Young v. Calhoun

656 F. Supp. 970, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2036
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMarch 18, 1987
Docket85 Civ. 7548 (SWK)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 656 F. Supp. 970 (Young v. Calhoun) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Calhoun, 656 F. Supp. 970, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2036 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).

Opinion

KRAM, District Judge.

Plaintiff Jerry Young, who is currently incarcerated at Sullivan Correctional Facility, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the deprivation of his constitutional rights by prison officials and guards. Young alleges, in his own words:

that all the defendants has told all the prison inmates that I am a homosexual and they be telling all the inmates to sodomize me, because they say they *972 don’t like jail house lawyers and every day the defendants be telling other inmates to kill me and that they will pay them. The plaintiff has been attacked and injured as a result of this slander by the defendants. Such deliberate indifference amounts to cruel and unusual punishment and a violation if his 8th and 14th Amendments.

Young seeks $150,000 in punitive damages and $150,000 in compensatory damages for mental and physical suffering.

This case is presently before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argue that a claim of verbal harrassment without more fails to state a cause of action under Section 1983. Defendants also argue that in order to state a claim for failure to protect an inmate from assault by another inmate, a plaintiff must allege unreasonable risk of injury coupled with acts or omissions which evidence deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or well-being.

When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421-22, 89 S.Ct. 1843, 1848-49, 23 L.Ed.2d 404 (1969). The court must also accept reasonable inferences from the facts in plaintiff’s favor. See Murray v. City of Milford, 380 F.2d 468, 470 (2d Cir.1967). Dismissal should not be granted for mere technical defects or ambiguities. See Arfons v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 261 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir.1958); Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319, 322 (2d Cir.1957). The test is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his favor, the complaint states any valid claim for relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see Clay v. Martin, 509 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir.1975); Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1225 (2d Cir.1974). A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim that would entitle him to relief. Dahlberg v. Becker, 748 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1845, 85 L.Ed.2d 144 (1985). In addition, in a case brought by a pro se plaintiff, the Court must construe the complaint broadly, and not hold it to the same standards as a complaint drafted by an attorney.

Applying these principles, the Court disagrees in part with the defendants’ characterization of Young’s complaint. Young seems to be bringing three claims. First, he claims that prison guards are defaming him. Second, he claims that the guards are harrassing him in retaliation for his activities as a “jailhouse lawyer.” Third, Young claims that the harrassment demonstrates deliberate indifference to his safety and physical well-being.

A. Defamation

There is no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for defamation because interest in one’s reputation is not a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-713, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165-66, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); Heller v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.1967). Thus, Young’s claim for defamation must fail and is dismissed.

B. Harrassment

The Constitution requires a state to provide its prisoners with access to the federal courts. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485, 89 S.Ct. 747, 748, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). A state may not prohibit inmates from furnishing legal assistance to other inmates unless it provides a reasonable alternative to assist inmates in filing legal petitions. Id. at 490, 89 S.Ct. at 751. The burden is on the state to prove the existence of such an alternative. Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir.1981); Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir.1971); Vaughn v. Trotter, 516 F.Supp. 886, 891 n. 4 (M.D.Tenn.1980).

*973 The right to receive legal inmate assistance is not limited to the recipients of the assistance. Jailhouse lawyers cannot be prohibited from providing legal assistance to inmates in the absence of alternative forms of legal aid. Byran v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233, 236-237 (3d Cir.1975); Vaughn, 516 F.Supp. at 893; Wetmore v. Fields, 458 F.Supp. 1131, 1143 (W.D.Wisc.1978). They have standing to assert their right to provide assistance. Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir.1978).

As with other constitutional rights, a state may not, in the absence of abuse, punish or intimidate the exercise of the right to provide legal assistance. Adams v. James,

Related

Gallipeau v. Berard
734 F. Supp. 48 (D. Rhode Island, 1990)
South Shore Bank v. International Jet Interiors, Inc.
721 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. New York, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
656 F. Supp. 970, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2036, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-calhoun-nysd-1987.