Young v. New York City Transit Authority

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Young v. New York City Transit Authority

172 A.D.2d 607, 568 N.Y.S.2d 147, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4612

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedApril 8, 1991

StatusPublished

This text of 172 A.D.2d 607 (Young v. New York City Transit Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Young v. New York City Transit Authority, 172 A.D.2d 607, 568 N.Y.S.2d 147, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4612 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for false arrest, malicious prosecution and battery, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garry, J.), dated June 20, 1989, as denied his motion for leave to amend the bill of particulars.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, we discern no improvident exercise of discretion in the Supreme Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend the bill of particulars to include a claim of damages for permanent psychological injury (see, CPLR 3025 [b]). The motion was made just prior to the retrial on the issue of damages and nearly four years after the original bill of particulars was served. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention and as noted in our prior order (see, Young v New York City Tr. Auth., 143 AD2d 656), neither the original pleadings nor the testimony at the first trial presented the defendant with notice of the claim the plaintiff now seeks to add. Indeed, in the original bill of particulars, the plaintiff affirmatively stated that he suffered no permanent injuries. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to advance any reasonable excuse for his delay in asserting the claim.

We have examined the plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order is affirmed. Bracken, J. P., Kooper, Lawrence, Balletta and O’Brien, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for false arrest, malicious prosecution and battery, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Garry, J.), dated June 20, 1989, as denied his motion for leave to amend the bill of particulars.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

Under the circumstances of this case, we discern no improvident exercise of discretion in the Supreme Court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to amend the bill of particulars to include a claim of damages for permanent psychological injury (see, CPLR 3025 [b]). The motion was made just prior to the retrial on the issue of damages and nearly four years after the original bill of particulars was served. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention and as noted in our prior order (see, Young v New York City Tr. Auth., 143 AD2d 656), neither the original pleadings nor the testimony at the first trial presented the defendant with notice of the claim the plaintiff now seeks to add. Indeed, in the original bill of particulars, the plaintiff affirmatively stated that he suffered no permanent injuries. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to advance any reasonable excuse for his delay in asserting the claim.

We have examined the plaintiff’s remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order is affirmed. Bracken, J. P., Kooper, Lawrence, Balletta and O’Brien, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

172 A.D.2d 607, 568 N.Y.S.2d 147, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4612, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-new-york-city-transit-authority-nyappdiv-1991.

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