Young v. Arizona, State of

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedAugust 17, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-01368
StatusUnknown

This text of Young v. Arizona, State of (Young v. Arizona, State of) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Young v. Arizona, State of, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Brittian Willie Young, et al., No. CV-22-01368-PHX-DJH

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 State of Arizona, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court 16 Without Prepaying Fees or Cost (Doc. 2). Upon review, Plaintiff's Application, signed 17 under penalty of perjury, indicates that Plaintiff is financially unable to pay the filing fee. 18 The Court will grant the Plaintiff’s Application and allow him to proceed in forma pauperis 19 (“IFP”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s 20 Complaint (Doc. 1). 21 I. Legal Standard 22 When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to 23 determine whether the action: 24 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 25 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 26 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting such a review, “[i]t is . . . clear that section 28 1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis, 1 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that 2 fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation 3 omitted). 4 Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require complaints to contain “a 5 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While 6 Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, 7 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 8 (2009).2 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 9 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual 10 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting 11 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when 12 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 13 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 14 556). A complaint that provides “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 15 elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor will a complaint 16 suffice if it presents nothing more than “naked assertions” without “further factual 17 enhancement.” Id. at 557. 18 In addition, the Court must interpret the facts alleged in the complaint in the light 19 most favorable to the plaintiff, while also accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as 20 true. Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). That rule does not apply, 21 §1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.” 22 Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012) 23 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 24 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”) (citation omitted). Therefore, section 1915 applies to this non-prisoner IFP complaint. 25

26 2 “Although the Iqbal Court was addressing pleading standards in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court finds that those standards also apply in the initial screening of 27 a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A since Iqbal discusses the 28 general pleading standards of Rule 8, which apply in all civil actions.” McLemore v. Dennis Dillon Automotive Group, Inc., 2013 WL 97767, at *2 n. 1 (D. Idaho Jan. 8, 2013). 1 however, to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court is mindful that it must 2 “construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.” Jackson v. Barnes, 3 749 F.3d 755, 763–64 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th 4 Cir. 2010)). 5 II. Discussion 6 Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any plausible claim for several reasons. First, it 7 does not state any cause of action with sufficient clarity to put Defendants on notice of 8 what exactly they are being accused of. Second, the Complaint does not explain what each 9 Defendant is alleged to have done. Several of the Defendants are judges and attorneys, but 10 there is no explanation as to why they are named as Defendants in this action. Third, 11 Plaintiff appears to bring this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of an entity called 12 “Open Entry Services.” But Plaintiff, acting pro se, may only represent himself. See 13 Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962). Finally, given that several of the 14 Defendants are judges, Plaintiff makes no showing why the doctrine of judicial immunity 15 does not bar a claim against them. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (“A 16 judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts . . . .”). For these reasons, 17 the Complaint fails to state any plausible claim. 18 III. Leave to Amend 19 In accordance with the well-settled law in this Circuit, because “it is not ‘absolutely 20 clear’ that [Plaintiff] could not cure [the Complaint’s] deficiencies by amendment,” the 21 Court will grant him the opportunity to do so. See Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 767 22 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (en banc) (internal 23 quotation marks and citations omitted) (holding that a pro se litigant must be given leave 24 to amend his complaint “if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect” 25 in the complaint); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (leave to amend should be “freely” given “when 26 justice so requires[]”). 27 Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be amended to address the deficiency identified 28 above. Plaintiff’s amended complaint should follow the form detailed in Rule 7.1 of the 1 Local Rules of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”).

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Related

Stump v. Sparkman
435 U.S. 349 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Jesse J. Calhoun v. Donald N. Stahl James Brazelton
254 F.3d 845 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Michael Lacey v. Joseph Arpaio
693 F.3d 896 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Frederick Jackson v. Michael Barnes
749 F.3d 755 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
McHenry v. Renne
84 F.3d 1172 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Shwarz v. United States
234 F.3d 428 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Young v. Arizona, State of, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/young-v-arizona-state-of-azd-2022.