Young v. Wheeler

34 F. 98, 1888 U.S. App. LEXIS 2254

• Court: U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Colorado
• Decided: March 16, 1888
• Status: Published

Opinion

Hallett, J.

Suit was brought by Harvey Young against Jerome B. Wheeler to obtain a conveyance of an interest in certain lands. Plaintiff alleges that in the latter part of the year 1882, and the early part of the year 1888, he entered into an agreement with the defendant for a partnership, the object of which was to secure title to lands, and to dispose of such lands. lie states that “your orator is unable to state the exact date of the making of the said agreement of partnership, for the reason that the subject of said partnership agreement was not embodied in any formal partnership agreement in writing, hut was discussed and agreed upon by your orator and the said defendant from time to time during said period, both from and by means of personal conversations held between your orator, and by letters written and interchanged between your orator and the said defendant during said period; but that the terms and conditions of said partnership agreemont were fully settled and agreed upon by and between your orator and the said defendant from and during said interviews and letters as aforesaid.” Prom this statement it appears that the agreement wás formed by a conversation between the parties, and to some extent by letters passing between them. How much of it may be shown in writing, and how much expressed in the acts and words of the parties, without writing, does not appear. After this bill was filed, and Mr. Wheeler, the defendant therein, answered, the Grand River Goal & Coke Company was brought into the case by supplemental bill, as the grantee of Mr. Wheeler of certain lands, the plaintiff seeking the same relief against the company as against Mr. Wheeler. That company has filed a demurrer to the bill, the principal point in which is that the agreement, as stated in the bill, is within the statute of frauds, as not being in writing; and the fact appears to be as contended by the defendant in respect to that matter.

Prom the clause which I have read from the bill it may be that the greater part of the agreement is dependent upon the parol understanding and agreement of the parties, and very little of it can be shown in the letters to which reference is made. If it be taken to be a partnership as alleged by the plaintiff, for buying lands, in which the plaintiff was to have an interest, although the title thereto should be taken in the name of the defendant Wheeler, the agreement would, if shown, tend to establish a trust on the part of Wheeler in respect to these lands for the plaintiff; and that cannot rest in parol under the statute. It is unnecessary to comment upon the statute or upon the point made in the demurrer at any length, because this is a question which is considered in the books, in several cases, and in the text-books. Smith v. Buraham, 3 Sum. 485, is a leading authority upon the question, and fully in point in respect to the agreement here stated.

It is to be observed also that if this was, as alleged by the plaintiff, a partnership for buying and selling lands, that the sale of these lands to the Grand River Coal & Coke Company — the defendant making this demurrer — was apparently within the terms of the agreement; and Mr. Wheeler having authority to make sale of the lands, and having done so to defendant company, the plaintiff would be in no position to demand anything from the company itself. Upon the terms of the agreement, if it be valid, he may claim an accounting from Mr. Wheeler in respect to the proceeds of the land, but for the land itself, if the partnership eon-templated a sale of the lands as well as a purchase of them, he could make no claim upon the vendee.

Upon these grounds the demurrer of this defendant to the bill is sustained.