Young v. Brown

46 S.E.2d 673, 212 S.C. 156, 1948 S.C. LEXIS 35
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedMarch 11, 1948
Docket16058
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 46 S.E.2d 673 (Young v. Brown) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Brown, 46 S.E.2d 673, 212 S.C. 156, 1948 S.C. LEXIS 35 (S.C. 1948).

Opinion

OxnBR, Justice:

This is an appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint. A clear summary of the material allegations of the complaint and the grounds of demurrer will be found in the order appealed from, which will be reported. In appellant’s brief the questions to be determined on this appeal are stated as follows:

“(1) Is a cemetery a nuisance when located in a residential area, merely because it is a reminder of death and thereby inspires, in some neighbors’ minds, ‘gloom and depression,’ even though it may be so located and operated as not to offend any of their physical senses ?
“(2) Is the area involved in the instant case a ‘residential area’ in the same sense as the area involved in the Praser case, as to which a funeral home was enjoined?”

*166 It is apparently conceded that the first question must be answered in the affirmative if we adhere to our decision in Fraser et al v. Fred Parker Funeral Home, 201 S. C. 88, 21 S. E. (2d) 577. Appellant sought and was granted permission to criticize the soundness of the principles adopted by a majority of the Court in the Fraser case and has devoted the major portion of his brief to an interesting and able discussion in favor of the view advanced in the dissenting opinions. After mature consideration, we are still of the opinion that this case was properly decided.

The second question seems not to have been considered or passed upon by the Court below and can hardly be said to be included in the grounds upon which appellant demurred. However, both appellant and respondents have argued this question in their briefs and in connection with it the further question as to whether the homes of respondents are situated so as to be affected by the proposed establishment of this cemetery. As these questions have been argued and will again arise when the case is tried, we may appropriately discuss the general principles to be applied in determining whether the establishment and maintenance of a cemetery should be enjointed as a private nuisance.

It is rather generally held in other jurisdictions that the mere presence of a cemetery, unattended by injurious or offensive drainage or fumes, does not constitute a private nuisance because it might be offensive to the esthetic sense of those residing nearby and render a neighborhood less attractive. In 10 Am. Jur., Cemeteries, Section 16, page 498, it is'stated: “There is a well-established rule that a cemetery is not a nuisance per se. A place of interment, however, may be a nuisance as a matter of fact, depending on its location, extent and manner of use, including mode of burials. A cemetery does not constitute a nuisance merely because it is a constant reminder of death and has a depressing influence on the minds of persons who observe it, or because it tends to depreciate the value of property in the *167 neighborhood, or make the vicinity less attractive and is offensive to the esthetic sense of an adjoining proprietor. On the other hand, where the location or maintenance of a cemetery endangers the public health, either by corrupting the surrounding atmosphere, or the water of wells or springs, it constitutes a nuisance.” Also, see annotations in 31 L. R. A., N.S., page 945, and 87 A.L.R., page 760, where a number of cases are cited in support of the statement that “the mere proximity to the premises of others does not render a cemetery a nuisance, because of their mental disquietude, superinduced by fixed or recurring reminders of death.”

In Monk v. Packard, 71 Me. 309, 36 Am. Rep. 315, the court, in concluding that a private burying ground situated near the plaintiff’s dwelling did not constitute a private nuisance, observed: “A repository of the bodies of the dead is as yet indispensable, and wherever located, it must ex necessitate be in the vicinity of the private property of someone who might prove its market value injuriously affected thereby * * * The human contents of these graves cannot, as they lie buried there, offend the senses in a legal point of view. The memorial stones alone affect the senses, and the same would result to the superstitious, though nothing human lay beneath them.” In Rea v. Tacoma Mausoleum Association, 103 Wash. 429, 174 P. 961, 962, 1 A.L.R. 541, the Court, after an extended review of the authorities, said: “No decision has been called to our attention wherein any court has awarded injunctive relief, rested upon the sole ground of the mere presence of a cemetery or other place of sepulture, unattended by injurious or offensive drainage or fumes, sensible to the complaining party, and our own search leads us to believe that no such decisions have been rendered.”

It is rather interesting to observe that among the courts adhering to the foregoing views and refusing to enjoin the establishment and maintenance of a cemetery on amount of its close proximity to a residence are some that take a dif *168 ferent view as to a funeral home and enjoin its establishment and operation in a strictly residential section. To illustrate: In McGowan et al. v. May, 186 Ga. 79, 196 S. E. 705, the Supreme Court of Georgia sustained an injunction against the threatened establishment of an undertaking business in a residential neighborhood. The same Court, in Harper et al. v. City of Nashville et al., 136 Ga. 141, 70 S. E. 1102, 1103, refused under similar circumstances to enjoin the establishment and location of a cemetery. It was there stated: “Cemeteries are a necessity. A place where the dead may be given decent Christian burial must be established, and the location of such must necessarily be upon some tract of land more or less suitable and commodious; and it is impossible to find a tract of land that is not contiguous to the lands of someone else. And inasmuch as cemeteries must be established, and should be located where they are reasonably accessible, it is rarely possible to so fix their location, when they are designed for the use of a populous town or city, where they will not be in more or less proximity to some residence; and unless the soil of the land used as a cemetery and "that of the contiguous owners is such as to cause a drainage which will produce a contamination of the waters, thereby putting in jeopardy the health or lives of the owners of the contiguous lands and the health of their families, or unless the air would be contaminated, courts of equity will not interfere by the grant of injunctive relief to prevent the establishment and location of the cemetery. Cemeteries are not per se nuisances, and it is only in exceptional cases that their establishment and location would be enjoined by a court of equity.” Also, see Hallman et al. v. Atlanta Child’s Home et al., 161 Ga. 247, 130 S. E. 814, where the Harper case was followed and the foregoing language quoted with approval.

The question of whether the establishment and maintenance of a cemetery in close proximity to a residence may be enjoined as a private nuisance appears to be one of first impression in this State. In City Council of Charleston v. Went *169 worth Street Baptist Church, 4 Strob.

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Bluebook (online)
46 S.E.2d 673, 212 S.C. 156, 1948 S.C. LEXIS 35, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-brown-sc-1948.