Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

717 F.3d 224, 2013 WL 2165262, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10189
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedMay 21, 2013
Docket12-1405
StatusPublished
Cited by297 cases

This text of 717 F.3d 224 (Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 2013 WL 2165262, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10189 (1st Cir. 2013).

Opinion

LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.

In an attempt to avert the foreclosure of her home, plaintiff Susan Young sought to modify the terms of her mortgage pursuant to the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), a federal initiative that ineentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible homeowners. When Young’s efforts did not result in a permanent loan modification, she sued defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”) and American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. (“AHMS”), alleging that their conduct during her attempts to modify her mortgage violated Massachusetts law. Defendants moved to dismiss her complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court granted defendants’ motion in its entirety. Young now appeals the judgment.

Young is one of many residential mortgagors who have brought cases against lenders and loan servicers arising out of attempts to modify loans under HAMP. As a result, courts in many jurisdictions, including our own, are grappling with the influx of these cases and the complex legal issues that they raise. Notwithstanding the window that Young’s case provides into the ongoing consequences of the housing market’s rise and fall, our review is confined to the allegations contained in the complaint and the parties’ arguments on appeal. After careful evaluation of Young’s pleading and the parties’ contentions, we affirm the district court’s judgment as to the dismissal of Young’s breach of contract claim under Count II, her claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and her claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. We vacate the dismissal of her breach of contract claim under Count I, her claim under Chapter 93A, and her derivative claim for equitable relief, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

A. Background on the Home Affordable Modification Program

In an effort to mitigate the destabilizing effects of the financial crisis of 2008, Congress enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“EESA”), Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. EESA authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to, inter alia, “implement a plan that seeks to maximize assistance for homeowners and ... encourage the servicers of the underlying mortgages” to minimize foreclosures. Id. § 109; 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a)(1). To effectuate these goals, the Secretary was given the power to “use loan guarantees and credit enhancements to facilitate loan modifications to prevent avoidable foreclosures.” Id. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary created an array of programs designed to identify likely candidates for loan modifications and encourage lenders to renegotiate their mortgages. HAMP is one of these programs.

HAMP urges banks and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible borrowers with the goal of “reducing [their] mortgage payments to sustainable levels, without discharging any of the underlying debt.” Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F.Supp.2d 342, 347 (D.Mass.2011); see generally Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First Year of the Home Ajfordable Modification Program, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 727, 748-53 (2010) (providing background on HAMP’s features). The Secretary, through Fannie Mae, entered into agreements with numerous home loan servicers, including Wells Far *229 go, pursuant to which the servicers “agreed to identify homeowners who were in default or would likely soon be in default on their mortgage payments, and to modify the loans of those eligible under the program.” Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir.2012). The servicers are to conduct an initial evaluation of a particular homeowner’s eligibility for a loan modification using a set of guidelines promulgated by the Treasury Department. Id. If the borrower meets those criteria, “the guidelines direct the servicer to offer that individual a Trial Period Plan (‘TPP’)” as a precursor to obtaining a permanent modification. Markle v. HSBC Mortg. Corp. (USA), 844 F.Supp.2d 172, 177 (D.Mass.2011). If the borrower complies with the TPP’s terms, including making required monthly payments, providing the necessary supporting documentation, and maintaining eligibility, the guidelines state that the servicer should offer the borrower a permanent loan modification. See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 557; see also Markle, 844 F.Supp.2d at 177 (“The standard-form TPP represents to borrowers that they will obtain a permanent modification at the end of the trial period if they comply with the terms of the agreement.”). Loan servicers receive a $1,000 payment for each permanent modification, in addition to other incentives. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 556.

B. Young’s Complaint

We now turn to the facts of Young’s case, drawn from her complaint and various documents incorporated by reference. Young purchased a home in Yarmouth, Massachusetts, on or about September 9, 1997. About nine years later, in September 2006, she obtained a mortgage on the property of about $282,000. Wells Fargo is the current mortgagee, and AHMS acted as servicer for the note. This mortgage provided for an initial interest rate of 7.8%, subject to change on September 1, 2008, and every six months thereafter. 1

In 2008, Young began falling behind on her mortgage payments after her father died and her income was reduced due to the recession. In August 2008, she sent a $2,600 payment to Wells Fargo in an effort to bring her payments up to date. Shortly thereafter, a notice was posted on her door stating that she was late on her mortgage payment, but instructing the homeowner to ignore the notice if she had already made the payments in question. When *230 Young called Wells Fargo on or about August 27, 2008, she was told that while her payment had been received, the bank would not process her check and intended to initiate foreclosure proceedings.

After a week of negotiations, Young agreed to send Wells Fargo a $5,628.42 check, in exchange for which Wells Fargo would fax her a forbearance agreement. Young sent the check, but did not receive a forbearance agreement in response. On September 8, 2008, Young contacted the bank and was told that “there was not an agreement.” After insisting that she had been promised a forbearance agreement, she was referred to a supervisor. This supervisor told Young that the August 2008 check for $2,600 had not been processed, and acknowledged that if this check had been processed, Young would be up to date on her payments. The supervisor also admitted that Wells Fargo was at fault for not processing the check and represented that if Young signed a forbearance agreement, the bank would cease foreclosure proceedings and process both the August and September checks.

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717 F.3d 224, 2013 WL 2165262, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-wells-fargo-bank-na-ca1-2013.