Young v. Desert Villa Partners LP

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedFebruary 21, 2020
Docket4:20-cv-05005
StatusUnknown

This text of Young v. Desert Villa Partners LP (Young v. Desert Villa Partners LP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Desert Villa Partners LP, (E.D. Wash. 2020).

Opinion

1 2

3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

7 JUDITH LEE YOUNG, NO. 4:20-CV-5005-TOR 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 9 v.

10 DESERT VILLA PARTNERS LP, also known as Desert Villa 11 Apartments, JAN ANGERMAN, and INDGO LLT, 12 Defendants. 13

14 BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1). This matter 15 was submitted for consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed 16 the record and files herein, and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, 17 the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice. 18 BACKGROUND 19 This case concerns Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants have violated the 20 Fair Housing Act and other nondiscrimination laws by failing to provide 1 reasonable disability accommodations to Plaintiff in their provision of rental 2 housing. Plaintiff alleges that she has a variety of medical conditions that impact

3 her functioning. ECF No. 1 at 6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, her landlord, 4 have given Plaintiff notice on several occasions that she has violated her 5 apartment’s lease terms by incurring excessive noise complaints, smoking in non-

6 smoking areas, over-watering plants resulting in water damage to multiple 7 apartment units, and encroaching on other tenants’ portions of a shared balcony. 8 ECF No. 1 at 6-8. Plaintiff alleges that she attempted suicide when Defendants 9 threatened to evict Plaintiff. ECF No. 1 at 8. Plaintiff’s factual allegations and

10 legal claims are duplicative of two other cases Plaintiff has filed in this Court. See 11 No. 4:14-cv-5094-TOR; No. 4:19-cv-5226-TOR. 12 DISCUSSION

13 A. Legal Sufficiency Review 14 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the Court is required to 15 screen a complaint filed by a party seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 16 U.S.C. § 1915(e); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)

17 (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to 18 prisoners”). Section 1915(e)(2) provides: 19 Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court 20 determines that (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim 1 on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 2

3 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 4 A claim is legally frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) when it lacks an 5 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 6 (1989), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. §1915(d), as recognized in Lopez v. 7 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a 8 claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or 9 where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.

10 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim 11 upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.”

13 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, “[d]ismissal 14 is proper only if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support 15 of the claim that would entitle him to relief.” Id. “In making this determination, 16 the Court takes as true all allegations of material fact stated in the complaint and

17 construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. Mere legal 18 conclusions, however, “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 19 U.S. at 679. The complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the

20 elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 1 (2007). It must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 2 face.” Id. at 570. The Court construes a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally,

3 affording the plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 4 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotations and citation omitted). 5 Plaintiff’s allegations of disability discrimination are duplicative of the

6 claims currently pending in her other open federal case, No. 4:19-cv-5226-TOR. 7 Here, Plaintiff develops additional factual allegations about the parties’ dispute 8 over Plaintiff smoking on the property, but this claim was already raised in 9 Plaintiff’s other case. See 4:19-cv-5226-TOR, ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 12; ECF No. 1-1

10 at 3. The only legal issue raised in this Complaint not raised in Plaintiff’s other 11 open federal case is Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants have a Brady obligation 12 to present exculpatory evidence in Plaintiff’s favor in the course of this ongoing

13 conflict between the parties. See ECF No. 1 at 10-11 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 14 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Brady imposes a duty on criminal prosecutors to produce 15 exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant; it imposes no obligation on the civil 16 defendants in this case. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Plaintiff’s alleged Brady violation

17 has no arguable basis in law and is legally frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 18 Plaintiff’s other allegations of disability discrimination and violations of the Fair 19 Housing Act are duplicative of the claims currently pending in her other open

20 1 || federal case, No. 4:19-cv-5226-TOR, and are not properly the subject of a second duplicative suit. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 4 1. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous under 5 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 6 2. Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status is REVOKED. 7 The District Court Executive is directed to enter this Order, enter judgment of dismissal with prejudice, forward a copy to counsel of record and Plaintiff, and 9|| CLOSE the file. 10 DATED February 21, 2020. 1 Jn SS eos 4, , Us 12 Ss we LY THOMAS Ok <=> Chief United States District Judge 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

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Related

Brady v. Maryland
373 U.S. 83 (Supreme Court, 1963)
Neitzke v. Williams
490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Raymond Watison v. Mary Carter
668 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Knoxville Outfitting Co. v. Knoxville, Fireproof Storage Co.
22 S.W.2d 354 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1929)

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Young v. Desert Villa Partners LP, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-desert-villa-partners-lp-waed-2020.