Young v. Engelstein

74 A.D.2d 1, 426 N.Y.S.2d 599, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10074

This text of 74 A.D.2d 1 (Young v. Engelstein) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Engelstein, 74 A.D.2d 1, 426 N.Y.S.2d 599, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10074 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).

Opinion

[3]*3OPINION OF THE COURT

Cardamone, J. P.

The issue before us is who is to bear the expense of demolishing a fire-damaged two-story brick building in a blighted area of Syracuse, New York. On October 21, 1978 the unoccupied and uninsured building was extensively damaged by fire. Two days later the respondent City of Syracuse declared that it was an immediate danger to the health, safety and welfare of the public and issued an emergency order for its demolition. Because property taxes had not been paid since 1971, the city sold the property annually at its tax sales. Each year the city has bid the property in on its own behalf and taken a tax sale certificate. But since it has never taken title by deed from the Commissioner of Finance or otherwise, however, the city asserts that responsibility for demolition rests on the estate of the owner. Appellant, Ahleen Engelstein, executrix of the estate of David Engelstein, urges that inasmuch as the statutory period of redemption for the years 1971-1975 had expired at the time this proceeding was instituted, the estate of the decedent should no longer be considered the owner. The appellant argues that since the city is the holder of tax sale certificates on the property for which the statutory period of redemption has expired, the city is, in effect, the owner and should pay the cost of demolition.

This appeal is from an order at Special Term which affirmed an administrative order of the Department of Community Development for the City of Syracuse which directed appellant to demolish the building which is located at 900-904 South Salina Street. The order at Special Term also denied appellant’s motion to join the Syracuse Commissioner of Finance as a necessary party respondent in the proceeding.

The issue to be decided must be analyzed within the framework of the specific provisions of the Syracuse Tax Act (L 1906, ch 75, as amd). Section 22 of that act (as amd by L 1958, ch 641, § 1), states in pertinent part: "If any such tax sale or certificate shall not have been redeemed prior to the expiration of the period of redemption the commissioner of finance, or his successor in office, shall issue to the city of Syracuse a deed or deeds for all of the lands described therein remaining unredeemed, or such commissioner, or his successor in office, shall institute proceedings in the name of the city of Syracuse to foreclose the lien of said taxes upon said real estate pursuant to the provisions of section forty-four of this [4]*4act”. At the root of its affirmance of the administrative order is Special Term’s conclusion that the word "shall” in the above-quoted section of the Syracuse Tax Act is not mandatory but merely directory. We disagree with that interpretation of the statutory language as used in this tax act. It follows, therefore, that we arrive at a conclusion different from that reached at Special Term, i.e., the city, not the estate of the owner, must bear the expense of demolition for this vacant building.

The General City Law provides for charging an owner with the expense of repair or removal of any building. That statute authorizes a city to adopt a local law or ordinance compelling the repair or removal of any building or structure that, from any cause, endangers the health, safety or welfare of the public (General City Law, § 20, subd 35). If the owner refuses to comply with the order of repair or removal, the city may raze the dangerous structure itself and recover the cost of demolition either as an assessment against the land or in a direct action against the owner (Lane v City of Mount Vernon, 38 NY2d 344; City of Buffalo v Dankner, 48 AD2d 572, app dsmd 38 NY2d 826). The City of Syracuse provided a procedure in its housing code whereby the owner of a hazardous building may be ordered to repair or demolish the structure (Housing Code of City of Syracuse, § 27-116). If the owner refuses to comply with the order the city may undertake the repair or demolition and charge the expense so incurred to the "person[s] responsible for such violation” (Housing Code of City of Syracuse, § 27-117). Our construction of the Syracuse Tax Act compels us to conclude that the city is the owner of the premises at 900-904 South Salina Street.

We begin with the observation that the interest created in favor of the holder of a tax sale certificate (here the respondent city) must depend on the particular statute (cf. Mabie v Fuller, 255 NY 194). It is a general rule that the purchaser of property at a tax sale has a right to conveyance which matures upon expiration of the redemption period (see Terrel v Wheeler, 123 NY 76, 84; Matter of Blatnicky v Ciancimino, 1 AD2d 383, 388-389, affd 2 NY2d 943). The same is true of the Syracuse Tax Act. Section 21 of that act directs the city treasurer after property taxes are in arrears for a certain period to "sell such real estate * * * for the payment of such taxes, fees, interest and expenses”. Section 22 directs the commissioner of finance of the city on the day of the sale to [5]*5"commence the sale of said real estate” and to "continue such sale from day to day until the whole thereof shall be sold” (L 1906, ch 75, as amd by L 1958, ch 641, § 1). The commissioner is further directed "to bid in for the city all parcels of real estate at such sale at a rate sufficient to pay the taxes for which the land is to be sold with all accrued interest, additions, charges, fees and expenses”. And section 22 further provides that "[t]he commissioner of finance shall make certificates of sale for all lands so bid in by him for the city describing the lands purchased and specifying the time when a deed therefor can be obtained. Such purchases shall be subject to the same right of redemption as herein provided and if the land so sold shall not be redeemed the commissioner of finance’s deed thereof shall have the same effect and become absolute as herein provided”. Under section 24 the owner of the property may redeem a tax sale certificate "within two years after the last date of such sale”.

A tax sale certificate held by the city which is not redeemed within this period is governed by the quoted provisions of section 22 which provide that if any such tax certificate shall not have been redeemed prior to the expiration of the period of redemption the commissioner of finance "shall” issue to the City of Syracuse a deed for property remaining unredeemed, or "shall” institute foreclosure proceedings. The effect of construing the word "shall” as permissive would be to allow the city to postpone indefinitely the perfection of title in itself when the current titleholder has refused to redeem any of the tax sale certificates and has expressed no willingness to pay future taxes assessed against the property. Language peremptory in form should be given a peremptory meaning unless it is evident from the entire act construed as a whole and from the surrounding circumstances that such language was intended to be construed as directory only (McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes, Construction and Interpretation, § 177, subd c). The plain meaning of the above language is to ensure that the city will act expeditiously upon expiration of the redemption period to take a tax deed and sell the property or to clear title by foreclosure proceedings. The purpose, of course, is to recoup as much of the unpaid taxes as possible and return the property to a tax-producing status on the city’s assessment rolls (24 Opns St Comp, 1968, p 958). The construction that respondent urges that we place on this provision would be inconsistent with this purpose and would

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Related

Canino v. Engelstein
374 N.E.2d 627 (New York Court of Appeals, 1978)
Mtr. of County of Nassau (Gelb-Siegel)
249 N.E.2d 426 (New York Court of Appeals, 1969)
Terrel v. . Wheeler
25 N.E. 329 (New York Court of Appeals, 1890)
Mabie v. Fuller
174 N.E. 450 (New York Court of Appeals, 1931)
Blatnicky v. Ciancimino
142 N.E.2d 211 (New York Court of Appeals, 1957)
Lane v. City of Mount Vernon
342 N.E.2d 571 (New York Court of Appeals, 1976)
Wells v. Wells
345 N.E.2d 588 (New York Court of Appeals, 1975)
Blatnicky v. Ciancimino
1 A.D.2d 383 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1956)
City of Buffalo v. Dankner
48 A.D.2d 572 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
74 A.D.2d 1, 426 N.Y.S.2d 599, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10074, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-engelstein-nyappdiv-1980.