Young v. Caramanica

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Young v. Caramanica

302 A.D.2d 519, 755 N.Y.S.2d 263

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 18, 2003

StatusPublished

This text of 302 A.D.2d 519 (Young v. Caramanica) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Young v. Caramanica, 302 A.D.2d 519, 755 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2003).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.), dated March 7, 2002, which denied her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant established her prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by submitting, among other things, affirmations by her examining physicians, which indicated that the [520]*520plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]; Kallicharan v Sooknanan, 282 AD2d 573 [2001]; Santoro v Daniel, 276 AD2d 478 [2000]). However, the plaintiff successfully opposed the motion by raising a triable issue of fact (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Altman, J.P., Smith, Luciano, Adams and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Doyle, J.), dated March 7, 2002, which denied her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendant established her prima facie entitlement to summary judgment by submitting, among other things, affirmations by her examining physicians, which indicated that the [520]*520plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]; Kallicharan v Sooknanan, 282 AD2d 573 [2001]; Santoro v Daniel, 276 AD2d 478 [2000]). However, the plaintiff successfully opposed the motion by raising a triable issue of fact (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Altman, J.P., Smith, Luciano, Adams and Cozier, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

302 A.D.2d 519, 755 N.Y.S.2d 263, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-caramanica-nyappdiv-2003.

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