Young v. United States

Court of Claims

Young v. United States

230 Ct. Cl. 901, 1982 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 196, 1982 WL 25266

CourtUnited States Court of Claims

DecidedApril 13, 1982

DocketNo. 720-81C

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 230 Ct. Cl. 901 (Young v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Young v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 901, 1982 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 196, 1982 WL 25266 (cc 1982).

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Opinion

per curiam:

The plaintiff, Roger Young, was a participant in the federal government’s Witness Protection Program, under which the United States agreed to pay and provide protection to persons who assisted the government in the prosecution of criminal cases. He and his wife have filed a petition (which they call a complaint) seeking damages of more than $23 million, based upon the government’s alleged violation of its agreements with the plaintiff, Roger Young, under the program. The plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The defendant has moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs have not stated a claim within the jurisdiction of the court. We agree, and dismiss the suit.

Under the Tort Claims Act only the district courts, and not this court, have jurisdiction over claims under that Act. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1976). Moreover, our general jurisdictional statute, the Tucker Act, limits our jurisdiction to [902]*902"cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. §1491 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Finally, we have held consistently and repeatedly that participants in the Witness Protection Program cannot maintain a suit in this court based upon the government’s alleged breach of agreement to compensate them under that program. This is because the making of payments under the program is discretionary with the government officials operating the program, and no statute creates any enforceable right to payment under the program that is enforceable by suit in this court. McFarland v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 819 (1981); Moon v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 750 (1981); Propst v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 535 (1980); Festa v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 661 (1980); Doe v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 632 (1980).

The defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the petition (complaint) is dismissed.

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per curiam:

The plaintiff, Roger Young, was a participant in the federal government’s Witness Protection Program, under which the United States agreed to pay and provide protection to persons who assisted the government in the prosecution of criminal cases. He and his wife have filed a petition (which they call a complaint) seeking damages of more than $23 million, based upon the government’s alleged violation of its agreements with the plaintiff, Roger Young, under the program. The plaintiffs invoke the jurisdiction of this court under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The defendant has moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs have not stated a claim within the jurisdiction of the court. We agree, and dismiss the suit.

Under the Tort Claims Act only the district courts, and not this court, have jurisdiction over claims under that Act. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (1976). Moreover, our general jurisdictional statute, the Tucker Act, limits our jurisdiction to [902]*902"cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. §1491 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Finally, we have held consistently and repeatedly that participants in the Witness Protection Program cannot maintain a suit in this court based upon the government’s alleged breach of agreement to compensate them under that program. This is because the making of payments under the program is discretionary with the government officials operating the program, and no statute creates any enforceable right to payment under the program that is enforceable by suit in this court. McFarland v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 819 (1981); Moon v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 750 (1981); Propst v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 535 (1980); Festa v. United States, 225 Ct. Cl. 661 (1980); Doe v. United States, 224 Ct. Cl. 632 (1980).

The defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the petition (complaint) is dismissed.

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Bluebook (online)

230 Ct. Cl. 901, 1982 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 196, 1982 WL 25266, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-united-states-cc-1982.

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