found defendant guilty.

No particular objection to the indictment is pointed out, and we can see no substantial defect in it; and the jury had the right to render a general verdict. Howard v. The State, 34 Ark., 433; Edmonds v. The State, 84 Ark., 720.

III. In the motion for a new trial are the usual grounds that the verdict was wholly unsupported by the evidence, and was against law and the instructions of the court.

The death, of Mary E. Taylor was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, by the finding and identification of her remains, and there were some indications that her death was caused by violence. The criminal agency of appellant rested upon circumstances, and upon his own statements.

Mary E. Taylor was married at the house of her brother, Starling Dabbs, in Franklin county, some seven years before her death, and went with her husband to Missouri, where, from some canse not appearing, they separated, and she returned, and had been living at her brother’s house for two years before her death.

On Sunday morning about 8 o’clock, July 7,1878, she left the house to go to John George’s, who lived about a mile east, up Mulberry creek, near its bank, and on the same side of the creek on which Dabbs lived. Members of the family testified that she was in good health and spirits, looking unusually well, of sound mind; her front teeth above and below were in her mouth and in an apparently sound condition, and she wore a light brown calico dress and checked sun-bonnet when she left the house on that morning.

Railing to return as soon as she was expected by the family, an uneasiness grew up, the neighbors were alarmed, and a general search was made for her. -

On Saturday, the thirteenth of July, her bonnet was found hanging on a bush, on the bank of the creek, near the water’s edge; and her rings, which she wore when she left the house, were tied to the bonnet-strings. The water in the creek at this place was twelve or fourteen feet deep, and ran slowly. "When she left the house, she went eastward, in the direction of the place where the bonnet was found.

On Monday, July 15th, her body (or its remains) was found in a slough, about three-quarters of a mile west of the house, and about a mile and a quarter from the place where the bonnet was found. The body was in still water about ten inches deep. The place where it was found was wild and unfrequented, no habitation being nearer than three-quarters of a mile. A thicket of underbrush extended across the slough below the body.

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Related

State v. Browning
178 S.W.2d 77 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1944)
Allen v. State
298 S.W. 993 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1927)
Smith v. State
250 S.W. 527 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1923)
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124 S.W. 781 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1910)
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68 L.R.A. 234 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1905)
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70 S.W. 470 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1902)

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Bluebook (online)
35 Ark. 35, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/youngblood-v-state-ark-1879.